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This thesis will challenge established accounts of the events leading to Henderson’s 
enforced resignation from the War Cabinet in August 1917. These accounts attribute 
Henderson’s determination to pursue British attendance at an international socialist 
conference in Stockholm to his concerns over the vulnerability of the socialist dominated 
but ‘moderate’ post-tsarist government. They contend that Henderson believed that the 
Russian government would be bolstered by the presence of Allied socialists at the 
conference. It will be argued in this thesis that whilst Henderson himself gave this 
impression, there is little supporting evidence to demonstrate that this was his main 
concern. The thesis will provide a detailed analysis of Henderson’s actions and statements 
during the period and will conclude that the standard account of this episode is not viable. It 
will argue that Henderson was not primarily motivated by events in Russia, but exploited 
them to bring about a change in Labour party policy, directed at engagement with the 
Socialist International in order to secure a peace based on socialist principles. It will be 
argued further that the threat of Bolshevism, not just in Russia, but more widely, has been 
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On the morning of 10 August 1917 Arthur Henderson, Secretary of the British Labour party, 
persuaded a special party conference to vote for attendance at an international socialist 
conference to be held in Stockholm. Later the same day, following angry exchanges with the 
Prime Minister, David Lloyd George, who made clear both his surprise and disapproval over 
this action, Henderson resigned from the War Cabinet. This was a ministerial resignation of 
considerable significance. Henderson was recognised at this time as de facto leader of his 
party, had supported labour participation in the two coalition governments, and had been 
included since December 1916 in Lloyd George’s five man inner core of the War Cabinet. 
The issue over which he resigned was one of high political importance. Should British 
citizens be permitted, as Henderson wished, to attend an international gathering based on 
ideological affinity and including political groups from opposing sides in the war?  
 
It is generally agreed that the roots of this episode lie in the period between 1 June and 16 
July 1917 which Henderson had spent in revolutionary Russia, attempting on behalf of the 
War Cabinet to keep the wavering Russians committed to the war. His critics would 
contend, in the words of Lloyd George, that whilst in Russia Henderson had contracted 
‘more than a touch of the revolutionary malaria.’1 His defenders rejected any such notion, 
arguing instead that Henderson had recognised in Russia that the fragile Provisional 
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 David Lloyd George, War Memoirs, Vol.2 (London, 1938), p.1127; see also the judgement of The Times 
correspondent in Russia, The Times, 31 December 1917, p.5. 
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Government, dominated as it was by ‘moderate’ socialists such as Alexander Kerensky, was 
under continuous threat from ‘extremists’, prominent amongst whom were the Bolsheviks 
led by Vladimir Lenin. He recognised too, claim his supporters, that the Stockholm 
conference, strongly supported by the moderates but opposed by the extremists, would 
provide a valuable boost to the Kerensky government and to its determination to remain 
committed to the wartime alliance with Britain and the other Allied powers. It is this version 
of Henderson’s motivation that has for many decades predominated. 
 
The aim of this thesis is to subject this now well established version of events, which we 
may describe as the standard account, to critical scrutiny. Initially on engaging on this task, 
this appeared essentially to be a matter of tying up loose ends. It was not considered that a 
full reappraisal would be required. The thesis originally envisaged was to cover a wider area 
of Labour foreign policy through the later stages of the war and the early years of the peace. 
The Stockholm affair was expected to be just one of several episodes discussed. Increasingly 
however research into this episode led to the conclusion that fundamental flaws in the 
Russo-centric core of the standard account were sufficient to justify the full reappraisal 
which will now be presented. This is not to say however that what follows will be confined 
to the events of summer 1917. No proper understanding of these events could be achieved 
without seeing them in wider contexts. Nevertheless, since the primary aim of the thesis is 
highlight the weaknesses in the standard account it will be necessary to devote considerable 
space at the heart of this account to a detailed re-examination of the months between May 




Before summarising the difficulties that have undermined the historiography on Henderson 
and the Stockholm affair, reference must be made to the difficulties Henderson has himself 
imposed on historians. Few politicians have been as permanently unrevealing as to the 
often hidden purposes and considerations which inspire particular courses in this 
profession. Henderson’s individual political style has been ably described by his first major 
biographer, Mary Agnes Hamilton.2 ‘At no time was it natural to him,’ she writes, ‘to 
produce his thinking processes for inspection or discussion, until they had reached a point of 
action in his mind.’3 He kept no personal diary nor, as Chris Wrigley wryly observed many 
years later, files of his personal papers, preferring ‘to use the waste-paper basket.’4 To gain 
a full understanding of Henderson’s motivation during the critical Stockholm period has for 
these reasons alone not been easy.  
 
The first and still most expansive account of Henderson’s involvement with the proposed, 
but never convened Stockholm conference is Hamilton’s. This may be taken as the first full 
statement of the standard account. Hamilton has been followed by a number of other 
historians who have reinforced and in some cases expanded the key elements of her 
account. These include two later biographers, Chris Wrigley and F. M. Leventhal, with 
Wrigley having also provided an earlier account of the Stockholm episode.5 Probably the 
most influential addition to the corpus however is J. M. Winter’s frequently cited 1972 
article discussing Henderson’s experience in Russia and its consequences.6 Taken together 
these works may be seen as having both consolidated and updated Hamilton’s account. 
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 An insubstantial earlier biography by Edwin A. Jenkins, see Bibliography, has been of little value to historians. 
3
 Mary Agnes Hamilton, Arthur Henderson: A Biography (London, 1938), p.130. 
4
 Chris Wrigley, Arthur Henderson (Cardiff, 1990), p.204. 
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 F. M. Leventhal, Arthur Henderson (Manchester, 1989); Chris Wrigley, David Lloyd George and the British 
Labour Movement: Peace and War (Brighton, 1976), pp:205-217. 
6
 J. M. Winter, ‘Arthur Henderson, the Russian Revolution, and the Reconstruction of the Labour Party’, 
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Since little has been added to the discussion on Henderson’s involvement with Stockholm 
since 1990, when Wrigley’s biography was published, we may see Hamilton and the 
historians referred to above as the joint bearers of a firmly established orthodoxy on the 
subject. But one twenty first century historian should perhaps be added to our list, not for 
having challenged any fundamental tenets of the standard account, but for having at least 
modified some of the judgements of his twentieth century precursors.7  
 
These several studies will constitute the main reference points for the standard account and 
will be utilised for this purpose throughout the thesis. Given that they straddle such a long 
period of time, it will be no surprise to see that they differ in several respects. This is in part 
because the standard account, despite its core features remaining remarkably durable, is 
not without areas of uncertainty or curiosity, and has been developed or extrapolated in 
various ways. This is of course a natural development, pertaining partly to the release or 
discovery of new sources, the most important of which have been government papers, not 
opened under the fifty year rule until 1967. 
 
We may now examine what appear to be the central features of the current orthodoxy and 
highlight the defects therein which this thesis will expose. These defects may be grouped 
under three headings: firstly, the account of Henderson’s conversion to Stockholm whilst in 
Russia; secondly, the campaign he thereupon undertook when back in Britain to persuade 
the Labour party to accept the invitation to Stockholm; and thirdly, the significance of 
Bolshevism in one or both of the above. 
 
                                                 
7
 Paul Bridgen, The Labour Party and the Politics of War and Peace, 1900-1924 (Woodbridge, 2009). 
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On the initial conversion to Stockholm, all the afore-mentioned historians believe that 
Henderson’s view on the conference changed whilst in Russia from one of opposition to one 
of support, and that his change of mind was triggered by concerns for the survival of the 
Kerensky led Provisional Government. Evidence can be found for the first part of this 
supposed transition in the form of correspondence between Henderson and labour 
associates in London indicating his initial rejection of the Stockholm conference and his lack 
of sympathy for the Russian socialists.8 It has proved a good deal more difficult however to 
find similarly persuasive evidence for the reversal of these attitudes. Hamilton is forced to 
rely instead on the conjecture that during the course of his stay in Russia Henderson came 
gradually to understand the difficulties facing his fellow socialists and developed much 
warmer feelings towards them as a result. Appreciating too that the attendance of Allied 
socialists at Stockholm would be of great benefit to his hosts he was at some point 
converted to the conference.9 For the post-1967 historians in our group the possibility 
existed of finding fuller evidence of Henderson’s conversion in the Foreign Office or War 
Cabinet papers, which included correspondence with Lloyd George and one substantial 
report to the War Cabinet. Winter in particular used this documentation to propose a 
specific time during Henderson’s stay, and a proximate cause, for the conversion.10  
 
With the exception of Bridgen, who proposes a different date for Henderson’s conversion, 
Winter is alone in attempting to be quite so specific.11 None of this however matters very 
greatly, since the main evidence for Henderson’s conversion came from Henderson himself. 
In his address to the 10 August labour conference he tells delegates that before he went to 
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 Hamilton, Henderson, pp: 132-133. 
9
 Ibid., pp: 130,133. 
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 Winter, Historical Journal, pp: 766-767. 
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 Bridgen, The Labour Party, p.96. 
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Russia he had been ‘opposed to the holding of an ordinary International Conference’ but 
had, whilst there, changed his mind.12 This reliance on Henderson’s own testimony however 
raises as many problems as it resolves. Obviously his words on this occasion must be 
considered in the context of what he was hoping to achieve at this moment, which was to 
persuade his party colleagues to take a step to which the majority of them had long been 
opposed. For Henderson indeed this was a crucial battle, set against the background of a 
party which had been bitterly divided virtually since the beginning of the war.  
 
Two issues on which party divisions were most intractable were central to the debate over 
Stockholm. These were, firstly, the question of involvement with the pre-war Socialist 
International, and secondly the issue of Allied war aims, which would be germane to any 
discussions the International would undertake. For most of the preceding three years a clear 
party majority, generally designated as ‘patriots’, had wanted nothing to do with either the 
International or the debate on war aims. They had been opposed by an insistent minority 
comprising so called ‘pacifists’ who took the contrary view.13 Underlying these differences 
were conflicting perceptions regarding the nature of the current war. ‘Pacifists’ by and large 
clung to what was the dominant pre-war position within the International: that any war 
between the major European powers was likely to take the form of an imperialist struggle 
for territorial or economic advantage and should be resisted by the united forces of 
international labour. ‘Patriots’ on both sides of the conflict quickly identified the war as one 
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 Peter Stansky, ed., The Left and War: the British Labour Party and World War1 (New York, 1969), pp: 222-
225. Henderson’s address to the Special Party Conference is reproduced in full by Stansky; it can also be found 
in Report of the Annual Conference of the Labour Party, January, 1918 , pp: 47-51. 
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 The terms ‘patriot’ and ‘pacifist’ were widely used by contemporaries, though polemically rather than 
literally. In this thesis they will therefore be used in inverted commas. What they represented will become clear 
as we proceed.  
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of aggression on the part of the enemy states and chose to close ranks with their rulers in 
what they declared a justifiable war of defence.14 
 
Six months before the Stockholm question became a matter of controversy in the summer 
of 1917 the general position on an international conference had been debated at the party’s 
annual conference in Manchester. A resolution moved by the ‘pacifist’ Bruce Glasier had 
called for the ‘speedy reconstitution’ of the Socialist International. In response the ‘patriot’ 
Will Thorne moved an amendment which prioritised the need to continue the war ‘until 
victory was achieved’, at which point the ‘Socialist and Trade Union organisations’ of the 
Allied Powers ‘should meet simultaneously with the Peace Conference.’ Thorne’s 
amendment was carried and Glasier’s resolution rejected, both by majorities of more than 
two to one. The party was thereby pledged to reject participation in any international 
socialist conference whilst the war continued and then to consider only a conference 
confined to Allied socialists once the peace terms were being decided.15  
 
For Henderson to achieve his goal of attendance at Stockholm these binding decisions had 
to be overturned. A significant part of the majority which had supported Thorne in January 
had to be persuaded in August to adopt a position long associated with the much rebuked 
minority. In these circumstances Henderson in his 10 August address was at pains to 
distance himself from those arguments in favour of the Socialist International traditionally 
deployed by ‘pacifists’. He asked his audience to dismiss from their minds the suggestion 
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 Whilst ‘patriots’ generally predominated, the one important exception was Russia, in which the majority of 
socialists ‘repudiated the war as an imperialist venture’, Rex A. Wade, The Russian Revolution, 1917 
(Cambridge, 2000), p.12. 
15
 For the full texts of the resolutions, the debate and the voting, see Report of the Annual Conference of the 
Labour Party, January, 1917, pp: 125-127. 
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that any members of the party’s National Executive now advocating attendance at 
Stockholm, himself included, had been ‘in any way influenced’ by the ‘unworthy or 
unpatriotic motives’ widely attributed to the party’s minority. He had ‘not wavered in the 
slightest degree’ in his attitude to the war. He asked delegates to ignore the ‘unscrupulous 
agitation that has been carried on outside’ designed to suggest otherwise. His declaration 
that he had initially been opposed to an ‘ordinary’ international conference, but that he had 
changed his mind in response to the extraordinary circumstances he encountered in Russia, 
was one of the ways he was able to reassure ‘patriots’ that he remained very much one of 
their number. 
 
Statements made by Henderson during the course of his party campaign must clearly 
therefore be treated with some caution. Evidence from the period in Russia showing that he  
had indeed converted to Stockholm for the reasons he later gave would for historians have 
been very welcome. But none have managed to find this evidence, at least not in any 
definite form. The first clear declaration that Henderson favoured attendance at Stockholm 
came just after he had left Russia. Having chosen to stop off in the Swedish capital as he 
made his journey home, Henderson was able to speak with the non-Russian organisers of 
the conference. It was on this day, 17 July 1917, that Henderson informed a British 
correspondent that he now considered the conference ‘desirable’.16 We do not know 
whether he had already reached that position before he left the Russian capital, Petrograd. 
Nor do we know what influence the conversations he had with the Stockholm promoters on 
17 July may have had on his decision to commit to the conference. 
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 The Times, 24 July 1917, p.5. 
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The lack of clear evidence in support of the standard account’s first major proposition must 
then be noted. Both when and why Henderson moved in favour of the conference are 
questions on which historians are essentially reliant on his own later words. Neither can a 
related problem be ignored. Just how did Henderson come to believe that Stockholm would 
be an effective means of bolstering the position of the Russian Provisional Government? 
Historians have failed to delve very far into this crucial question. Yet this is undoubtedly an 
important matter, not least because as we shall see, Stockholm was not the only way 
Henderson believed Petrograd could be supported by the Allies. 
 
Assuming nevertheless that Henderson had become strongly convinced of the value to 
Russia of the Stockholm conference, historians have perceived him as driven to pursue this 
objective regardless of the opposition he faced from within the Cabinet, the House of 
Commons, the bulk of the press, and senior ranks of the Labour party. The fact that he 
remained undeterred by this considerable opposition and on 10 August powerfully restated 
his case at the special conference occasions no surprise. As we shall see however this 
perception of a stubborn and resolute pursuit of a widely understood and principled 
position does little justice to the twists and turns of what became a highly complicated 
campaign. Particularly in its final forty eight hours, Henderson’s actions make something of 
a mockery of the assumptions on which the standard account was built.  
 
The key question which arises from this final period is why Henderson persevered with a 
campaign that could clearly no longer achieve its stated objective, but ran the very real risk, 
if not the near certainty, of bringing about the outcome that he supposedly never desired: 
his enforced resignation from the Cabinet. We shall see that the bearers of the standard 
13 
 
account find no common way of answering this question. Nor are they comfortable with a 
related issue: the charge levelled against Henderson by Lloyd George that he [Henderson] 
had deceived his Cabinet colleagues regarding his intentions at the special conference. The 
Prime Minister insisted that Henderson had led him to believe in these final days that he 
would, as a member of the Cabinet, attempt to achieve on 10 August the outcome the 
government wanted: a rejection by the Labour party of the invitation to Stockholm. Exactly 
what Henderson may or may not have said to create this impression remains unknown. It 
does nevertheless seem the case that this impression was created, that Lloyd George and 
others within the Cabinet did indeed expect Henderson to use his influence in this way.17 
That the Prime Minister was genuinely shocked and angered when the news arrived that 
Henderson had done exactly the opposite has been accepted by almost all historians.  
  
The controversy over Henderson’s alleged deceit of Cabinet colleagues has never really 
been settled. Henderson from the outset forcefully denied the charges.18 Hamilton 
unsurprisingly would give him her backing, although she is again handicapped by having no 
access to crucial War Cabinet minutes. She essentially argues, on the basis of Henderson’s 
past behaviour, that he strongly supported the view that ‘loyal observance of collective 
responsibility’ was ‘vital to democratic government.’19 This sense had been ‘sharpened, not 
blunted, by war.’20 Lloyd George, she observes, was unable to provide any explanation as to 
why on this occasion Henderson should have chosen to behave so uncharacteristically.21 
Also, since Henderson had repeatedly made clear over the preceding fortnight that he 
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 George H. Cassar, Lloyd George at War, 1916-1918  (London, 2011), p.52; Wrigley, David Lloyd George, 
p.213. 
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 Hansard, House of Commons Debates, 5th series, (hereafter H C Debs), 13 August 1917, Vol.97, cc: 925-
928. 
19
 Hamilton, Henderson, p.158. 
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 Ibid., p.143. 
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 Ibid., p.158. 
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favoured attendance at Stockholm, Hamilton infers that his views must have been ‘entirely 
familiar’ to Cabinet colleagues.22 The clear implication of Hamilton’s judgement is that Lloyd 
George knew perfectly well what Henderson would do at the Labour conference and that 
the surprise and the accusation of deceit which followed were both feigned. As has been 
indicated, this is now a rejected view.  
 
Hamilton is undeniably partisan. She was during the war a ‘pacifist’ and would have taken a 
dim view of Lloyd George’s drift towards the ‘patriotic’ and Conservative right, which 
elevated him to the premiership in 1916.23 She seems to have had little to do with 
Henderson during the war but in 1929, as a newly elected Labour MP, she was invited by 
him in his new role as Foreign Secretary to join the British delegation at the League o 
 Nations. Close contact with him during her stay in Geneva evidently induced in her a great 
respect for Henderson which is manifest throughout her subsequent biography.24 Her views 
on the controversy surrounding Henderson’s alleged deceit of the War Cabinet were clearly 
influenced by her strongly held opinions of the two protagonists, as well as by wider labour 
opinion which had long since concluded that Henderson had been innocent of any 
deception.25  
 
The eventual release of the Cabinet papers undoubtedly made Henderson’s professions of 
innocence rather harder to believe. Also, after the lapse of half a century partisanship was 
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 Ibid., p.157. 
23
 See for example her comments on Lloyd George’s self serving decision to call a general election in December 
1918, an election that led to the parliamentary dismissals of all those in any way tinged with wartime ‘pacifism’, 
including Henderson, Mary Agnes Hamilton, Remembering My Good Friends (London, 1944), pp: 94-95. 
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resignation to the ‘duplicity’ for which Lloyd George had ‘become notorious’, LSE Digital Library, Beatrice 




perhaps less of an issue.  Nevertheless, a reluctance to deviate from the well established 
characterisations of the starkly differing politicians at the centre of the dispute may well 
have played a part in the post-1967 accounts. Henderson had long epitomised the blunt but 
honest labour politician, the antithesis indeed of Lloyd George. Whilst nobody would wish to 
deny that these depictions have general validity, it will be argued below that at least on this 
occasion Henderson did choose to deploy political skills more characteristic of his rival. If 
this is so, then questions inevitably follow as to the nature of his political motives at this 
time. Henderson knew during the final days of his Stockholm campaign that no British 
delegation would actually be travelling to the conference. Why then did he choose to risk 
his reputation for political integrity, as well as his place in government, by securing a 
decision at the special conference which would astound and embarrass his Cabinet 
colleagues? We shall in due course see that this question cannot satisfactorily be answered 
without abandoning the suppositions of the standard account. Moreover, if these 
suppositions must be abandoned in order to explain Henderson’s puzzling decision to 
persevere with his Stockholm campaign in the face of circumstances which had changed 
significantly since his return from Russia, how can the same suppositions be seen as reliable 
tools through which to understand his wider objectives?  
 
We may now consider the third area of the standard account on which doubt may cast: the 
influence of Bolshevism on Henderson’s unfolding campaign. Hamilton again leads the way 
on this question, crediting Henderson with an awareness that Stockholm would be ‘the sole 
means of holding Russian democracy together against the disruptive tactics of the 
16 
 
Bolsheviks.....’26 Winter broadly seconds this view, contending that for Henderson the 
matter at stake over Stockholm was ‘the fate of the socialist revolution in Russia.’27 
Significantly however, Winter also introduces a new dimension to the Bolshevik threat as 
perceived by Henderson: the possibility that this destructive ideology could gain a foothold 
elsewhere, perhaps even in Britain. If Stockholm was seen by Henderson as a means by 
which the Bolsheviks in Russia could be weakened, his subsequent political activity in 
Britain, in particular his reorganisation of the Labour party, was in Winter’s view a means to 
frustrate the ambitions of the country’s own potential Bolsheviks.28 
 
A student today approaching this episode in World War One or Labour party history could 
be forgiven for concluding that this was indeed a significant factor in Henderson’s actions. 
He or she might quickly encounter one or more of the following observations: ‘Fear of 
Bolshevism and the extreme left throughout Europe was almost certainly a preliminary to 
the new constitution.....’29; Henderson was determined to create a reorganised and 
moderate socialist party ‘that was resistant to the extra-parliamentary and revolutionary 
left, for his trip to Russia had convinced him of the need to prevent extremists from taking 
control of the party.’30; Henderson had concluded that ‘the greatest threat to the allies’ war 
effort’ was the emergence in Petrograd of ‘a more extreme left-wing 
government.....encouraging pacifistic and revolutionary tendencies throughout Europe 
[which would] imperil the British Labour party....31; Henderson ‘had been persuaded by his 
trip to Russia of the need for an effective left-wing party that could head off the danger of a 
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 Hamilton, Henderson, p.133. 
27
 Winter, Historical Journal, p.770; for similar remarks see Wrigley, Henderson, pp: 114-116; Leventhal, 
Henderson, pp: 65-66; Wrigley, David Lloyd George, p.210.  
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 Winter, Historical Journal, p.771. 
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 Ross McKibbin, The Evolution of the Labour Party: 1910-1924 (Oxford, 1974), p.92 
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 Bridgen, The Labour Party, p.96. 
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British revolution more successfully than the Provisional Government was meeting the 
Bolshevik challenge.’32 All these observations cite Winter’s 1972 article. 
 
The 1917 sources however, whilst they certainly indicate Henderson’s distaste for Lenin’s 
movement, fail to sustain the argument that Bolshevism in particular was perceived by him 
as quite such a threat. He did recognise in Russia that Lenin’s supporters, despite the fact 
that they remained a minority within the Soviets, were capable of generating considerable 
disorder and dissent, particularly in relation to the government’s attempt to revive the 
economy and the army. He doubted however whether the Bolshevik movement could go 
beyond serious disruption and itself make a successful bid for state power.33 During the 
course of his campaign on returning to Britain he gave no sign that he had changed his mind 
on this question.34 It was only in the aftermath of the Bolshevik overthrowing of the 
Kerensky government that Henderson linked this event to his earlier campaign. Having 
drawn attention to the vulnerability of the Petrograd government during the summer, he 
suggested that the government’s indifference to his warnings had ‘contributed to the 
present awful Russian disaster?’35  Others had already suggested as much.36 For Henderson 
this was a point easily scored against his former Cabinet colleagues. Yet as the Times rather 
pertinently commented, it could also be doubted whether ‘he – any more than others – had 
formed so definite an impression of the Russian situation’ during the summer.37 As for his 
perception of the Bolshevik threat to British labour, there is not much in the historical 
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 David Stevenson, The First World War and International Politics (Oxford, 1988), p.162. 
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 LHA, Henderson to Roberts, 21 June 1917, Henderson papers,LP/HEN 1/31; TNA, Arthur Henderson,‘British 
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 The Times, 29 December 1917, p.8. 
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18 
 
record to support Winter’s view, and still less to justify the prominence this idea has gained 
in recent decades. 
 
 The cumulative weaknesses within the standard account we have highlighted in this brief 
survey provide the justification for a full reappraisal of Henderson’s actions in this period.  
But any such reappraisal must go further than merely demonstrating the inadequacy of 
accepted beliefs. Whilst the task of challenging existing accounts must remain the essential 
starting point of this thesis, it must be supplemented by some attempt at providing a more 
persuasive explanation of Henderson’s Stockholm campaign. We must assume that 
historians, like nature, abhor a vacuum. One obvious place in which to seek an alternative 
motivational framework capable of displacing the established view of Henderson’s 
Stockholm campaign lies in the courses he followed once free from his Cabinet 
responsibilities. As has been well documented, Henderson, with time and political freedom 
now at his disposal, devoted much of his energy in the final fifteenth months of the war to 
two major projects. One of these was the constitutional reconstruction of the Labour party, 
which was to transform the existing, somewhat loose federal structure into ‘a nation-wide 
political organisation’ with party branches ‘in every parliamentary constituency.’38 This was 
a well judged and rational response to the greatly expanded franchise about to be provided 
by the 1918 Representation of the People Act. Henderson’s second major initiative at this 
time was to pursue, in the wake of the failure to convene the Stockholm conference, a new 
international socialist  project which represented, in Winter’s words, a ‘policy of which he 
knew the government disapproved.’39 Although Winter has famously linked the programme 
of party reconstruction to the preceding Stockholm campaign, this second of Henderson’s 
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post-resignation initiatives appears on the face of it to represent a more obvious continuity 
with Stockholm than the first. 
 
This thesis will contend that such a continuity is indeed essential to understanding 
Henderson’s actions both before and after his Cabinet resignation. We have noted that his 
first clear declaration in favour of Stockholm occurred in Sweden rather than Russia, on a 
day in which he spoke with conference organisers closely linked to the Internationalist 
Socialist Bureau (the executive body of the Second International). The ISB had been engaged 
since well before the Russian revolution in finding some way to revive the fractured 
International and thereby create a unified socialist perspective on the war.40 In the minds of 
his interlocutors, the revival of the International pre-dated and probably predominated over 
any concerns they may have shared with Henderson regarding the future of the Russian 
revolution. It is clearly the case that Henderson, as shown by his post-Stockholm 
programme, ultimately shared the ambition of reviving the International.  
 
We have seen also that once he became committed to Stockholm, Henderson’s task was to 
overcome the opposition within majority Labour opinion to any wartime involvement with 
the International. We must surely therefore consider the possibility that Henderson 
recognised that a direct plea to his party to reverse its view on the International would be 
considerably less effective than a plea based on the new and exceptional factors he had 
observed in Russia. The failure of standard accounts to consider this possibility may again be 
attributable in part to the reluctance of sympathetic historians to show Henderson as 
misleading his party as to his real motivations: to have been, in the modern parlance, 
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economical with the truth. The case will be made in this thesis that any such sensitivity 
should now be abandoned. Once it is allowed that Henderson may have behaved in the 
manner of many other determined politicians, in pursuit of a goal to which he attached 
great importance, a new narrative of the Stockholm episode can begin to fall into place. 
 
Were we to assume however that Henderson was already by 17 July (a full week before he 
arrived back in Britain) hoping to lead the Labour party in a new internationalist direction, a 
major question arises. Could he have imagined that he would be able to do this whilst 
remaining a member of the government? The answer is almost certainly not. The Lloyd 
George coalition government took power on 7 December 1916 and was immediately 
recognised, despite the inclusion of Henderson at the pinnacle of the War Cabinet, as 
considerably more right wing in its political complexion than the former coalition led by H. 
H. Asquith.41 It also faced a new range of problems. As the great Somme offensive petered 
out over the winter, having failed to achieve the much hoped for breakthrough, and having 
cost a great many British lives (including Henderson’s eldest son), the new government 
addressed concerns over the rise of ‘war weariness’.42 Although public commitment to the 
war remained largely unbroken, talk of peace could exert in some quarters a significant 
appeal. The need for determined measures against the various organisations of domestic 
dissent which could capitalise on this change in atmosphere was recognised by the ministry 
as imperative.43 
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The issue quickly became all the more urgent when, even before 1916 was out, peace 
initiatives were launched from abroad.  On 12 December for the first time in the war the 
German government made ‘direct overtures of peace to the Allies.’44 This was followed by a 
suggestion by the recently re-elected United States President, Woodrow Wilson, that the 
belligerent powers should reveal the terms on which they would be willing to make peace, 
especially since, as Wilson judged from their various public statements, their objects 
appeared ‘virtually the same’.45 Neither of these initiatives was welcomed by Allied 
governments, in which determination to fight on to victory remained strong. But whilst it 
was relatively easy to dismiss the approach from Berlin, a response to Wilson, representing 
as he did the most powerful of neutral nations, required a good deal more care.46 Following 
prolonged debate Allied governments decided to present a joint statement on their aims to 
the President. This statement, which they accepted would be made public, was delivered on 
11 January 1917. Although this carefully worded document presented Allied war aims in 
terms of morally acceptable criteria such as future security and liberation of oppressed 
peoples, it did not conceal that territorial changes to the detriment of the Central Powers 
were envisaged.47 
 
As the War Cabinet would later acknowledge, the reply to Wilson had been used as ‘anti-
war propaganda’ both at home and abroad ‘to prove that our war aims were imperialistic 
and grasping.’ It was held that henceforth such frank expressions of war aims ‘might with 
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advantage be allowed to fall into the background.’48 Wilson’s own response to the Allied 
reply, the famous “Peace Without Victory” address of 22 January to the United States 
Senate, also did much to encourage pacific sentiment.49 Wilson’s argument that a 
settlement concluded without either side being in a position to dictate terms would be 
more likely to result in a stable and lasting peace, though completely contrary to the views 
of Allied governments, was praised by their ‘pacifist’ critics who had themselves frequently 
made similar points.50 The War Cabinet would throughout 1917 take measures to limit the 
influence of these newly encouraged ‘pacifist’ critics.51 These would culminate in August in 
the creation of a National War Aims Committee (NWAC), the primary focus of which was ‘to 
combat pacifism’.52 Contrary to what was implied in this new body’s title its object was to 
stifle rather than encourage conversations on specific war aims, relying instead on 
regurgitated ‘vague platitudes’ as to the infamies of Prussian militarism.53 
 
From December 1916, writes Keith Robbins, ‘pacifists’ entered ‘a time of hope’ during which 
the prospect of moves towards a peace settlement suddenly grew.54 How far Henderson 
may have been influenced by or sympathetic to a peace campaign given wings first by 
Wilson and then by the Russians is essentially unknown. But as a member of a Cabinet 
concerned to isolate and undermine any such campaign he could hardly have expressed his 
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personal support. The publicly available evidence consequently points in the opposite 
direction: that until his return from Russia he remained solidly in line with the official view. 
His private thoughts however were characteristically kept to himself. Given that he would 
later pursue, and with evident strong conviction, his own peace programme, would it not be 
reasonable to assume that his place in government constituted the main constraint on any 
involvement in the public discussions generated in Britain by Wilson and the Russians? 
 
It is a fact that when released from this constraint after 10 August 1917, Henderson did go 
on to generate a process which culminated eighteen months later in an international 
socialist conference concerned to influence the terms of peace. But when and why did he 
decide to embark on this course? And how and why did he plan or hope to overcome the 
many serious difficulties entailed in such a controversial change of direction?  
 
Standard accounts have recognised to varying extents that Henderson may have been 
affected by changing attitudes internationally on the pressing questions as to when and how 
the war would be concluded. Winter refers to his conviction ‘by mid 1917’ that ‘the war had 
radically changed not only his but also popular ideas about politics.’ A ‘new democratic 
consciousness’ which Henderson highlighted required Labour to act in accordance with its 
traditional standpoint and interests, which ‘were international in scope.’55 Hamilton says 
much the same, referring to a deep moral unrest in 1917 amongst British workers, behind 
which ‘lay the feeling that a war which had begun as a crusade was degenerating into a dog 
fight, and that they, once appealed to as co-operators in a heroic enterprise, were now 
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mere cannon fodder.56 Wrigley offers his own more cautious perception that Henderson 
seemed ‘to have regained his faith in socialist war aims.’57 Henderson himself would 
observe after his resignation that in the past ‘British Governments decided when the nation 
should make war and afterwards determined the terms that should bring about its 
settlement. To-day, it is the British people who are at war and the people must decide the 
terms of peace.’58 These perceptions however remain of secondary significance in standard 
accounts of the Stockholm campaign, in which the fate of Russia continues to assume its 
dominant position in Henderson’s motivation.  
 
It is generally believed in these accounts that when he launched the Stockholm campaign 
Henderson did not expect that he would be jeopardising his government office. This is a 
view he might reasonably have held since the War Cabinet had itself considered British 
attendance at Stockholm as a possibility earlier in the year.59 On the other hand, once it 
became clear in July that ministers were now taking a very different view, it is questionable 
whether Henderson could have retained any great confidence that his position within 
government remained safe. Winter suggests that he probably knew ‘that a political collision 
was inevitable’.60 That this collision would result in Henderson’s enforced resignation was of 
course all the more inevitable in the light of Lloyd George’s belief that Henderson had 
misled him over his intention to support Stockholm at the Labour conference. The question 
then as to whether Henderson did in some way mislead the Prime Minister, or whether 
indeed he realised that Lloyd George was expecting him to dissuade his party from voting in 
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favour of going to Stockholm, although central to any understanding of the episode, has not 
been adequately addressed in standard accounts. 
 
Having been unwilling to accept Lloyd George’s charges of duplicity against him, labour 
historians have been able to present Henderson’s dismissal from the Cabinet as an 
unwarranted action by the Prime Minister. Acting honestly and sincerely on his conviction 
that his party’s attendance at Stockholm would be to the benefit of the new democratic 
Russia, as well as to the Allies as a whole, Henderson found himself drummed out of the 
War Cabinet as a result of malevolence, political cynicism or poor judgement on Lloyd 
George’s part. This, paradoxically, gave him the freedom to pursue a party programme 
which would challenge Allied governments on war aims, an outcome that appears 
inconceivable had he remained in the Cabinet. The alternative possibility - that Henderson 
sought to contrive his own dismissal from the Cabinet in order to pursue this programme - 
has been rejected or simply not considered by labour historians.61 Yet this alternative has at 
least one major attraction. It would surely place Henderson in a more flattering light, as the 
architect of his own future, rather than the beneficiary of Lloyd George’s ‘blunder’.62 The 
traditional view in which Lloyd George turns out to have been his own worst enemy of 
course has its attractions. But it is perhaps an unfortunate curiosity that historians who have 
widely approved of Henderson’s post resignation initiatives on behalf of his party have been 
required to concede that these initiatives were only made possible by the unreasonable and 
self-defeating behaviour of the Prime Minister. 
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In summary then, we may surely note that the two main outcomes of Henderson’s decision 
to address the 10 August party conference as he did were his dismissal from the War 
Cabinet and the nullification of the party’s Manchester decision. Both these outcomes were 
essential to the internationalist policy which he thereafter pursued. Standard accounts see 
this development essentially as a case of unforeseen consequences, on both Henderson’s 
and Lloyd George’s part. This thesis will argue that for Henderson this assumption can be 
challenged. It will suggest, on the contrary, that a strong case may be made for the 
contention that Henderson actually won, as much by luck perhaps as good judgement, a 
significant political battle with Lloyd George, and was thus enabled to lead his party in a new 
and challenging direction for the remainder of the war, which had, probably by the time he 
returned to Britain in late July, been his true objective.  
 
Such a reading of the Stockholm episode clearly suggests an analysis in line with the 
historiographical school of ‘high politics’. It has been noted by proponents of this school that 
labour historians have largely rejected such an approach. Arguing that this form of analysis 
is politically Conservative (as unashamedly was its most prominent advocate, Maurice 
Cowling), labour historians have tended to dismiss what they perceive as an interpretation 
of British politics too focussed on the rivalries and ambitions of the nation’s most senior 
politicians. They have preferred to explain their own party’s political rise (and occasional 
fall) in terms of ‘foundational ideas, electoral sociology, or some combination thereof.’63 
More importance is attached to ideology and ‘politics from below’ than to the rarefied 
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atmosphere of ‘high politics’. To what extent then might these approaches also be valid to 
Henderson and the Stockholm affair? 
 
Winter’s comments, quoted above, suggesting that Henderson was influenced by the 
emergence in mid-1917 of a ‘new democratic consciousness’  which chimed with Labour’s 
traditional and internationalist perspectives clearly support ‘history from below’ and 
ideology as possible drivers of his actions. But although he would go on to cite such 
considerations later in the year after he had left the Cabinet and was already deeply 
engaged in his new political course, there is little to indicate that this ‘new democratic 
consciousness’ in British politics, if it existed, had any influence on Henderson’s behaviour 
prior to his visit to Russia. It is also firmly believed of course that Henderson’s change of 
political direction occurred whilst he was in Russia.64 In that country there was indeed 
during this time a veritable ferment of new radical perspectives on the war and the role that 
could be played by the international fraternity socialists in bringing it to a satisfactory end. 
But it remains unclear how far and in what sense Henderson’s course of action on returning 
to Britain may have been driven by this international pressure from below. Account must 
obviously also be taken of the contrary pressure from below of ‘patriotic’ and anti-
Stockholm sentiment still prevalent within his own party. Such pressures from below could 
be seen therefore as cancelling each other out, leaving Henderson to make his own decision 
as to the options available to him for reasons he may in some measure have chosen to  
conceal. Historians have rightly focussed on Henderson’s personal decision to act as he did 
as central to the Stockholm drama. Regarding the campaign he then launched on his return 
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to Britain there is little dissent from the proposition that this was a case of Henderson 
leading rather than being led by his party or any wider domestic public opinion. 
 
Cabinet disputes are by their nature matters of ‘high politics’. The Cabinet crises of May 
1915 and December 1916 can clearly be analysed in this way. Whilst both were fuelled by 
substantial issues concerning the conduct of the war, they clearly also revolved around 
personal rivalries between senior figures jockeying for position at the pinnacle of national 
politics.65 The crisis of July/August1917 does however present different features. In the first 
place it only affected the personnel of the Cabinet in a minor way, with Henderson alone 
losing office and being replaced by his Labour party colleague, George Barnes, who had 
deputised for him whilst he had been in Russia. Secondly, although Henderson as de facto 
leader of the Labour party and member of the War Cabinet can be seen as one of the ‘fifty 
or sixty.....politicians who mattered’ in the sphere of high politics both he and his party were 
new to this status, which they had attained only as a consequence of the war and the 
recognition by longer established political leaders of the importance of labour to a 
successful outcome of the conflict.66 In high political terms the battle between Henderson 
and Lloyd George was far from a confrontation between equals. 
 
A further sense in which Henderson fits less than convincingly into a high political narrative 
is his strikingly unusual indifference to personal advancement. Neither in the sphere of 
national government nor in that the Labour party’s leadership did he ever appear to be 
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driven by any strong desire to secure in the longer term his elevated wartime status. As 
regards the party, as Hamilton observes, the war had in fact provided him with the 
opportunity to secure a lasting leadership at the expense of his main rival, MacDonald, but 
he chose rather to assist in the latter’s reinstatement.67 And as we shall demonstrate in this 
thesis, his sacrifice of Cabinet office, however interpreted, came about with little serious 
care on his part for its retention. 
 
The focus of his dispute with Lloyd George had in reality little to do with his position in 
Cabinet or directly with wider government policy. It centred rather, as we have suggested, 
on the future policy of the Labour party. Nevertheless, given that his original stated 
objective was to secure a British presence in Stockholm, he would of course need to 
persuade his Cabinet colleagues to act counter to other Allied governments by sanctioning 
such a presence. Cabinet minutes show surprisingly little evidence of any such attempted 
persuasion. His objective regarding his ministerial colleagues appears rather to have centred 
on a concern that the government could block or undermine his main party objective, which 
was to persuade the proposed party conference to accept in principle that it could attend an 
international labour conference in Stockholm and thereby undo the resolutions of the 
previous January’s annual conference. 
 
Historiographical debates over the value and validity of ‘high politics’ and its rival 
methodologies have continued over the several decades since Cowling’s first works 
appeared.68  The protracted nature of this debate rather suggests that no one 
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historiographical approach can be applicable in all cases. In practice historians may have to 
choose horses for courses. Peter Clarke has observed that since historians are ‘actually and 
ultimately concerned with what happened once......there is an inescapable role for 
contingency in their causal explanations, especially in political history.’69 The unique episode 
in British political history with which this study is concerned, incorporating as it does the 
unusual political circumstances of the war, the influence of the especially turbulent 
contemporary events in Russia, the stark divisions within the wartime Labour party, as well 
as the untypical political style of our central protagonist, has little in common with other 
Cabinet ruptures in modern times. The principal challenges which this thesis imposes can 
arguably be reduced to the answering of two central questions: why did Henderson choose 
during his spell abroad to attempt to reverse his party’s current position on attendance at 
an international socialist conference? And why, under the circumstances that prevailed on 
10 August, did he choose to address that day’s labour conference as he did, predictably 
ensuring not any British attendance at Stockholm but rather his own removal from the 
Cabinet? The manner in which these questions may best be approached are very different. 
 
For the second question a high political approach is undoubtedly valuable. Indeed the 
absence of such an approach in earlier accounts arguably constitutes one of the major 
weaknesses in the historiography. Cowling has defined high politics ‘as primarily a matter of 
rhetoric and manoeuvre.’70 Henderson’s actions during the sixteen days following his return 
from Russia can readily be understood in these terms. What may be unusual in this 
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particular case is that the rhetoric and manoeuvre needed to be applied on two fronts: the 
Cabinet and the Labour party. This naturally made Henderson’s task especially complex. For 
the first question however this approach would be far from efficacious. Cowling’s 
conception of high politics posits a network of senior politicians acting and reacting on an 
ever continuing basis to positions taken by their colleagues and rivals. At the (significantly 
uncertain) time Henderson took his initial decision on Stockholm he was largely detached 
from his political networks in Britain. Both for Cabinet and Labour colleagues this decision 
came out of the blue, with virtually no prior soundings or assessments of the domestic 
political waters. His decision in short lacks almost completely the visibility that ‘high 
political’ historians would expect and rely upon. 
 
To understand this decision then a recourse to simple deduction is surely required. Such a 
deduction cannot be reliably based on Henderson’s own subsequent explanations since 
these fall into the category of ‘rhetoric’ deployed to achieve the desired result of 10 August. 
Political actions rather than words must be utilised. Using such a process of deduction to 
understand an individual’s unrevealed motivation must surely also demand a wider 
biographical approach. The characters and core beliefs of individual politicians clearly 
provide indications as to why they may have alighted on particular political goals. 
Henderson’s record during a lengthy career as a Liberal and later a Labour politician, as well 
as his initial responses to the war, must be considered in order to provide some sort of 
explanation as to why in 1917 he chose this particular path. No less relevant of course is his 
political record post 1917.One of Henderson’s abiding beliefs was, by general consent, a 
consistent opposition to militarism and war. It is interesting to note in this context that his 
entire adult life coincided with an era in which numerous progressive and religious groups 
32 
 
came to perceive that war between advanced nations had become an anachronism. Civilised 
societies, they insisted, could and should find means of resolving disputes without recourse 
to the barbarous practice of mutual slaughter. The pre-war international socialist movement 
strongly supported this view. 
 
By 1914 no major war between the great European powers had been fought for more than 
four decades, yet preparations for such a war never ceased. These preparations moreover 
incorporated the advances of modern science and technology, allowing future wars (should 
they occur) to be conducted on a massively greater and more destructive scale. There was a 
perception before 1914 that a European war ‘would have ruinous consequences for social, 
political and economic stability.’71 For the many-faceted peace movement in Britain it 
appeared essential that the moral and political progress that might ultimately remove war 
from the human agenda (at least in the first place for the advanced nations of the world) 
should keep pace with the material progress which was already rendering the prospect of 
armed conflict so potentially catastrophic.72  
 
As an upcoming Liberal politician and senior trade unionist, and as a man with a strong non-
conformist religious faith, Henderson appears to have shared these views and to have 
participated in peace campaigns, even if his involvement was generally limited.73 After 1903, 
as an MP representing the newly created Labour Representation Committee (the pre-1906 
name of the Labour Party) he continued to support pacifist causes. Having condemned the 
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recently terminated conflict against the South African Boers as ‘an iniquitous war’, he 
remained a steady opponent of ‘militarism’, rearmament and the Entente with tsarist 
Russia. He was sympathetic to the radical wing of the Liberal party which constituted the 
main parliamentary opposition to the ‘balance of power’ and anti-German policies of the 
Foreign Office. Like many progressives, he opposed British involvement in the looming war 
following the Sarajevo crisis virtually until the last minute.74  
 
There is a consensus amongst Henderson’s biographers that whilst he did harbour a moral 
commitment to the radical and pacifist cause of reforming international relations, this was 
not yet for him a major personal priority.75 It became so, the consensus continues, only after 
1917 and Stockholm. ‘His international outlook....now....became vivid and personal, and 
never again left him,’ observes Hamilton.76 It is true that others in the higher reaches of the 
Labour party were more prominent in pre-war anti-militarist campaigns than Henderson. It 
is also the case that many of these others remained resistant to the rationale for war against 
Germany in 1914 whilst Henderson opted to follow the bulk of the Labour party in 
supporting the war. However, as with many progressive internationalists who were 
persuaded to back the war once underway, there is no reason to believe that Henderson 
abandoned or modified his anti-militarist views. Again like many other British progressives, 
Henderson hoped and believed that the war would lead not just to the military defeat of the 
Central Powers but to a new and more pacific international order. But as the war persisted 
and the human and material costs of waging it remorselessly grew, doubts also emerged as 
to how committed Allied governments really were to the desired new international order. 
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As suggested above, Henderson’s position in government during the middle years of the war 
required him to keep any such doubts he may have shared to himself. 
 
In the final months of the war and throughout the post-war period until his death in 1935 
Henderson continued, as Hamilton stated, to take a keen interest in international affairs. In 
the minority Labour government of 1929-1931 he served as Foreign Secretary. He took this 
opportunity to orient British policy much closer to the League of Nations than the preceding 
Conservative administration had wished. He pushed through measures establishing 
procedures for international arbitration of disputes and pressed forward on the dilatory 
process to initiate general disarmament, to which the signatories to the Treaty of Versailles 
had committed themselves ten years earlier.77 The Labour government having fallen the 
previous autumn, Henderson accepted the position as President of the International 
Disarmament Conference which finally convened in February 1932. Under the then 
inauspicious international climate the conference drifted slowly towards failure. 
Henderson’s determination to at least keep discussions going was later rewarded by his 
receipt of the Nobel Peace Prize, months after the conference had effectively collapsed in 
the summer of 1934.78 
 
Henderson won much praise from the British public for these endeavours. ‘For this was a 
time,’ writes John Callaghan, ‘when the First World War was popularly remembered - in 
film, poetry, fiction and autobiography - as a never-to-be-repeated disaster.’79 These years 
were indeed an historical highpoint in the long running attempts to significantly reform 
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international relations. Labelled as ‘radical’ in their pre-war manifestation, reviled as 
‘pacifist’ during the war, and criticised by ‘realists’ as ‘idealist’ or ‘utopian’ in the post-war 
period, this was a continuous movement to address the above mentioned fear of future 
wars conducted with ever more deadly forms of weaponry.80  Recognising Henderson as 
very much in line with this wider movement in its successive formulations gives support to 
the argument that will be presented below.81   
 
Faced with the deficiencies in standard accounts of the Stockholm episode this thesis will 
attempt a thorough re-examination of the available evidence. Almost all of the source 
material on which this re-examination will depend has been available for a considerable 
time, and was indeed open to most of the historians whose accounts we have examined. It 
appears however that these materials have been used less extensively or rigorously than 
they might have been, perhaps because there seemed no obvious reason to question earlier 
accounts, particularly Hamilton’s, or perhaps because of a reluctance to unpick a narrative 
in which Henderson and Lloyd George played out roles so well suited to their respective 
reputations. This attempt to explore more fully the available material, alongside a more 
sceptical treatment of Henderson’s own campaigning statements, will inform the approach 
taken towards these longstanding sources in this thesis.  
 
In one particular area however, that of Russia in 1917, interpretations have been modified 
following the end of the Cold War and the opening to the West of Russian archives. Earlier 
                                                 
80
 See the comments of one wartime contemporary regarding the danger of increasingly destructive weapons 
outstripping the wisdom of the men who would control them, George Bernard Shaw, ‘Common Sense About the 
War’, New Statesman, 14 November 1914, Vol.4, no.84, Special War Supplement, p.24. 
81
 For classic texts on these consecutive periods, see A. J. A. Morris, Radicalism Against War, 1906-1914: The 
Advocacy of Peace and Retrenchment (London, 1972); Marvin Swartz, The Union of Democratic Control in 
British Politics during the First World War (Oxford, 1971); Edward Hallett Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis: an 
Introduction to the Study of International Relations (London, 1939). 
36 
 
accounts of the Stockholm episode, particularly those of Hamilton and Winter, accept a 
dynamic at the heart of Russian politics in the summer of 1917 based on the battle within 
Russian socialism between Menshevism and Bolshevism.82 This binary view of Russian 
revolutionary politics has been modified in recent times to take account of the many other 
political groupings that struggled to meet the great variety of social, political and national 
aspirations released by the February revolution. The satisfaction of these aspirations in the 
midst of an ongoing world war inevitably created immense problems, arguably to the point 
of making the new Russia almost ungovernable. It would take several years of chaos, civil 
war and foreign intrusions before a sufficiently ruthless political regime could finally 
establish control over most of Russia’s pre-war territory.83  
 
The ousted Kerensky’s several reminiscences, set against the long background of the Soviet 
Union’s international estrangement, encouraged a belief in the West that with more 
support from its wartime Allies the fledgling democratic revolution in Russia could have 
survived and perhaps even prospered. This is a view that obviously played well into the 
established narratives of Henderson’s Stockholm campaign. It interesting to note however 
that during the period he was in the country few believed that the small and extreme 
Bolshevik faction could succeed in taking and maintaining power in the Russian state. 
Henderson himself shared this majority view. When or if he changed his mind remains 
wholly unclear. 
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One further aspect of this thesis may, finally, be considered. Since its main purpose will be 
an examination of Henderson’s likely motives for acting as he did in the summer of 1917, 
the focus will necessarily be on the narrow and uncertain area of those ‘thinking processes’ 
which, as Hamilton observed, he kept very much to himself until such time as they could 
form a plan of action. The post-resignation outcomes of Henderson’s actions are well known 
and significant, and will not be the subject of any revision in this study. We need therefore 
mention them only briefly and in passing. One such outcome, no doubt, was a weakening of 
the patriotic unity of the country. Although Henderson promptly sought to minimise the 
damage attendant on his resignation, assuring the War Cabinet that he continued to share 
and was ready to support in a ‘non-Government capacity’ the Cabinet’s desire ‘that the War 
should be carried to a successful conclusion’, the defection of so senior a figure to what 
would clearly become an oppositional role represented a definite deterioration in the 
government’s position.84  
 
Of more lasting significance were the changes effected in the Labour party. The party had 
for three years been conspicuously divided on its attitude towards the war. Officially it had 
had little to say other than to echo the government line. Under Henderson’s post-Stockholm 
leadership the situation was transformed. By the end of the war the bulk of the party was 
aligned behind comprehensive, independent policies, both domestically and internationally, 
and had put into place new structures to facilitate electoral success. It was in short ready to 
reap its post-war success and emerge as the principal party of opposition to the 
Conservatives. It was also by the end of the war taking a leading role in the revival of the 
Socialist International. When the socialist movement finally convened its first full 
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conference in early 1919, attended by delegates from the Allies, Central Powers and 
Neutrals, credit for this achievement was rightly awarded to Henderson personally.85 
 
It could perhaps be argued that since these achievements are fully recognised, further 
speculation on Henderson’s ultimately impenetrable motivations can serve no important 
purpose. Several rejoinders can be offered to such an argument. One such has already been 
mentioned. It has not been the primary purpose of this thesis to proffer a new 
interpretation of Henderson’s objectives to be considered alongside that which already 
exists. It has been, rather, a matter of demonstrating that the long accepted interpretation 
lacks credibility and cannot on that account continue to stand, and that therefore something 
must be offered to take its place. It is surely also a historiographical norm to treat the 
motives of historical actors, where these can be reasonably assessed, as of scarcely less 
interest than their deeds.  Where moreover suspicions of political obfuscation come into 
play, this interest is likely to be enhanced. In this particular case study, we may also note 
that a thorough exploration of motives can give rise not just to minor adjustments, but to 
radically different conclusions. Did Henderson act out of apprehension for the beleaguered 
Petrograd government, or did he see in the Russian situation an opportunity to affect 
change in the Labour party under the umbrella of a different concern? Did his perseverance 
in the Stockholm campaign to the point of his loss of Cabinet office represent a laudable 
sense of determination and commitment or was it the result of calculated political finesse? 
 
A conclusion incorporating an untypical degree of political finesse on Henderson’s part may 
finally also have a bearing on the episode’s historiography. For if it were accepted that a 
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significant number of historians over a period of a hundred years have misread Henderson’s 
true motives, then some explanation of such a misreading must be required. Paradoxically 
perhaps, the political finesse Henderson may have deployed to such effective purpose in 
1917 may have subsequently obscured rather than illuminated his remarkable success. 
Reason enough, it must surely be argued, for the full reappraisal of the Stockholm episode 
this thesis will offer. 
 
The thesis will be set out in four chapters arranged chronologically to cover the full passage 
of the war. The first will deal with the period between August 1914 and May 1917; the 
second will focus on the period encompassing Henderson’s stay in Russia, whilst the third 
will look particularly closely at his Stockholm campaign in July and August 1917. The final 
chapter will embrace the subsequent period up until the summer of 1919. Although 
presenting the key considerations for the purpose of the thesis in chronological order, these 
chapters are not designed to simply present a wartime narrative. Each chapter will pose its 
own distinct questions, the cumulative answers to which will provide the overall shape of 
the thesis. There is also of course some benefit in terms of general comprehensibility in 
discussing events in the order they occurred.  
 
Chapter One will tackle the question of how far the belief at the centre of the thesis - that 
Henderson’s commitment to an ongoing involvement in the Socialist International was 
largely independent of whatever worries he may have had regarding the situation in Russia - 
can be sustained by evidence emerging from an examination of the earlier war years. Whilst 
it will be seen that this is no easy task, in part because of Henderson’s habitual reticence 
and in part because for most of this time he was a member of the government and thereby 
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obliged to follow the Cabinet line, the case will be made that a continuity does exist 
between the period prior to his joining the first coalition in May 1915 and his actions 
following his return from Russia twenty six months later. 
 
Chapter Two will address the absence of evidence in support of the standard account’s view 
that Henderson converted to Stockholm whilst in Russia. In examining more closely than 
previous studies have done the particular circumstances which Henderson faced throughout 
his stay, the chapter will propose that only towards the end of his visit would it have been 
possible or prudent to make a commitment to his hosts over Stockholm, and that there are 
good reasons to believe that he would have preferred to postpone any final decision until 
he had spoken to the conference organisers in the Swedish capital. Similarly, Chapter Three 
will conclude, following a more detailed and thorough consideration of the evidence than 
has hitherto been provided, that the standard account has failed to adequately explain 
Henderson’s actions following his return to Britain, especially during the final and crucial 
forty eight hours of his campaign.  
 
The fourth chapter will begin by proposing alternative explanations of Henderson’s actions 
in Russia and on his return to Britain, before outlining the more or less seamless transition 
from a Stockholm campaign purportedly designed to bolster the Russian government to a 
post-Stockholm campaign for the revival of a Socialist International. It will assess what he 
most hoped to achieve through this subsequent campaign and conclude that his ultimate 
aim was to encourage a progressive and ameliorative settlement to the war. It will argue 
that this aim was consistent with his international views both before and after the First 
World War. The main conclusion then proposed by this thesis is that it is in the context of 
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Henderson’s more or less lifelong views on international affairs that his actions in the 
summer of 1917 can best be understood. To continue to place these events primarily in the 
context of political upheaval in Russia, it will be suggested, would be misleading.  
 












Why did Henderson induce the Labour party in the autumn and winter of 1917 to focus its 
attention on the still controversial issues of war aims and the socialist international?  This is 
the question this chapter will seek to answer. It is generally assumed that his decision to 
embark on this course is related to Russia and Stockholm. And in as far as these matters 
precipitated his resignation from the Cabinet this is obviously true. He could not have 
followed this path whilst a member of the government. But this brings us to a consideration 
of means and ends. His resignation helped provide the means to pursue this objective, but 
why and when did he come to feel that this was a legitimate end? Historians have been 
unable to give clear answers to this question, largely because Henderson himself gives so 
little away. There is even uncertainty as to whether his political change of direction may 
have been born in Britain or Russia.1 We can only observe that from the spring of 1915 
Henderson and other Labour ‘patriots’ refused to publicly discuss the issue of war aims and 
that there was no hint of any change of position until his return from Russia.2 Throughout 
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the same period there was a definite reluctance to engage with what was left of the Second 
International. 
 
For the purposes of this thesis the question of whether Henderson’s changed political 
perception began in Britain or in Russia is important. But with no clear indications from 
Henderson his biographers have had to form their best guesses as to his state of mind 
during the months before June1917. The results have been rather divergent. Hamilton sees 
her subject in this period as something of a tragic figure, still mourning the death of his son, 
suffering the pain of isolation from too many of his Labour comrades, and an ‘outsider’ in 
the Cabinet. Though he continued doggedly in his ministerial work, she surmises, ‘the 
question would arise, more and more insistent – Was he really doing the best by the nation 
and by the labour movement in sticking to his association with men whose general outlook 
and ideas he did not share, at the price of losing contact with and sympathy among his 
fellows?’3 Leventhal too sees him as haunted ‘by doubts about his effectiveness’ and 
clinging to office ‘in the hope that he could uphold the interests of the labour movement 
whether or not he could retain its confidence.’ Nor were his relations with the new Prime 
Minister ever ‘as amicable as they had been with Asquith.’4 Wrigley however sees 
Henderson’s period in the second coalition government in a more positive light, noting that 
despite some ‘occasional personal tensions, Henderson had no major policy difference with 
Lloyd George until he went to Russia’ and that he expounded the Prime Minister’s policies 
‘with much vigour.’5 
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Since it is highly unlikely that evidence will be found to demonstrate the validity of any of 
these differing views, this chapter will offer a different approach to the problem. It will be 
argued that little can be learned in relation to the questions which concern us from the 
many months in which Henderson held Cabinet office. He was throughout this long middle 
period of the war punctilious in his adherence to the doctrine of Cabinet responsibility, 
never deviating in public from the government’s line. He appears to have wholeheartedly 
accepted that the creation in 1915 of a national government symbolised the ‘unity and 
determination of our country until our efforts.......culminated in a final and lasting peace.’6 
He adopted as his principal role in both coalitions that of mediating between ministers and 
the labour movement, largely to ensure the industrial harmony essential to the 
achievement of military victory. Strategic and foreign policy matters he readily left to those 
he believed better qualified than himself.7 
 
More illuminating by far is the opening period of Henderson’s war. Contrary to what would 
follow, he could not in this period simply adhere to a well established and consistent public 
line. Like so many others he had not only to construct his position on the war, but had to do 
so by reversing his original stance. Although there is much in the historical record showing 
him negotiate this transition, it is again the case that historians cannot agree on central 
questions as to when, why, and to what extent, he moved from pre-war opposition to 
British involvement in the conflict towards full commitment to the ‘patriotic’ cause. 
Underlying these disagreements lies a division of opinion on the fundamental question as to 
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whether he converted to ‘patriotism’ primarily as a consequence of personal conviction, or 
as a result of political calculations as to the long term interests of his party. 
 
One element of this early phase of the war on which we will focus is the resolution agreed 
by the Allied socialist parties of Britain, France, Belgium and Russia on 14 February 1915. 
This is particularly significant since it represents a formal position on the war effectively 
adopted by the British Labour party in the absence until then of anything agreed by the 
party’s annual conference, which was postponed in 1915. Also, the gathering in London of 
Allied socialists was the one and only international conference which British labour attended 
during the first three years of the war. When the party prepared in 1917 for a second Allied 
socialist conference as a prelude to the full international conference at Stockholm, a 
statement produced by the National Executive began by declaring its continued acceptance 
of the agreement of 1915. We may see this resolution then as a bridge between 
Henderson’s first and third periods of the war. 
 
Henderson’s middle period as a Cabinet minister (longer than the other two combined) may 
not reveal much as to any developing thoughts on the war he may have harboured, but it is 
nevertheless important in indicating issues relating to the state of his divided party which he 
could not in the longer term ignore. In this chapter then we will consider separately both 
the first and second period, the one with the principal aim of understanding how he settled 
on his own ‘patriotic’ position, and the other with assessing the impact in several policy  
areas of the deepening division within the party. The policy areas we shall examine in this 






‘Pacifist’ or ‘Patriot’?  August 1914 – May 1915 
 
Three conclusions will be offered in relation to Henderson’s movement during this period. 
Firstly, it will be suggested, Henderson’s fundamental beliefs on war, peace and 
international relations, as demonstrated throughout his political life, lend themselves more 
naturally to the ‘pacifist’ phases at the start and end of the war than to the albeit lengthy 
‘patriotic’ interlude between them. Secondly, it will be argued that whilst the true extent of 
Henderson’s personal identification with ‘patriotic’ sentiment during the war cannot by its 
nature be easily determined, his actions, particularly in the early months of the war, can be 
satisfactorily explained by concerns over the continued cohesion under the stress of war of 
the Labour party. Thirdly, and as a consequence of this perceived danger, Henderson 
attempted to, and partially succeeded, in establishing a position on the war that balanced 
key components of the rival stances of the opposing groups within the party. That position 
can be identified most clearly with the Allied socialist resolution of February 1915, which 
Henderson himself had a hand in drafting.  
 
Before beginning our discussion of Henderson’s responses to the war we must briefly return 
to his pre-war politics and the beliefs he held regarding the conduct of international 
relations.  In common with most of the senior figures in the pre-war international labour 
movement Henderson was an inheritor ‘of the traditions and thought of the enlightenment, 
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confident that men were capable of attaining perfectibility, if only shown the true way.’8 His 
belief in moral progress was as we have seen strongly reinforced by deeply held religious 
faith. During his early years as a rising Liberal activist in the North East, observes Ross 
McKibbin, he would have come into contact with an ‘intensely pacifist’ regional outlook 
influenced by Quakers and Radicals.9 These early convictions, which he evidently retained 
for the rest of his life, impelled him into a loosely aligned community of progressive 
internationalists active in Britain, as elsewhere, in the pre-war years.10 As a way of assessing 
the alternatives open to Henderson in August 1914, the scene may usefully be set by looking 
more generally at the reactions of this progressive community. 
 
Viewing the July 1914 international crisis as a concern of the Continental powers, 
progressives demanded that Britain should not become embroiled in what was essentially a 
Balkan conflict into which neighbouring powers had been disastrously drawn. Sir Edward 
Grey, the Foreign Secretary, saw matters very differently. It was for him essential that 
Britain should provide military support to the French, who were in their turn committed to 
back Russia in the war with Germany which now seemed inevitable. Despite the opposition 
of a great many progressives, up to and including numerous members of the Liberal Cabinet, 
war was duly declared on 4 August.11 Progressives responded to this setback in a variety of 
ways, which broadly fell into three categories. Many simply converted to unequivocal 
support for the war, largely in response to the apparent German initiation of the conflict. A 
much cited example of this tendency was Oxford University’s prominent classicist, Gilbert 
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Murray. Having been an active critic of Grey’s Entente policy, Murray now saw the conflict 
as a consequence of the ‘unalterably aggressive designs of Germany.’12 Grey, he now also 
realised, had worked throughout the pre-war period to foster good relations with Berlin and 
to maintain the precarious international peace.13 Another celebrated convert to unequivocal 
support for the war was H. G. Wells, whose early statements saw the conflict in the starkest 
of terms. Victory for Germany would mean ‘the permanent enthronement of the War God 
over all human affairs.’ A German defeat could ‘open the way to disarmament and peace 
throughout the earth.’14 
 
At the opposite extreme some, mostly Labour, chose to retain their forthright opposition to 
the conflict. In a statement of 13 August the National Council of the Independent Labour 
Party (ILP) sent ‘sympathy and greeting’ to German socialists and blamed the ‘appalling 
crime’ of the war on ‘the rulers, the diplomats, the militarists’ of the belligerent nations, 
including Britain.15 Ramsay MacDonald, who had shared with Henderson in recent years the 
most senior Labour party positions, presented in the ILP press a powerful critique of what 
he saw as Grey’s fundamentally deceptive diplomacy.16 But the few who continued to 
criticise the government’s decision to take up arms during the early days of the war quickly 
found themselves subject to hostile public responses, which doubtless encouraged greater 
discretion amongst other more cautious sceptics.17 This third intermediate group of former 
neutralists adopted a different type of response to the outbreak of war, characterised by an 
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unwillingness to continue expressing their earlier views without necessarily abandoning 
them, whilst professing their resolve to work for an Allied victory. The major Liberal papers 
fell into this category. The Manchester Guardian, which had remained strongly critical of 
Grey’s determination to press the country into war until the final moment, articulated well 
this new position. ‘Some time the responsibility for one of the greatest errors in our history 
will have to be fixed,’ it declared on the first morning of the war, ‘but that time is not now. 
Now there is nothing for Englishmen to do but to stand together [for] the attainment of our 
common object – an early and decisive victory over Germany.’18  
 
A safer way to raise the issues that continued to concern progressives, it was soon more 
generally decided, was to focus attention on ‘the terms of peace and other future matters, 
leaving the past to be dealt with when the country is out of danger.’19 Yet this too presented 
difficulties. A focus on distant matters such as the peace settlement during the early stages 
of a war which had clearly started badly for the Allies was understandably open to criticism. 
It was therefore felt that any attempt to raise the question of peace should be postponed 
until the military position became clearer, fear of defeat or invasion could be put aside, and 
public opinion, it was hoped, could become more receptive to wider perspectives on the 
nature, development and possible conclusion of the conflict. In the meantime, suggested C. 
P. Scott, editor of the Manchester Guardian, attention should be focussed on ‘the getting 
together [of] the nucleus of an organisation and preparing written matter for publication 
when the appropriate time comes.....’ 20 
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The possibility of keeping these preparations private was perhaps always remote. The 
bubble burst as early as 10 September after a private circular had been leaked to the 
Morning Post. This aggressively Conservative paper immediately warned the public that ‘an 
organisation is being secretly prepared in order to flood the country “when the proper 
opportunity occurs” with “books, pamphlets and leaflets” directed to the object of a peace 
satisfactory to Germany.’21  Other organs of the patriotic press were quick to echo the Post’s 
condemnation. Realising that they were going to be slandered almost whatever they said, 
the accused concluded that they may as well come out and state their views clearly.22 The 
Union of Democratic Control (UDC), which became the principal voice of radical Liberal 
dissent, was thus born.23 Insisting that their new organisation was in no sense a ‘stop-the-
war’ movement, the founders defiantly set out their criteria for the terms of peace.24 Their 
disavowals of ‘pacifism’ did nothing however to lessen the ‘patriotic’ outrage, encouraging 
the more cautious radicals to distance themselves from the vilified new organisation, thus 
splitting the progressive movement still further. With the UDC and the ILP remaining a 
defiant minority the dichotomy between ‘pacifists’ and ‘patriots’ began to set firm, curiously 
resembling in its durability the military stalemate simultaneously forming on the other side 
of the Channel. 
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This early and conspicuous division in their ranks was one of several handicaps under which 
progressive internationalists would labour throughout the war. Those who chose to remain 
on the ‘patriotic’ side of the fence hoped that they would thereby be better placed to wield 
some influence over the eventual peace, yet the circumstances in which they could safely 
raise this vital topic continued to elude them. One major problem they faced was their pre-
war record in failing to heed the warnings of their political enemies as to the nature and 
extent of the German threat. The ‘scaremongers’ they had so readily dismissed in earlier 
years could now insist that it was they who had been proved correct.25 The advocates of a 
progressive peace could scarcely avoid raising old, now rather suspect hopes of harmonious 
relations with the German nation. What they believed in was by its nature an ameliorative 
peace. What they rejected was the traditional diplomatic cycle whereby the punitive 
settlements of one war tended to create the grievances which would lead to the next. But to 
make the case for a ‘soft’ peace against Germany was to invite the charge that they had 
learnt nothing from their previous errors. 
 
A further difficulty arose through their determination to avoid criticism of what emerged as 
the patriotic consensus on the causes of the war, for which the Central Powers were held 
solely responsible. To call for a peace settlement based on a ‘New Diplomacy’ which would 
abandon traditional forms of national security in favour of untried procedures of 
international collaboration could easily be seen as an inappropriate response to the 
circumstances presumed to have given rise to the current war. Had there been a perception 
in Britain that the war was in part at least a consequence of the brinkmanship inherent in 
the pre-war international system, progressive perspectives may have attracted greater 
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support, as indeed they did in the post-war years when great power brinkmanship was 
latterly indicted as a major cause of the conflict. The raising of this idea in the early years of 
the war was always likely to be seen as an apologia for Berlin and therefore ‘pro-German’.26 
 
The belief that Germany had brought about the war was challenged by few in Britain. It was 
indeed widely asserted that Berlin had been planning such action for several decades. These 
opinions were bolstered by the professional judgement of eminent historians.27 They were 
bolstered further by the brutal manner in which Germany had chosen to fight the war. 
Much publicised atrocities in Belgium, the shelling of British coastal towns, the sinking of 
British vessels by submarine warfare and the use of poison gas in the trenches, all combined 
to form a composite picture of German criminality from which the deliberately planned 
launching of world war was par for the course.28 Unlike the subsequent war against fascism 
or the Cold War against communism, the First World War is not commonly viewed as an 
ideological conflict, yet the criminality of Germany was seen at this time as the function of a 
prevailing pattern of thought loosely described as ‘Prussian militarism’. This differed from 
the sorts of militarism identified during the pre-war years with all the great powers in that it 
was now recognised to dominate German cultural life to a uniquely unprecedented extent. 
 
In a chapter entitled ‘The New German Theory of the State’ the Oxford historians showed 
how the writings of pre-war German thinkers had fostered the ‘idealization of the state’, the 
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self preservation of which demanded the perpetual enhancement of its power relative to 
other states, unconstrained by concerns for the individual or civilised moral norms.29 The 
trawling through works of German philosophers and historians appropriate to the bolstering 
of this image became a powerful tool of Allied intellectuals during the war, giving the 
conflict an unmistakable ideological dimension.30 The invasion of Belgium was held to 
illustrate the profound difference between the German approach to international relations 
and that of the other major powers. Disregarding treaty obligations or the rights of small 
nations Berlin attacked its helpless neighbour simply because it appeared a military 
necessity. The Allies on the other hand had responded in order to uphold the established 
public law. Believing that ‘History’ would ‘doubtless attribute’ the British decision for war ‘to 
the Belgian question,’ the Oxford historians were sure that had the French rather than the 
Germans invaded Belgium, Britain would ‘indubitably have kept neutral, if it did not throw 
her onto the side of Germany.’31 
 
In the face of a patriotic consensus strongly supportive of these views, the moderate left 
found it difficult to evoke a national discussion on the desirability of a progressive peace. 
Late in 1914 for example, George Cadbury, Quaker pacifist and proprietor of the liberal Daily 
News, wrote to his editor, A. G. Gardiner, suggesting that sometime before ‘peace was 
declared.....we must if possible educate men to think.’32 By which he meant of course, to 
think like a progressive. But how this was to be done in the prevailing political climate was 
                                                 
29
 Oxford Faculty of Modern History, Why We Are At War, pp: 108-117. 
30
 The historian Heinrich von Treitschke, Prussian general and military historian Friedrich von Bernhardi and 
the philosopher Hegel constituted for this purpose ‘the unholy trinity, with Nietzsche in reserve for those who 
wished to leave nothing to chance.’  Stuart Wallace, War and the Image of Germany: British Academics 1914-
1918 (Edinburgh, 1988), p.47. 
31
 Oxford Faculty of Modern History, Why We Are At War, pp: 90,92. 
32
 George Cadbury to A. G. Gardiner, 9 December 1914, Gardiner papers, quoted in Stephen Koss, Fleet Street 
Radical: A. G. Gardiner and the Daily News (London, 1973), p.163. 
54 
 
left unanswered. As the determination to crush the hated Hun grew ever stronger in Britain, 
the possibility of providing such an ‘education’ ever receded. Tellingly perhaps, it was not 
until the powerful interventions of outsiders, President Wilson and the revolutionary 
Russians, that the moderate progressives finally sensed an opportunity to advance their 
views.33 
 
Having considered briefly the political atmosphere in which he had to operate, we may now 
turn to Henderson’s own responses to the outbreak of war. We may start by examining the 
views provided by his three main biographers. Hamilton sets out her stall quite 
straightforwardly. She believes that Henderson, like the majority of his labour colleagues, 
converted immediately to full support for the war, which he perceived as a just and 
necessary response to the outrage of German aggression against Belgium. As early as the 
evening of 3 August, she suggests, Henderson was a committed ‘patriot’.34  
 
Hamilton’s views on the significance of Belgium at this moment were common during the 
inter-war period.35 But this perception has in recent times been modified. Belgium’s 
importance in bringing about the collapse of the campaign for neutrality is today recognised 
as double edged. Shock and outrage at the German attack on a small neutral state doubtless 
influenced many. At the same time however the invasion made it morally easier to support 
a war which could be justified in terms of high principle, rather than the imperatives of the 
balance of power or a barely concealed alliance obligation. The invasion, in short, greatly 
facilitated the movement of progressives to acceptance of a war that was now recognised as 
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unavoidable. This was particularly important within the Liberal party, from the Cabinet 
downwards, for whom many felt obliged to back their leaders out of political loyalty or fear 
of the consequences of bringing about a government collapse.36  
 
Like Hamilton, Leventhal believes that Henderson was ‘stirred by the violation of Belgian 
neutrality’ and that he consequently ‘accepted Grey’s rationalizations for British 
intervention.’37 The reference to Grey is significant, for both Hamilton and Leventhal. 
Hamilton’s singling out of the evening of 3 August as the moment Henderson’s mind 
changed is influenced by the fact that this was the occasion of Grey’s celebrated address to 
the House of Commons, which is thought to have won many doubters round to the 
necessity of war.38 The Foreign Secretary’s revelation that Berlin had demanded the right for 
German troops to cross Belgian territory, and would invade the next day if this were not 
granted, was inevitably a powerful inducement to support British involvement in the coming 
war.  
 
A further revelation however may have had the opposite effect. The House was informed 
that naval arrangements between Britain and France of which MPs had not been aware had 
ensured that French warships were concentrated in the Mediterranean where they could 
protect British as well as their own interests. In return the Royal Navy would deploy in the 
Channel in defence of France’s northern shores. This imposed on the British government an 
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immediate obligation to prevent German vessels launching attacks on undefended French 
Channel ports, which Grey insisted could not honourably be evaded. In the context of his 
longstanding insistence that the Entente with France imposed no form of legal obligation on 
Britain to enter a war in defence of its neighbour, Grey was now able to offer an obligation 
of ‘honour’ which, as was obvious to his critics, appeared scarcely less binding in its effect. 
‘Secret diplomacy’ was a longstanding concern to progressive dissenters, and this latest 
example came as a significant shock.39  
 
No firm evidence that Henderson accepted Grey’s arguments in favour of intervention at 
this time exists, and in the light of the above the proposition may be doubted. As a matter 
of fact his name would appear under a circular issued by the Labour executive four days 
after Grey had addressed parliament, in which the Foreign Secretary was heavily criticised. 
The purpose of this circular was to provide details of resolutions adopted by the party over 
the previous two days. It is worth noting that there is no mention, either in the circular or 
the resolutions, of Belgium or the German assault. The conflict is still blamed on ‘Foreign 
Ministers pursuing diplomatic policies for the purpose of maintaining a balance of power.’ 
Grey’s policy of ‘understandings with France and Russia only’ had been ‘bound to increase 
the power of Russia both in Europe and Asia, and to endanger good relations with 
Germany.’ The Foreign Secretary moreover had committed the nation to supporting France 
‘without the knowledge of our people.’ Denying that the labour movement was in ‘any way 
receding’ from its earlier opposition to ‘engaging in a European war’, the party’s executive, 
while ‘watching for the earliest opportunity for taking effective action in the interests of 
peace......’ advised that ‘all Labour and Socialist organisations should concentrate their 
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energies’ on measures designed ‘to mitigate the destitution which will inevitably overtake 
our working people while the state of war lasts.’40 
 
The Executive resolutions were not carried without argument. They were pushed through 
however by a significant majority of eight to four. Clearly, given the tenor of the statements, 
it was the more ‘patriotic’ amongst the delegates who constituted the minority. This seems 
surprising in the light of subsequent disputes within the NEC, the personnel of which 
changed only marginally during the war. The ‘patriots’, following this first week of the war, 
would almost invariably muster majority support for their views, at least until Henderson 
returned from Russia in 1917. This untypical balance of forces in early August strongly 
suggests that the image projected by Hamilton of a party moving more or less instantly and 
en masse towards a committed patriotic stance on the war is questionable. Almost certainly 
the process by which the patriotic ascendancy asserted itself was more uneven and 
protracted than this image allows. Before attempting to assess what can be known 
regarding Henderson’s personal position on the declaration of war, on Grey, and on related 
matters, a closer examination of the above process will again be useful. 
 
Support for the war has generally been seen as the essence of ‘patriotism’. One problem 
with this is that a large number of ‘pacifists’, including the two most notorious offenders, 
MacDonald and E. D. Morel, secretary and driving force of the UDC, also supported the 
war.41 ‘Victory.....must be ours,’ wrote MacDonald to the Mayor of Leicester (his 
parliamentary constituency) in mid-September.42 This had been his consistent position. His 
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earlier attempt to persuade the Labour Party to abstain on the vote for war credits was not 
motivated by illusory hopes that the war could by this stage be prevented, but by the ‘desire 
to preserve a free hand in criticism’ of the government.43 Morel too declared in the UDC’s 
first pamphlet that it was ‘imperative that the war, once begun, should be prosecuted to a 
victory for our country.’44 These statements were not unusual. The many misnamed 
‘pacifists’ who recognised that war was at times a necessary evil did not call for an 
immediate peace. Acknowledging that any settlement would require the withdrawal of 
German troops from Belgium and France they were not so naive as to believe that this 
would be offered as a token of Berlin’s goodwill. What singled them out from their fellow 
countrymen was something rather different: their refusal to endorse the hardening patriotic 
consensus which insisted that the war had come about solely as a result of German 
aggression and which subscribed to the fiction that Allied governments were essentially 
motivated not by the traditional objectives of great powers, but by the need to liberate 
Europe from the poisonous strain of ‘Prussian militarism’.  
 
Initially, as we have seen, support for the war as manifested by the more cautious 
progressives could best be described as backing for the nation in its coming trial rather than 
acceptance of Grey’s arguments. Given his closeness to the neutralists in the final pre-war 
days, given also his record of opposition to militarism, it seems quite likely that Henderson 
might have taken such a view.45 If Hamilton and Leventhal use language which suggests that 
their subject should be placed in the same category as Murray or Wells, that is as an 
immediate convert to the government’s case for war, Wrigley adopts wording more 
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indicative of a belief that would place Henderson in the intermediate grouping we have 
identified with the Manchester Guardian. Although the situation ‘was not as he would have 
wished,’ Wrigley writes, Henderson accepted the necessity of coming to terms ‘with the 
reality of a major war in progress.’46 
 
Whilst uncertainty over Henderson’s personal reaction to the reality must remain, it is clear 
that he and MacDonald moved apart during the first week of the war. Although Henderson 
was in the Commons during the critical hours of 3 August, he did not follow the example of 
MacDonald and Hardie by speaking against Grey. Two days later however he and 
MacDonald met with the Radical Liberal MPs, Arthur Ponsonby and Charles Trevelyan (the 
latter having just resigned from Asquith’s government over the decision to declare war). The 
conversation appears to have centred on the idea of setting up a joint committee of 
representatives from the Liberal and Labour parties to coordinate policy now that the war 
had commenced.47 Almost immediately however the first major break between the two 
Labour men emerged following MacDonald’s failed attempt to persuade the party to 
oppose war credits. With the great majority of Labour MPs, including Henderson, voting 
against him, MacDonald resigned as Chairman of the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP).48 
 
How can the sentiments expressed by the NEC be squared with the near unanimous 
rejection of MacDonald’s proposal to abstain in the parliamentary vote for war credits? 
Undoubtedly, one important consideration is that of venue and occasion. To have voted 
against the government in the national spotlight of the House of Commons, to have been 
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indeed the only party to have done so, would have represented a most provocative and 
politically dangerous challenge at such a moment.49 The deliberations of the National 
Executive on the other hand were directly communicated only to affiliated bodies of the 
Labour party. The resolutions of 5th and 6th August appear to have been ignored by most of 
the national press. It is also the case that Labour MPs were on the whole more conservative 
than the politically mixed bag of NEC delegates.50 Above all perhaps, opinions during these 
days were in a state of some flux. In discussions with Labour MPs shortly before the war 
credits request, MacDonald had failed to detect any major opposition to his own point of 
view.51 
 
This state of flux obviously makes it difficult to pinpoint any one individual’s movement of 
opinion. Henderson’s biographers are nevertheless convinced that within a relatively short 
space of time he became fully aligned with the ‘patriotic’ sentiments of the majority of his 
party. This transition, they also suggest, was a matter of personal conviction, a sense indeed 
of national obligation, which evidently encompassed a readiness to accept official notions of 
the war’s essential purpose.52 This is not however universally accepted. McKibbin’s stress on 
the ‘intensely pacifist......quaker-radical influences’ that Henderson had absorbed in earlier 
years makes him question how easily these could have been put aside in 1914. He suggests 
that it would have been ‘perfectly conceivable’ for Henderson to have taken the path of 
MacDonald, Ponsonby and others following the outbreak of war, and that it was ‘perhaps 
surprising’ that he did not. If his trade union connections had been ‘strong enough to push 
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him into supporting the war’, suggests McKibbin, this would have been a close run thing. He 
accordingly detects during the first months of the war a degree of ‘ambiguity’ in 
Henderson’s responses to the war.53 
 
Signs of this ambiguity can be detected in the efforts he continued to make to heal the 
breach with MacDonald and in his decision to join the General Council of the UDC, both 
indicative of a desire to retain some sort of foothold in both ‘patriot’ and ‘pacifist’ camps.54 
As late as January 1915 he was ready to temper his orthodox view on the responsibility of 
‘Prussian militarism’ for the war with sceptical comments about those in Britain who 
declaimed ‘against militarism in Germany but were not unwilling to support universal 
militarism in England.’55 Whilst Henderson took definite steps in the direction of 
‘patriotism’, he was often responding to rather than initiating key events. Asquith’s proposal 
of 28 August 1914, inviting leaders of other parties to cooperate in a parliamentary 
recruiting campaign, provides an early example of this. Majorities in the PLP and the NEC 
voted in favour of joining the new campaign, whilst the ILP for the most part was strongly 
opposed, voicing objections to sharing platforms with longstanding political opponents and 
participating in occasions that could too easily succumb to jingoist excess.56  
 
Whilst Henderson endorsed the majority view it has been suggested by David Marquand 
that he, like MacDonald, had ‘misgivings’ about appearing on recruiting platforms.57 A 
‘certain ambivalence’ in his initial response to the campaign has also been detected by 
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Christopher Howard, who believes that his support for the initiative was determined in part 
by the fear that Asquith might have called a wartime general election had the cooperation 
of other parties not been forthcoming.58 The wider nature of any such ambivalence may be 
divined in comments relating to the recruiting campaign included in the subsequent annual 
conference report. The party, it was stated, had joined the campaign on the ‘understanding 
that speakers......would not necessarily be responsible for......opinions regarding the original 
causes of the war, or the chain of circumstances which led up to it’ contrary to those 
adopted by the labour movement.59 Undoubtedly too Henderson would have been 
concerned by the further distance the campaign created between the opposing wings of the 
party. When MacDonald offered it some qualified support Henderson responded 
euphorically, stating that this would persuade the party ‘that we are not as apart as some 
imagine.’60 
 
His hopes on this count were short lived. A new and more damaging initiative, emerging this 
time from within the party itself, greatly accentuated the division between the two leaders. 
On 15 October the party’s daily paper published a document it described as ‘admirable and 
valuable’.61 Although not a formal party statement, the document had been signed by a 
large majority of Labour MPs and leading trade unionists. Its purpose was to ‘clear away 
once and for all’ misconceptions as to the opinions of the party’s majority. As the statement 
went on to make clear these opinions were fully in line with the patriotic consensus. The 
critical tone of the August executive resolution was abandoned. Concerns over secret 
diplomacy and the balance of power were conspicuous by their absence. All that remained 
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of the traditional Labour critique of international relations was a brief final sentence stating 
that when the time came to discuss peace, the movement would stand, as before, for an 
international agreement among civilised nations to resolve disputes by arbitration.62 
 
Amongst the signatories to this ‘patriotic’ manifesto was Henderson, who explained rather 
apologetically to MacDonald that he had had nothing to do with its drafting, had only signed 
‘after a good deal of thought’, and had tried to persuade the authors to consult more widely 
with all members of the Executive with a view to considering amendments.63 Little came of 
this latter effort, the concessions in language offered by the ‘patriots’ dismissed by 
MacDonald as ‘absurd’.64 It was by now obvious that divisions of opinion on the war would 
remain deeply entrenched and that this was a reality with which party leaders would have 
to come to terms. Whilst Henderson did now accept that the leadership breach would 
regrettably remain, he nevertheless continued to press MacDonald to at least commit 
himself to retaking his post as PLP chairman at the end of the war; this was a commitment 
his disillusioned colleague was unwilling to make.65 
 
Historians agree that throughout the war Henderson acted in a manner designed to ensure 
that the Labour party would emerge from the conflict in the strongest possible position. The 
divisions which occurred at the outset, both within the leadership and between the 
affiliated sections of the movement, were in this respect a matter of immediate and great 
concern, raising obvious questions as to whether the party could even survive the war 
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intact.66 In Hamilton’s view, Henderson was determined to avoid any sort of ‘heresy hunt’, 
as the more fervent ‘patriots’ desired. Since the war would only be a temporary 
phenomenon, the bitter divisions it generated should themselves be seen as temporary. 
Henderson was firmly resolved not to permit ‘the old line of division between the ILP and 
Trade Unions to reappear and develop into a schism.’ He would in short tolerate the 
expression of controversial minority views within the party, even though, Hamilton insists, 
he found these views deeply distasteful.67 
 
We of course know that the Labour party did in the end hold together, unlike the Liberal 
party. This however was unforeseeable in the first months of the war. With their long roots 
in British politics and their position as an established party of government, the Liberals 
hardly seemed the most obvious candidates for division and collapse. Disagreements over 
entering the war had certainly been evident, but Asquith and Grey had succeeded in 
bringing around all but a few relatively insignificant dissenters to their decision to intervene.  
The Labour party was at this stage far more openly at odds with itself. Moreover it still 
constituted, unlike its progressive rival, a young and fragile entity. 
 
Unwilling at its birth in 1900 even to describe itself as a party, the Labour Representation 
Committee was the outcome of a lengthy effort on the part of the ILP to bring the socialist 
societies, the co-operative movement and the trade unions into a single political federation. 
Notably divergent in wealth and power, as well as ideology, the constituent parts of the new 
federation cohabited with some difficulty. The unions in particular, many of which initially 
chose to shun association with the socialists, feared that their own resources might be 
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siphoned off by the latter into programmes for which they had little sympathy.68 It was not 
until 1909, when the one remaining large union not yet in the fold - the Miners’ Federation 
of Great Britain - finally agreed to affiliate to the party, that the ILP fully achieved its original 
aim.69 And even then, as a loose alliance of independent organisations the party lacked 
much by way of common purpose, the main fault line remaining that between the socialist 
ILP and trade unionists.70 A party which in 1900 had struggled to ‘get off the ground’ could 
still be seen by 1914 as far from secure.71 
 
Foreign policy was one issue on which the pre-war labour movement was potentially 
disunited, as had been evident during the Boer war.72 Nevertheless, a policy combining 
socialist internationalism, anti-militarism and vigorous criticism of the Liberal government’s 
anti-German alliance and rearmament programmes was adopted by the party between 
1900 and 1914. It has been argued that this Labour foreign policy was principally the 
creation of a ‘Big Four’ of ILP leaders - MacDonald, Keir Hardie, Philip Snowden and Bruce 
Glasier - all of whom, it may be noted, gravitated to the pacifist camp in 1914.73 The 
responses of trade unionists to the several aspects of this programme varied. Doubtless 
many were content to leave the foreign policy critics to their own devices, provided their 
campaigns did not impinge directly on union interests, as they did for example in relation to 
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criticisms of naval rearmament.74 A wider problem for the ILP programme was what Pugh 
has identified as ‘the patriotic, monarchist and imperial sentiment that existed within the 
Labour Movement.’ Between the Boer and the greater German war this sentiment 
remained relatively quiescent, only to emerge with significant force in 1914.75 
 
On foreign policy Henderson had occupied a pivotal position. He was the only Labour 
politician since 1906 to have occupied either of the two leadership positions of Chairman of 
the PLP or Secretary of the Party who was not also a member of the ILP. For most of this 
period he was not a member of any socialist society. However, on becoming party Secretary 
in January 1912 he simultaneously adopted, in accordance with a decision taken the 
previous year, the position of Secretary of the British section of the International.76 Since 
this was an avowedly socialist body it was judged desirable that the senior officers of the 
British section should themselves be socialists. Henderson could at this point have joined 
most of his senior colleagues in the ILP, but chose instead to take up membership of the 
Fabian society, the most moderate of the available options, and the most detached from the 
polemical hurly-burley of the other socialist groups.77 If this was a sign that he was not 
greatly enamoured of the ILP, feelings in this respect were largely mutual. His earlier 
assumption of the Chairmanship of the PLP had given rise to privately expressed fears on 
the part of Hardie that his influence would lead to the ascendancy of ‘reaction and timidity’ 
within the party.78  
                                                 
74
 Rearmament, of course, provided jobs, Newton, British Labour, pp: 182-187. 
75
 Martin Pugh, Speak for Britain: A New History of the Labour Party (London, 2010), p.105. 
76
 For the decision to give this International responsibility automatically to the party secretary see, LHA, NEC 
mins., 26 April 1911. 
77
 Wrigley, Henderson, p.68. 
78
 Hardie to Glasier, 27 December, 1908, Glasier papers, cited in, Pelling, Short History, p.21; for a fuller 
account of Henderson’s cautious and conservative politics and his differences with Hardie in the pre-war period, 




At the same time however Henderson was certainly more supportive of the foreign policy 
agenda of the ILP ‘Big Four’ than were many of his fellow trade unionists. Although 
significant numbers of trade unionist MPs consistently embarrassed the party by their 
failure to support its opposition to arms increases, Henderson was a prominent supporter of 
the party position.79 Whilst most trade unionists showed little interest in the deliberations 
of foreign socialists, Henderson was again an important exception. When in 1905 a 
Committee was created to forge closer links between British socialists, trade unions and the 
Second International, the TUC decided to take no formal part. Individual unionists could 
nevertheless volunteer to serve on this body, as Henderson did. But he was only one of a 
pair of non-socialist members amongst the seven who made up the Committee.80 This 
engagement in the affairs of the International would of course increase greatly when he 
became secretary of the British section. 
 
It is likely that as divisions emerged in the party following the outbreak of war Henderson 
would have wished to use his pivotal position to keep unionist dominated ‘patriots’ and 
socialist dominated ‘pacifists’ in harness. Once it became obvious that these divisions were 
only likely to harden the pressure to choose one side or the other became correspondingly 
intense. There are powerful reasons to see why he would, in the interest of retaining party 
unity, take the ‘surprising’ (as McKibbin sees it) decision to commit to the majority 
‘patriots’. One has only to consider the probable consequences of the alternative choice. 
Had Henderson followed MacDonald and the bulk of the ILP, the Labour party would have 
found itself in an extraordinary and surely unsustainable position in which all its traditional 
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foreign policy spokesmen were at odds with the great majority of its members. Given the 
overwhelming numerical and financial strength of the unions within the Labour 
confederation, as well as the pre-war reservations of many of their members regarding the 
amalgamation, tensions could surely have become exacerbated to a critical extent. 
Attempts were indeed made during the war to create a separate trade union party.81 
Henderson’s forceful opposition to these moves doubtless played a significant part in their 
failure.82 There can be little doubt either that his ability to counter these secessionist 
impulses would have been immensely weaker had he been identified from the outset with 
the ‘pacifist’ camp. 
 
We may then consider Henderson’s movement in the early months of the war as a steady if 
somewhat reluctant progress into the ‘patriotic’ ranks, this being balanced by the ambiguity 
we have discussed, which ensured he retained links to both sides of the party. The ideal 
position to which he may still have aspired would have been some sort of party statement 
on the war which could be supported by both the opposing groups. An opportunity to 
achieve this was soon to arise through the agency of the Socialist International, the 
scattered parts of which were puzzling over how to proceed following the failure to 
generate a unified response to the crisis of the previous August. Whilst the holding of a full 
conference was no longer possible, discussions were taking place which would lead to the 
convocations of three separate conferences - neutrals in Copenhagen, the Allies in London, 
and the Central Powers in Vienna - during the early months of 1915.83 The Allied 
conference, which took place on 14 February, was approached with some trepidation. It was 
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obviously going to reveal significant disagreements. A week before it met the patriotic 
majority of the French socialists (commonly referred to during the war as majoritaires) 
declared its determination ‘to pursue the war to the bitter end’.84 Belgian socialists were 
understandably expected to take the same line. Russian socialists by contrast were known 
to be largely opposed to the war.85 Both the French and British delegations moreover were 
internally divided. Rather than expose these manifold differences to the wider world, the 
conference organisers declined to offer invitations to the press. It was also decided that the 
meeting should be no more than an informal exchange of views. No attempt would be made 
to draw up a common programme.86 
 
This decision was communicated to the forty six delegates by Hardie, who chaired the 
conference, but was then overturned on the suggestion of Emile Vandervelde, chairman of 
the ISB and minister in the exiled Belgian government, in the hope of procuring a resolution 
in line with the firmly anti-German majority view. As anticipated, consensus proved hard to 
achieve. After a period of rancorous debate it was therefore decided to set up a drafting 
committee comprising two representatives from each nation, Henderson and MacDonald 
representing Britain, which would hopefully agree on an acceptable text. Following still 
more arduous negotiation the committee voted by six to two on a draft that was put to and 
finally endorsed by the conference. The two committee dissenters were MacDonald, who 
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opposed, and a Russian delegate, who abstained.87 The resolution then was clearly a hard 
won compromise as the text very obviously reveals. 
 
The statement begins by declaring that the Conference could not ignore ‘the profound 
general causes of the European conflict, itself a monstrous product of the antagonisms 
which tear asunder capitalist society.....against which international socialism has never 
ceased to fight, and in which every government has its share of responsibility.’ Following 
this opening sentence however, responsibility was placed firmly on the Germans, whose 
invasion of Belgium and France had threatened ‘the very existence of independent 
nationalities’ and struck a blow ‘at all faith in treaties.’ Whilst ‘inflexibly resolved’ to fight 
until victory the Allied socialists were at pains to declare their equal determination ‘to resist 
any attempt to transform this defensive war into a war of conquest.....’ They were ‘not at 
war with the peoples of Germany or Austria, but only with the Governments of those 
countries by which they are oppressed.’ Difficulty was created by the fact that at least one 
also of the Allied governments was seriously oppressing its own citizens. Russian socialists, 
supported by the Western minorities, successfully demanded against the wishes of the 
majority that a paragraph condemning the Russian authorities for their widespread 
suppression of domestic opposition be included.88 
 
Despite the great effort that had gone into its achievement there was little sense of 
satisfaction over the resolution during the months which followed. It was perhaps too easy 
for both sides of the political divide to regret those sections of the statement which gave 
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legitimacy to the views of their opponents.89 This was more of a problem for the majorities 
than the minorities, since their numerical dominance might have been expected to show up 
more prominently in the text. The ambiguities they permitted to pass in the resolution were 
furthermore open to attack from their wider patriotic communities. The returning French 
socialists in particular were harshly judged by their national press.90 British delegates by 
contrast got off lightly. The exclusion of the press was in this sense very helpful. Neither the 
conference nor its ‘ambiguous’ declaration was given wide coverage. One exception was the 
Morning Post, which did include a report on the conference, accompanied by the text of the 
resolution, but which covered the matter in a surprisingly uncritical manner.91 However in 
an editorial three days later, apparently inspired by the criticisms in France, the paper 
adopted a scathingly condemnatory tone.92 
 
Our analysis would suggest that Henderson would have viewed the inter-Allied resolution 
more positively than many amongst the conference delegates. It did demonstrate after all 
an almost unique show of unity, however fragile, on the vital questions raised by the war. 
The balance it displayed moreover between vigorous support for the war effort and 
traditional socialist perspectives on international peace was not dissimilar to that found in 
an address made by Henderson just a few weeks earlier, in which he had declared himself a 
pacifist who had devoted his life to the cause, and in which he had implied that militarism 
was not the sole prerogative of Germans. He had nevertheless concluded that it had 
become necessary to face the ‘grim realities’ of the present world tragedy and to accept the 
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necessity of crushing the Kaiser’s ‘mischievous lust for power.’93 Although this balance had 
been rather lacking in the October trade union led statement which he had earlier been 
pressed into signing, historians are agreed that his commitment to the realisation of a 
progressive peace as elucidated in the Allied socialist statement was throughout the war 
genuine and strong.94  
 
But although the text of the February resolution did indeed give substantial weight to 
concerns over the peace, it did nevertheless prioritise the ‘patriotic’ position. The discussion 
on the nature of any final settlement was clearly predicated on an Allied military victory. 
Were ‘German imperialism’ to triumph, Allied socialists would have little possibility of 
influencing the terms of peace. Such an outcome, they believed, would amount to no less 
than ‘the destruction of democracy and liberty in Europe.’ There was no repeat in the 
February resolution of the references in the NEC’s statement of the previous August to 
seeking the ‘earliest opportunity for taking effective action in the interests of peace.....’ It 
was now more clearly recognised that whilst Allied socialists could play an important part in 
attempting to ensure that the settlement would reflect their principles, their ability to 
secure an early date for that settlement would essentially depend on the contribution they 
could make to a speedy Allied victory.  
 
This implied priority of the ‘patriotic’ over the ‘pacifist’ sections of the February statement 
reflected the position towards which Henderson had been moving over the previous six 
months. It may also have facilitated the significant further step he was to take three months 
later in becoming a minister in the first Coalition Cabinet. Responding once more to a Prime 
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Ministerial initiative, Asquith’s offer on 19 May of a place in government, Henderson was 
again, according to G. D. H. Cole, ‘uncomfortable’ about accepting.95 The party itself was 
generally divided, having been before the war fiercely determined to maintain its political 
independence. A constitutional amendment forbidding members of the Executive ‘from 
identifying themselves with or promoting the interests of any other Party’ had been 
adopted at the 1913 annual conference.96 ‘Patriots’ as well as ‘pacifists’ felt that entry into a 
coalition government was both unconstitutional and politically a step too far.97  
 
A specific objection was the constraint this might put on Labour’s freedom to criticise where 
necessary the conduct of the war. This was largely a concern for the minority, from where 
the policies and concealed motives of the government were by now habitually under attack. 
Snowden made the case powerfully in the national press, arguing that once in government 
‘the fetish of Cabinet responsibility’ would require Labour ministers ‘to accept and defend 
policies and actions quite inconsistent with the ideas of the party.’ The Labour movement, 
he contended, acknowledged its duty to the nation, but that duty could be performed 
perfectly adequately from outside the government.98 This indeed was the position which 
would be adopted by the Irish nationalists.99  
 
Addressing party workers at his constituency on 29 May Henderson dismissed the idea that 
participation in government would constitute a sacrifice by the party of its right to hold 
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critical views. Members of the Labour movement, he maintained, would not be dictated to 
by ministerial colleagues from other parties. But was it even wise to focus so heavily on the 
right to criticise? ‘We were not going to be saved by criticism,’ he declared, it was ‘the 
saving of the nation’ which was of ‘primary, essential importance.’ Once this was achieved 
Labour would ‘revert to our position without having compromised that position in the 
slightest degree.’ Joining the government was not moreover an especially significant new 
departure, since the party was already cooperating in the war effort through its earlier 
commitments, notably the parliamentary recruiting committee. Having thus minimised the 
difficulties being raised by some of his colleagues, he also focussed on what would be an 
important benefit of entering government: the party would be granted an unprecedented 
opportunity to demonstrate to the nation its ‘capacity for statesmanship’, something it 
would be unable to do in any other way. For all these reasons then, offering his own 
personal judgement, he felt that it would have been ‘impossible’ for the party to have done 
otherwise than accept Asquith’s invitation.100 
 
What then of Cole’s view that Henderson was uncomfortable over the coalition offer? It is 
true that in the above address Henderson did state that initially that it had been ‘no easy 
matter’ to decide what to do in response to the Prime Minister’s offer and that he was 
content (as Cole also suggests) to allow the party to decide for him. It could therefore be 
argued that in his constituency address he essentially made the best possible case for the 
party’s decision. Yet this address carries the tone of strong personal conviction. The case he 
made for continuity may also have had greater relevance to him personally than to other 
less senior party figures. As Wrigley has shown, he had become involved during the 
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preceding period in numerous government appointed bodies dealing with various aspects of 
the war.101 The idealised view of political cooperation in the most pressing of national 
causes, which he propounded to his constituency supporters, certainly became for him a 
regular refrain. The argument that party and personal interests should remain subordinate 
to the task of doing whatever was necessary to bring the nation to victory was an enduring 
feature of his period in office. When this later cost him the support of many Labour activists, 
he responded defiantly. Criticised at the 1917 party conference for his readiness to remain 
in a government accused of anti-labour actions he retorted angrily that he would be 
resigning every day to please some of his critics. If he were to please himself he might even 
do so, but ‘he was not there either to please himself or them, he was there to see the War 
through.’102 
 
We may sense then that having helped secure the agreement of February 1915 Henderson 
felt freer to move less ambiguously into the ‘patriotic’ camp. From the perspective of 
maintaining party unity this could now seem relatively safe. Not only had the minority 
signed up to a commitment, bolstered by Allied socialists, in which vigorous pursuit of the 
war was very definitely sanctioned, they were also very much less likely than the trade 
unionist majority to contemplate defection from the party. It would in truth have been hard 
for the dissident socialists to go back to their pre-1900 status as small impecunious parties 
highly unlikely to ever attain positions of national power.  
 
It was also steadily clearer that ambiguity was not a safe or straightforward option in the 
prevailing political climate. The party may have got off lightly over the inclusion of ‘pacifist’ 
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sentiments in the February resolution, but there was no guarantee that the Fleet Street 
guardians of the patriotic consensus would show such forbearance in the future. With the 
war routinely seen in Manichean terms as a life and death struggle between good and evil, 
political pressures were correspondingly intense.103 These pressures were manifest 
throughout British party politics and played a large part in pushing Asquith into acceptance 
of a coalition government.104 Similarly within the labour movement, pressure on those seen 
as insufficiently committed to the war was increasingly in evidence. W C Anderson, author 
of the fiery ILP manifesto early in the war as well as current Chairman of the NEC, 
characterised the outlook of Labour ‘patriots’ as one in which ‘you must either be a Jingo 
shrieking your rage and hate and fear.....or......you are praying for the downfall of your 
country and the triumph of Prussian militarism.’105 The ‘for or against’ mentality was indeed 
commonplace in the contemporary statements of Anderson’s ‘patriotic’ colleagues. John 
Hodge, a member of the NEC, had used the expression when challenging MacDonald over 
the vote for war credits at the beginning of the war; a year later at the TUC annual congress 
his NEC colleague G. H. Roberts repeated that one was ‘either for or against the nation’.106 
Similar comments were made in the Labour party annual conference the following January 
by two other members of the NEC, J. R. Clynes and G. J. Wardle.107 
 
There was a rationale for this sort of pressure. Dissensions within Britain would be picked up 
abroad, negatively impacting on the war effort. In a series of vitriolic articles, letters and 
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editorials appearing in The Times in the autumn of 1914 MacDonald had been chastised for 
‘Helping the Enemy’ when it was learned that his critical comments regarding Grey’s 
diplomacy had been exploited in the German press.108 When Henderson signed the patriotic 
labour declaration in October he was apparently swayed by his colleagues’ argument that 
the party’s lack of clarity on the war had created ‘a very bad impression....in neutral 
countries’, and that it was ‘desirable’ that some statement should be made to counteract 
this.109 Striking a safe balance between ‘patriotic’ and ‘pacifist’ sentiments was unlikely to 
have become easier as the war progressed. Joining the government helped him escape this 
dilemma, requiring him to resign both from the UDC General Council (though not without 
expressing his continuing sympathy for the cardinal points of the Union’s constitution), and 
from his position as Secretary of the British Section of the International.110 
 
If Henderson became less ambiguously a ‘patriot’, what sort of commitment did he retain to 
the ‘pacifist’ sections of the February resolution? It seems likely that he would have seen 
himself in the same boat as many other progressives, eager to ensure that the war would 
end with a progressive peace settlement, ready to engage in political battle to that end, but 
obliged to hold fire until the popular climate moved at least some way from its current 
‘patriotic’ excess. But nobody had any idea when the national mood would become more 
supportive. Henderson was also now a member of the government. In criticising the party’s 
decision to join the coalition, Snowden had predicted that as the war approached its 
conclusion, when peace terms would need to be decided.......the party would find itself still 
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shackled to coalition government ‘with its hands tied and its mouth closed.’111 In the end of 
course Henderson was free to lead the party in an unshackled and determined campaign for 
socialist peace terms, but had no way of anticipating the circumstances which would make 
that possible. In the intervening period therefore, Snowden’s forebodings seemed well 
justified. 
 
Developments during the middle period of the war were undoubtedly discouraging for 
progressives. With no end to the military stalemate in sight, peace remained far beyond the 
horizon, and discussion of its probable terms was still strongly discouraged. Developments 
during this period did impact however on the likely shape of a future settlement, widening 
the gulf between ‘patriots’ and ‘pacifists’. We shall examine in the remainder of this chapter 
how these burgeoning events boded for the hopes expressed in the Allied socialist 




A Party Divided 
 
The Allied Socialists had declared in 1915 that they were ‘resolved to resist any attempt to 
transform this defensive war into a war of conquest.’ They would also reject ‘the political 
and economic crushing’ of the citizens of enemy states, since they were themselves victims 
of the aggressive designs of their governments. They insisted too that they ‘remained true 
to the principles of the International’ and expressed the hope that the working classes of all 
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countries would ‘before long’ find themselves reunited ‘in their struggle against militarism 
and capitalist imperialism.’112 In all three of these resolutions the prospects of achieving 
their goals seemed subsequently to diminish. As a Cabinet minister and effective leader of 
the Labour party Henderson was able to observe and was to varying degrees involved in the 
diminution of these prospects, but appeared unable or unwilling to react to this clear 
weakening of hope for a socialist peace. Whilst some evidence suggests that he may have 
‘gone native’ and increasingly come to share the views of his Cabinet colleagues regarding 
desirable peace terms, it is equally possible that he was simply constrained, not only by the 
conventions of Cabinet responsibility but also by the continuing strength of ‘patriotic’ 
sentiment in his party. This section will consider these alternative possibilities.  
 
Regarding the stipulation that the war should not become a ‘war of conquest’, doubts 
continued to grow over whether Allied war aims, as agreed in treaties concluded during the 
spring of 1915 and beyond, were consistent with the notion of a defensive war. Strong and 
well founded suspicions that the Russians had secured their Allies’ consent to post war 
control of the Ottoman Empire’s capital, Constantinople, were more or less confirmed 
during the course of 1916.113 And in what amounted to a significant failure of ‘secret’ 
diplomacy many details of the expansionist terms by which the Italian government was 
persuaded in the spring of 1915 to join the war on the Allied side were widely known almost 
as soon as the treaty was signed.114 Closer to home it was clear also that powerful lobbies in 
Paris were anxious not only to secure the return of Alsace-Lorraine (an ambition largely 
acceptable to British opinion since these territories had been annexed from France in 1871) 
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but aimed also to take control of ‘the entire left bank of the Rhine’, despite the area being 
populated by eight million Germans.115  
 
Similarly in Britain vigorous lobbying in favour of the retention of the majority of Germany’s 
scattered colonies which had been seized or were in the process of being seized by British 
and Imperial forces was a feature of the political scene.116 It seemed likely too that with a 
final collapse of the Ottoman Empire widely expected, not only Russia would gain control 
over current areas of Turkish rule. French ambitions in the Levant were freely discussed in 
Paris. British forces were engaged by spring 1915 in both Mesopotamia and Gallipoli. 
Although the infamous Sykes-Picot agreement on post-war spheres of influence in the 
Middle East would not be signed until 1916, serious thought to the future shape of the 
region was being given much earlier.117 British labour could not agree on how to respond to 
these indications of expansionist intent. For ‘pacifists’ these were matters over which the 
government should be forcefully challenged. ‘Patriots’ on the other hand were sensitive to 
official claims that public discussion of such issues could weaken Allied solidarity and 
encourage the enemy. Ministers could insist moreover that the contents of Allied treaties, 
the secrecy of which had as was traditional to be maintained, would be acted upon only in 
accordance with prevailing conditions once the war was concluded.118 The ‘patriotic’ option 
therefore was to steer clear of the topic.  
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There was another equally powerful reason to take this stance. The issue of peace terms 
could be raised for more than one reason. The February resolution certainly legitimised 
debate on the subject in order to ensure that imperialist instincts would not prevail over the 
socialists’ concern that victory should be followed by an ameliorative peace. For ‘pacifists’ 
however the question of peace terms was increasingly seen to have more immediate value. 
As it became ever clearer that the soldiers were failing to bring an end to the war at 
anything other than an unacceptable cost, it was argued that the diplomats should be given 
the chance to negotiate a settlement. Since it was agreed that the most vital British and 
French war aim was the removal of German forces from the occupied areas of Belgium and 
France, could this be bought by the sacrifice of some of the lesser and more questionably 
legitimate Allied aims? If so, many lives might surely be saved.119 
 
This line of reasoning was already emerging as the Allied socialists met in early 1915 and it 
was met in the national press with a hostile response. Reacting to an article in the February 
1915 Contemporary Review by the ‘Radical publicist’ Harold Spender, in which the possibility 
of a negotiated settlement was mooted, the Daily Express journalist Sydney Dark reacted 
forcefully to this dangerous idea. Using arguments that would be regularly deployed 
throughout the war, Spender’s suggestion was dismissed, to use the sub-headings of Dark’s 
response, as ‘wicked and foolish’, a ‘puerile proposal’ and ‘the enemy’s game’. To talk of 
peace was to weaken the determination of the Allies ‘to fight on until Germany is hopelessly 
beaten.....’ Anything less would render the sacrifices already made as in vain; brave men 
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would have died for no purpose; and future generations would have to prepare ‘to fight 
Prussianism all over again.’120 Labour ‘patriots’ were quick to adopt similar views.121 
 
There was an important and obvious distinction between the idea that peace terms would 
be a matter of justifiable interest in relation to the settlement that would follow a German 
defeat, and the alternative notion that terms could be negotiated in order to reach a peace 
without clear victory for either side. But ‘patriots’ found it easy to conflate these purposes. 
Later in the war when the Labour party was willing to challenge the government to openly 
state British war aims, Winston Churchill provided a fine example of this technique. He was 
afraid, he told a Bedford audience, that there were people who go about saying ‘restate 
your war aims’ when what they really mean is ‘make friends with the victorious Huns.’ They 
ask ‘What are we fighting for?’ when they really mean ‘Let us leave off fighting.’122 To avoid 
becoming a victim of this sort of obfuscation the safe option was to remain within the 
confines of accepted phraseology and to talk only of the nation’s commitment to a just and 
lasting peace, as Henderson frequently did during his ministerial phase. Such words could be 
invested with meanings that did not challenge national ambitions. For surely it would be 
‘just’ to liberate the oppressed national groups suffering under German, Austrian or Turkish 
misrule. And plainly too a peace settlement that left the Empire’s global position 
strategically enhanced relative to that of the aggressors would be an effective way to ensure 
the peace would be ‘lasting’. 
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The resolve of the Allied socialists to reject ‘the political and economic crushing’ of enemy 
citizens on the grounds that they were themselves oppressed by the common enemy 
appeared not to find general favour. The notion that the peoples, as opposed to the 
governments, could retain mutual sympathy during the war was to prove delusive. In Britain 
the government would in the early days insist that it had no quarrel with the German 
people, and ministers would periodically repeat this. But this was a sentiment more usually 
expressed by Liberals than Conservatives.123 Two years into the war the Liberal peer, Lord 
Bryce, could continue to insist that Britons, excluding a ‘certain chauvinistic element’ to be 
found in all countries, harboured no hatred for the German people.124 But did Bryce perhaps 
understate the hostility evinced throughout the nation towards the hated Hun? 
 
From the early months of the war in fact the argument was made that enemy citizens 
should not be considered as innocent of their country’s designs. Within weeks of the 
outbreak the Daily Mail gave space in its columns to the Belgian playwright, Maurice 
Maeterlinck, who proclaimed the guilt of all Germans and urged his British readers not to 
succumb at the war’s end to the inevitable efforts there would then be to enlist sympathy 
for those supposedly unfortunate Germans who were ‘merely victims of their monarch and 
their feudal caste.’125 The British writer, Arnold Bennett, would later argue that since the 
German people would undoubtedly be happy to reap the benefits of a criminal war in the 
event of their armies proving victorious, so too should they share in the national 
punishment and humiliation of defeat.126 Few historians today would disagree with the 
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judgement of Arthur Marwick that ‘an intense hatred of the German Kaiser and people’ was 
an ‘obvious feature’ of the British wartime mood: a mood which manifested itself in spy 
hunts, calls for internment, and periodic destructive riots against those of German origin 
settled in Britain.127 Labour ‘patriots’ were not immune from these hatreds. In a warmly 
applauded address at the 1915 Trades Union Congress, E. H. Jarvis of the Carpenters and 
Joiners Union, was persuaded that German workers had ‘entered the trenches eagerly 
and.....taken delight in shooting our lads down.’128 
 
One way in which German civilians might suffer as a consequence of defeat in the war was 
through discriminatory trade measures levied upon them by the victorious Allies. This was a 
major concern of British progressives. Many Conservatives had perceived the pre-war 
German threat as economic as well as military, and a movement for tariff reform had been 
largely directed at their powerful economic rival. The war provided an irresistible 
opportunity to renew this campaign. A Commons motion of 10 January 1916 calling on the 
still predominantly Liberal coalition to initiate discussions with Dominion and Allied 
governments designed to direct their combined economic strength against the enemy won 
considerable support in the House. There was wide consensus over the proposition that 
since Germany had been waging economic war against its rivals for many years prior to its 
military assault, it would almost certainly do so again once this assault had been seen to fail. 
The Liberal President of the Board of Trade, Walter Runciman, largely went with the tide in 
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agreeing that ‘we must see to it that, having ended this War victoriously, we do not give 
Germany a chance of reconstructing her commercial position.’129 
 
Later in the year at an economic conference in Paris ways of putting these ideas into effect 
were agreed.130 The proposals that emerged horrified ‘pacifists’.131 They were declared to 
be in clear contradiction to official statements that the purpose of the war was not to 
punish enemy civilians.132 As with expansionist war aims however justifications for these 
measures were not difficult to find. Only minorities in Britain and France would have wished 
to dissent from the statement released by their governments following the conference, 
which asserted that Germany and her allies were already preparing for ‘a contest on the 
economic plane, which will not only survive the re-establishment of peace, but will at that 
moment attain its full scope and intensity.’ In the face of ‘so grave a peril’, the statement 
continued, it was the duty of Allied governments, ‘on grounds of necessary and legitimate 
defence’ to prepare their own counter-measures.133 Labour had traditionally opposed 
protectionism, but during the war this opposition was challenged. At the 1916 TUC 
conference a motion designed to challenge the decisions in Paris was neutralised by an 
amendment aimed at blunting this purpose.134  
 
Evidence that a part at least of ‘patriotic’ labour was entirely out of sympathy with the 
stance taken by Allied socialists on enemy civilians was provided by the emergence of a new 
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militantly nationalist party, the Socialist National Defence Committee. This body had 
features in common with the more notorious ‘national socialist’ movements which 
flourished between the wars: a strong sense of racial identification; a profound loathing for 
the pacifist and internationalist left; and a penchant for political violence directed against its 
political enemies.135 The new party was the initiative of a former member of the British 
Socialist Party (BSP), Victor Fisher, who had attended the Allied Socialist conference as a 
delegate of this group, which at the time had been dominated by ‘patriots’.136 Changing its 
name successively to the British Workers’ National League, the British Workers’ League and 
the National Democratic Party the group became associated with the Cabinet minister, Lord 
Milner, who provided Fisher’s new party with political and financial support.137  
 
Henderson may have assumed in early 1915 that whilst the differences within labour on the 
war were unbridgeable, divisions would be far less pronounced when it came to 
considerations of the eventual peace. The patriotic manifesto he had reluctantly signed the 
previous October had arguably suggested this much. The BWL however set about negating 
any such presumption. It held the German people and German socialists, no less than the 
Kaiser’s regime, responsible for the war and fiercely objected to any sort of ameliorative 
peace.138 It opposed a post-war return to free trade, supported the recommendations of the 
Paris Economic Conference, and campaigned for a closed economic system within the 
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Empire.139 Yet the League had considerable support at all levels within the labour 
movement, including several members of the NEC and, by 1917, ‘no fewer than eleven’ out 
of thirty eight of Labour MPs.140  It established over seventy branches around the country 
and staged up to a hundred patriotic mass meetings a week.141  Its weekly paper claimed a 
circulation of approximately 30,000.142 
 
A third expectation raised in the Allied socialist resolution over which action proved 
inordinately difficult concerned the International. It had been assumed following the 
February 1915 conference that discussion with the ISB would continue. Henderson and 
MacDonald were expected in due course to travel to The Hague for this purpose. Following 
Henderson’s move into government and the consequent resignation from his role with the 
British Section, MacDonald would have to be accompanied by whoever else would assume 
Henderson’s place as Secretary – someone necessarily in prevailing circumstances being a 
‘patriot’. But the two most eligible candidates, Hodge and Clynes, declined to take up the 
position.  It had been intended that in such an event the Executive would appoint another 
individual. Hodge however successfully proposed a different solution: that it was ‘desirable 
that no delegation from the British Section should attend international meetings at The 
Hague under existing circumstances.’143 But if British labour would not go to The Hague, The 
Hague decided it would come to Britain. In March 1916 Camille Huysmans, the ISB 
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secretary, and its president, Vandervelde, arrived in London ‘to get first hand information as 
to the feeling in Britain’ regarding the war and eventual conditions of peace. 
 
The purpose of the ISB visitors was to initiate conversations related primarily to the 
eventual peace not only with the Labour party, but also the other groups affiliated to the 
British section: the ILP, the Fabians and the BSP. Each of these organisations later submitted 
reports to the ISB; the Labour party did not. After twice deferring its decision on how to 
respond, the Labour executive finally informed Vandervelde and Huysmans ‘that any 
consideration of possible terms of peace by the British movement was absolutely impossible 
at the present time,’ that ‘such action would create misunderstandings in neutral and Allied 
countries and also in the mind of the enemy as to the attitude of the British working class 
towards the war,’ and that ‘the only thing with which the Labour Party could concern itself 
was the prosecution of the War to a victorious termination’.144 The following January the 
executive was confronted with a further initiative, this time on the part of Dutch socialists, 
who invited the French and British parties to meet with themselves and a delegation from 
Sweden. Once again the response was negative.145 This latest rejection came on the eve of 
the 1917 annual conference in Manchester, at which the majority secured its resolution 
against any international conference before the end of the war.  
 
It was during this conference however that the fraternal French delegate, Pierre Renaudel, 
informed his British hosts that his own party would soon be extending invitations to a 
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second Allied Socialist conference in Paris.146 The executive found it particularly difficult to 
reject the invitation of so important an ally, despite this running counter to the latest 
conference decision. Initially the decision was taken, albeit reluctantly, to accept the French 
invitation. Four weeks later the executive changed its mind and announced that it would not 
attend, upon which the SFIO called off the conference altogether.147 
 
It was noted in these early months of 1917 that the British labour party appeared to be 
lagging behind other European parties, who were increasingly questioning their loyalties to 
their respective governments. In a hard-hitting UDC pamphlet Morel accused the Labour 
leadership of standing alone amongst ‘the world’s democratic organisations’ in continuing 
to ‘support the Imperialist ambitions which prolong the war.’148 The pamphlet was written 
sometime between Wilson’s ‘Peace Without Victory’ address on 22 January and the Russian 
revolution in mid-March. Morel reproduced statements from German, French and Italian 
parliamentary socialists, all of which expressed strong support for Wilson’s address and 
condemned the ‘exalted brigandage’ of their own nations’ imperialists.149 Although Morel 
doubtless overplayed the significance of these movements in continental socialist opinion, 
there was certainly something in what he said. British labour seemed stubbornly impervious 
to the pressures on patriotic opinion within other socialist parties during the winter of 1916-
17.150 These pressures were to increase greatly following the overthrow of the tsarist 
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government as radical Russian socialists came to international prominence with unequivocal 
condemnations of what they saw as an imperialist war.151 
 
The party of greatest importance to British labour was undoubtedly the French. Being of 
similar size and political significance within the international movement, and being closely 
aligned on their views on the war, the two parties attached great value to their sustained 
solidarity. The balance of power within the SFIO however was moving very much in the 
direction of the minoritaires during 1916.152 The decision to call a second Allied socialist 
conference was a consequence of gains for the French minorities in local party branches, 
which allowed Longuet and his supporters to press reluctant majoritaires into support for 
this initiative.153 The proposed agenda later agreed for this conference would undoubtedly 
have struck British labour ‘patriots’ as ‘pacifist’ in its tone and language and may have 
played a part in inducing the NEC to reverse its decision to attend.154  
 
Majoritaires in the French parliament had already been pushed the previous November into 
demanding of their government that it ‘must convince everybody that it has no bad designs’ 
and that soldiers must not be asked ‘to spend their efforts in pursuit of territorial 
conquests.’ Having attended the SFIO annual conference in late December and witnessed 
the growing strength and confidence of the minoritaires, Henderson would report to the 
War Cabinet on ‘the considerable development of pacifist feeling’ within the French party. 
He expressed concern regarding Longuet’s faction which had ‘been leading a movement for 
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peace’ and had ‘weakened on [the French demand for the return of] Alsace-Lorraine.’ Had 
the Longuet group swung behind a more radical group of minoritaires, he observed, the 
majority may well have lost their ascendancy. Moreover, if the recent peace initiatives on 
the part of the Germans and Americans ‘had held out any hope for the restoration of 
Belgium, the Longuet group would have been very dangerous.’155 
 
 
Henderson was clearly speaking the language of his Cabinet colleagues in this discussion. 
But did this now represent his true opinion? His comments or silences over the previous two 
years on the matters we have been considering above give no hint that he was anything 
other than a committed ‘patriot’. The fact that once free of Cabinet responsibility he went 
on to pursue ‘pacifist’ objectives in relation to war aims, the International, and post-war 
economic discrimination against enemy states is the only reason one might have to doubt 
this. But whether in the context of the War Cabinet or of his party he continued during the 
first five months of 1917 to follow an unmistakably ‘patriotic’ line. According to MacDonald, 
for example, it was Henderson who pressed the NEC to overturn the initial decision to 
accept the French invitation to a second Allied conference, on the grounds that there was a 
‘danger that the British majority might be outvoted.’156  
 
Considering then Henderson’s responses to the political developments we have described 
above, all of which were antithetical to the prospects of a progressive peace, we are left 
with two explanatory options. One of these is that his views on the war had indeed become 
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firmly aligned with those of his Cabinet colleagues. This would undoubtedly represent a 
familiar trajectory, undergone many times by radical politicians. What would be unusual in 
this case however was the sudden return to original perspectives which was shortly to take 
place. Current interpretations explain this in terms of his experiences in Russia and the 
miscalculations of Lloyd George. A second explanation could suggest that he was in reality 
dissatisfied with his current position, but that the political constraints under which he 
laboured were responsible for the lack of any evident discontent. Henderson has left no 
clues as to which of these explanations carries the greater conviction. The most we can do, 
it would seem, is to approach the issue tangentially, by examining the nature and extent of 
the political constraints by which he may well have felt bound. As Snowden had of course 
predicted, participation in government was almost certainly a very powerful constraint at 
this time. So too, we may assume, was the vigilance of the ‘patriotic’ press, always quick to 
sniff out ‘pacifist’ backsliding.157 And as we have seen, there were many in his party who 
shared powerfully ‘patriotic’ views.158 Henderson may indeed have been triply constrained, 
seeing little possibility of striking out in a new direction, even if this was something he might 
have desired. 
 
Two other considerations may be mentioned. If it were not possible for Henderson at this 
time to change course, it would seem very much in character that he should continue along 
the current path with his customary vigour. And again, apprehensions over the continued 
cohesion of his party may certainly have played a part. Wilson and the events in Russia 
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naturally encouraged the minority, but as the confidence of ‘pacifists’ grew, so too did the 
responses of the ‘patriots’. The party had long been polarised and in this period was 
becoming ever more so.159 For the reasons we have already considered, Henderson, 
regardless of any personal views he may have held, was not prepared to step over into the 
minority camp for fear of allowing the more extreme ‘patriots’ to question the merits of 
remaining within a party whose most senior figures  were dallying with ‘pacifism’.  
 
Growing polarisation within the Labour party was reflected a in a growing polarisation 
within the nation, of which the Lloyd George government, dominated as it was by the 
political right, was a symptom. The decision of the Labour leadership to join this coalition 
had itself exacerbated the differences within the party. The readiness of the NEC and PLP to 
join the new coalition in December 1916 was acrimoniously debated at the party conference 
the following month.160 Henderson himself stoutly supported this decision, despite its being, 
in important respects, a harder change to justify than that of 1915. Few in the party (and 
certainly not Henderson) had welcomed the campaign which had removed Asquith from 
office. Few were impressed by the political intrigues through which Lloyd George had 
secured the premiership.161 And the role of the press in this unseemly political coup was 
condemned by ‘patriots’ and ‘pacifists’ alike.162 Asquith’s refusal, supported by the majority 
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of Liberal MPs, to serve under Lloyd George made it impossible to claim moreover that the 
new coalition represented the nation as a whole.163 
 
Henderson made light of these matters, stressing rather the more fundamental continuities 
in Labour policy, particularly the need to demonstrate to the world the maximum degree of 
national unity in support of the war. He did nevertheless place some emphasis on the 
benefits the movement was likely to achieve as a result of having joined the new coalition. 
In the negotiations preceding Labour’s accession Lloyd George had offered Labour twice the 
number of ministerial posts they had obtained under Asquith. These were posts moreover 
which would be important in protecting the interests of workers. The Prime Minister had 
also pledged to adopt principles of state control over major industries, something which 
Labour had long sought. These commitments, if honoured, would certainly chime with the 
party’s domestic concerns. There was apparently however a further commitment, which 
Henderson did not mention. This was a promise that Labour would be represented at the 
peace conference. It was only revealed, perhaps by agreement, at the end of the war, when 
the party executive demanded that it should be redeemed.164 Whilst Henderson may have 
been obliged to remain silent on this particular pledge, it should certainly be noted that 
throughout his lengthy justification of the party’s decision to embrace Lloyd George’s right 
wing regime, he made no mention at all of any controversies surrounding the question of 
peace.165 
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It was left to others amongst the coalition supporters, notably Clynes, to raise this issue on 
his behalf. Having castigated Snowden and his associates for apparently believing that they 
could distance themselves from support for the war and then claim that ‘they above all 
others’ had the right to determine the terms of peace, Clynes polemically asked:  ‘Was it of 
no value to Labour to have a man of great Trade Union experience like Mr. Henderson 
having a voice and taking part in the terms of the settlement as he had in the general 
prosecution of the War?’166 Given Henderson’s elevated position in the new Cabinet, this on 
the face of it appeared a reasonable assumption. But whilst present on an almost daily basis 
at meetings in which the most sensitive matters of the war and international politics were 
discussed, he generally failed to take a prominent part in these discussions or to challenge 
the assumptions shared by his Cabinet colleagues. Unacquainted as he was ‘with even the 
basic elements of strategy’, Henderson was given and accepted other areas within 
government, usually involving labour or manpower problems, in which to work.167  
 
One exception to this norm was the series of Imperial War Cabinet meetings in the spring of 
1917 attended by high level representatives of the Dominions and India. In one of these 
meetings Henderson did register dissent. The purpose of this particular meeting was to 
consider the report of a Committee on Territorial Desiderata chaired by Lord Curzon and 
more generally to discuss Imperial war aims. The Committee had been unanimous, reported 
Curzon, on the need to secure ‘the future safety of the British Empire by removing the 
menace, which the German colonial system and the German ambition for expansion 
towards the Suez Canal and the Persian Gulf, created to the sea communications of the 
Empire and to its peaceful development.’ The spokesmen of the Dominions and India had 
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held ‘the very strongest views’ on this matter. Removing the threat to the Empire, the 
Committee believed, required the retention of at minimum, German East Africa, Palestine 
and Mesopotamia.  
 
Other less important areas, though their retention would be desirable, could conceivably be 
relinquished if it proved necessary to trade territories in the peace conference. It was 
recognised during the course of the discussion that consideration would need to be given to 
the views of the Allies and to the military positions of the combatants at the end of the war 
before such aims could be finally settled upon. The Cabinet therefore decided to accept 
Curzon’s report as ‘an indication of the objects to be sought’ at a peace conference rather 
than as ‘definite instructions’ to be given to the Empire’s negotiators. Henderson however 
‘regretted that he felt compelled to dissent from this Conclusion.’ Since it was clear that 
‘certain annexations’ were being considered, and speaking ‘not as representing himself, but 
the Party which had sent him to the Imperial War Cabinet, he was bound to vote against any 
annexation of territory.’168  
 
This clearly fell short of any strong personal affirmation of what Clynes may have imagined 
to be his intention to fight in Cabinet for a Labour peace. The statement that he was bound 
by his party to dissent obviously left open the possibility that his personal views on this 
matter may have differed from the positions of his party. Even if he did feel personally 
committed to a labour peace, it could be argued, he clearly recognised his inability to 
persuade Cabinet colleagues to abandon their traditional perspectives on what would best 
serve the Empire’s interests. Any Labour campaign against an annexationist peace would 
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clearly be fought at some later period, and mainly in some other political forum. Snowden 
could well have seen this as a clear case of a compromised Labour man with his hands tied 
and mouth closed. But in fairness to Henderson, it was up to his party to take up the baton 
on this issue, and his party was too deeply divided to do any such thing.  
 
An episode which occurred in February 1916 is worth contemplating in this respect. 
Realising the need to plan for the eventual end of the war, Henderson submitted proposals 
to the party executive that sub-committees should be set up jointly with the PLP to consider 
the questions of (a) peace terms, (b) Labour after the war and (c) electoral reform. The 
second and third of these committees were duly established and reports from them would 
appear regularly at future NEC meetings. The arrangements made for the peace terms 
committee were however somewhat bizarre. Its membership, comprising a balance of two 
‘patriots’, two ‘pacifists’ and Henderson was appointed on 15 February; the previous day 
however it had been agreed that this committee should merely ‘hold itself in readiness to 
take action respecting Peace Terms when occasion arises.’169 In the event, the occasion 
never did arise, the committee’s formation ultimately being overtaken by the dramatic turn 
in the political situation following Henderson’s return from Russia sixteen months later. It is 
surely remarkable that the Labour executive remained so resistant to broaching the issue of 
peace terms, despite its broad position having been formally stated in the previous year’s 
Allied socialist resolution, that it could not discuss this important topic even in private. 
 
It was perhaps just too depressingly obvious that any attempted discussion on peace terms 
would inevitably degenerate into futile confrontation. The challenge for the party in the 
                                                 
169
 LHA, NEC mins., 14 and 15 February 1916. 
98 
 
long run was to find a way of considering these questions in a manner that could transcend 
the rigidly opposed views of ‘patriots’ and ‘pacifists’. In the face of the now hardened 
attitudes in both groups, this was unlikely to be accomplished other than by some sea-
changing political development which would allow the terms of the debate to be 
reformulated. Perhaps then an area of common ground could be established, around which 
the more moderate elements of the opposing camps could unite. This indeed is what 
happened the following year, but this could not have been foreseeable in 1916. The one sea 
changing event that could on the other hand be safely predicted was that at some point the 
military stalemate would be broken and that the peace settlement, by virtue of its 
imminence, would necessarily become a legitimate matter of public debate. Given that this 
was necessarily dependent on military success, Henderson’s support for the Lloyd George 
coalition and its promise to prosecute the war more effectively can be seen to make sense. 
Little could be gained moreover by Henderson’s prematurely attacking the presumptions on 
peace terms of Cabinet colleagues before these became matters of much wider public 
discussion.  
 
Leaving the creation of a detailed party position on the peace settlement until the war was 
almost over was obviously however fraught with danger. Especially in the light of the 
divergent party perspectives, some more extensive period of political preparation would 
ideally have been required. This, as we have seen, had been argued by progressives in the 
early weeks of the war. The belief that there were ‘military and conservative interests in 
England’ who would be preparing for a peace unacceptable to labour did not at that time 
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seem particularly perverse.170  And the Allied socialists clearly acknowledged such a danger 
in February 1915. We may surmise that for Henderson in 1916 this danger would have 
remained perfectly perceptible, but that he accepted it because he saw no way it could be 
overcome.  
 
Until he went to Russia in 1917 then, we may account for Henderson’s actions in terms of 
the key decisions he had taken earlier in the war: to remain close to the party’s trade 
unionist majority; to fully support the government in its pursuit of military victory; and to 
hold fire over agitation regarding war aims until the political climate became significantly 
less hostile to this venture.  As always with Henderson, uncertainty regarding his innermost 
thoughts, plans or expectations, is unavoidable, and what is offered here is at best an 
informed guess. But for the reasons indicated in the Intoduction to this thesis, the 
inadequacy of the standard account necessitates a search for some new understanding. A 
key question at the heart of any such understanding is the extent and manner to which he 
felt committed to the fight for a progressive peace before he set sail for Petrograd. No 
convincing answer can be provided to this question through a direct examination of the pre-
Russia period. Evidence that he had remained strongly committed to a progressive peace 
comes essentially from the period after Russia.  
 
For the most part this evidence will be gleaned from later chapters, but one relevant 
indication may be provided here. A major theme of this chapter has been Henderson’s 
relationship to the February 1915 Allied socialist resolution. It may be fitting therefore to 
conclude with a brief look at the fate of this statement in the months after it was drafted. 
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For the two and a half years following its creation it had been used for the most part as a 
means by which ‘patriots’ could condemn their ‘pacifist’ opponents for failing to honour the 
commitment therein to remain ‘inflexibly resolved’ to fight until victory was achieved. 
Henderson used it in this manner in his justification at the 1917 annual party conference of 
the decision to join the Lloyd George coalition.171 Six months later it was used to very 
different effect.  
 
Following decisions made by the NEC on 25 July, the day after Henderson’s return from 
Russia, a ‘Memorandum on the Issues of the War’ was prepared for presentation to a 
hurriedly convened second Allied socialist conference in London, initially scheduled for the 
8th and 9th August. (This conference was to prepare for the full international conference in 
Stockholm, then scheduled for 22 August).172 The Memorandum opened by ratifying, 
reaffirming and reproducing the bulk of the 1915 resolution. What followed was a detailed 
statement of what were considered to be legitimate Allied war aims. In its penultimate 
clause the document called for the reconstitution of the Socialist International. Its final 
clause demanded of the ‘warring Governments’ a ‘common repudiation and abandonment 
of imperialism and aggression.’ Socialist and Labour movements were enjoined to press 
their governments towards a frank exchange of each other’s ‘claims and desires’ in the 
‘confident belief’ that this could lead to the passing ‘of the present terrible calamity.......’173 
 
In calling for the restitution of the International, in openly commenting on war aims, and in 
its advocacy of peace through negotiation, this Memorandum was already a far cry from 
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earlier official utterances of the party. Subsequent statements from future Allied socialist 
conferences would again be headed by the resolution of 1915.174 Having spent more than 
two years functioning as a political football then, the 1915 resolution suddenly assumed a 
new and more positive role: as a launch pad for a new Labour policy, a policy designed to 
ensure that an imperialist war would not be followed by an imperialist peace. No one has 
doubted that Henderson provided the momentum for this transformation. 
 
Historians are agreed that the major concerns mentioned above - party unity, an Allied 
victory and a progressive peace - influenced Henderson’s behaviour during the war. The 
relative strength of these concerns doubtless altered at different stages of the war. But all 
three constituted parameters within which his actions would be confined. In the long middle 
period of the war he was clearly as a member of the government doing his bit to help win 
the war. In continuing to accept that his party was divided and that opposing groups would 
remain free to voice their respective views, he certainly helped hold the party together, but 
at a cost in terms of pursuing an active official policy that went beyond unquestioning 
support for the nation. Regarding progressive peace terms, a Labour campaign at this stage 
of the war would be controversial and divisive, all too likely to create disunity between the 
country’s supporters of such a peace and those powerfully placed groups who continued to 
believe that future safety was best secured by enhancing the nation’s power at the expense 
of current or possible future enemies. It would also exacerbate divisions within Labour itself, 
again threatening the party’s cohesion. At this point in our argument then, we can see that 
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Henderson was indeed considerably constrained in any attempt he may have thought 












In August 1917 Henderson explained to his party that he had been opposed to British 
attendance at the Stockholm conference when he went to Russia, but that the 
circumstances he encountered whilst there persuaded him to change his mind. In 
December, following the recent Bolshevik coup, he pointedly asked party colleagues if it 
could be doubted that the government’s ignoring of his advice during the summer had 
‘contributed to the present awful Russian disaster?’1 These and other scattered remarks 
form the foundation of the labour historians’ standard account. For these sympathetic 
researchers the challenge has been to find in the historical record of Henderson’s six week 
stay in Russia evidence that corroborates, or better still, fills out an otherwise scanty 
account. Hamilton had few available sources on which to provide any such confident 
answers, but for the later historians we have been considering, access to government 
papers after 1967 provided the opportunity to make such an attempt. 
 
This chapter will show that these attempts were largely unsuccessful. Curiously enough, 
clear evidence that Henderson changed his mind on Stockholm whilst in Russia has not been 
found. Attempts to derive this conclusion from tangential remarks in Henderson’s 
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correspondence with Lloyd George have not been convincing. It has not been possible to 
glean from the contemporary sources convincing answers to the most fundamental 
questions regarding Henderson’s change of mind: precisely when, why, and in response to 
what particular events, had Henderson become committed to Stockholm? The reliance of 
standard accounts on Henderson’s own explanations of what happened in Russia remains 
largely unbroken. The attempts that have been made to fill out the record will be discussed 
below and their conclusions will be challenged. A rather fuller exploration than any so far 
provided of the events in Russia during Henderson’s stay will lead to a new conclusion: that 
if he did convert to Stockholm before he left Petrograd it is unlikely that this could have 
occurred until almost the end of his stay, and that it is arguable that the conversion was only 
completed after he had left Russia. Existing accounts of Henderson’s time in Russia, it will 
also be noted, have failed to take sufficient account of broader factors which would have 
impinged on Henderson’s consideration of the Stockholm option. They have also failed to 
take into account all the available evidence.  
 
Winter, author of the first and most influential post-1967 account of Henderson’s role in the 
Stockholm affair, has gone further than his successors in trying to fill the historical gaps. He 
has suggested the critical moment of his subject’s conversion whilst in Russia as well its 
proximate cause.2 Indicative perhaps of a tacit acceptance of Winter’s judgement, neither 
Wrigley nor Leventhal would attempt any further precision in this respect. Not until many 
years later did Bridgen follow Winter’s example and propose a date for Henderson’s 
conversion (which differed from that of his predecessor by two weeks). Bridgen however 
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offers little clarity as to why he chooses the date he does.3 Neither of these accounts will be 
shown to be reliable. The one thing of which he can be certain is that the first clear 
statement by Henderson of support for Stockholm does not actually appear until he reaches 
the city of Stockholm itself as he begins his journey home to Britain.4  
 
This may have a great deal more significance than has hitherto been recognised, particularly 
since during his brief stop in the Swedish capital he engaged in talks with the original 
proposers of the international conference, whose aims, as we shall see, were somewhat 
different to those of the Russian advocates. It will be argued in this chapter that the 
tendency in the standard account to perceive matters in simple terms of Henderson’s 
moving from opposition to support for Stockholm whilst in Russia can be challenged on two 
counts: firstly because the available evidence is not sufficient to sustain this, and secondly 
because it fails to give sufficient consideration to the fact that there were several different 
reasons the various political actors involved may have chosen, at one time or another, to 
support, oppose or defer judgement on the holding of or attendance at the conference. The 
discussion will rely principally on the evidence emerging from the period Henderson was 
actually in Russia and will specifically discount subsequent statements he would make when 
in Britain that may be seen as having political value in his attempt to persuade his party to 
follow his controversial new position.  
 
We may begin then with the first key component of the standard account: that when 
Henderson arrived in the Russian capital, Petrograd, on 1 June he was firmly opposed to his 
party’s attendance at the conference. Winter is particularly strong on this argument, 
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affirming that Henderson’s mind was ‘set against the Stockholm Conference’ and 
contending that the contrary view of Arno Mayer is simply ‘wrong’.5 But can Mayer’s 
judgement that Henderson was at this stage ‘uncommitted’ on the question be so easily 
dismissed? Formally speaking, Henderson would as Secretary of the Labour party have felt 
obliged to support the resolution of the 1917 annual conference rejecting British attendance 
at a full International Socialist conference, and the NEC had already rejected an invitation to 
Stockholm on 9 May. At that time however the party was following the French, whose 
socialists had earlier spurned the invitation. Agreement on policy between the two major 
Allied parties was naturally something both valued. By the end of May however a senior 
figure in the SFIO, Albert Thomas, whose position in the French government was similar to 
Henderson’s in the British, and who had already been despatched to Russia to perform the 
same role as his British counterpart, had become an advocate of the conference.6 More 
dramatically, in Paris the SFIO in a mood of unprecedented militancy had unanimously 
reversed its decision to reject Stockholm.7 Although Henderson remained bound by his own 
party’s decisions, he would certainly have seen these French developments as of potential 
future significance. 
 
Henderson was also of course a member of the War Cabinet, which had been modifying its 
own antithetical views towards a socialist conference during the fortnight prior to his 
departure. The background to these discussions was Russia’s deteriorating situation, as 
Allied governments saw it, following the revolution. A first Provisional Government in 
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Petrograd dominated by the liberal opposition to the tsar, mainly the Constitutional 
Democrats (Cadets), saw no reason to change the former regime’s policies on the war or on 
the secret commitments into which the Allies had entered. This government however was 
from the outset challenged by the Petrograd soviet, which rejected any policy of continuing 
the war in an attempt to achieve tsarist war aims and called instead for a peace based on 
the principles of ‘no annexations or indemnities’.8 Such profound disagreements ultimately 
led to the fall of the government and its replacement by a coalition, in which Soviet 
members were included, committed to a non-annexationist policy.9 These developments 
gave rise to concerns in London over the danger that Russia might conclude a separate 
peace.10 
 
This deeply worrying possibility had immediate relevance to the Stockholm question, given 
the enthusiasm of the Petrograd soviet for the conference and the still more alarming news 
that ‘leading German Socialists’ were likely to be present at the conference. The War 
Cabinet now feared that in the absence of Allied representation the Germans ‘would 
impress on the Russians that the British Empire and France were alone standing in the way 
of peace.’ The sending of labour delegates to the conference could in the light of these fears 
be justified. The difficulty arose however over who such delegates should be. Those who 
were known to be willing to attend were mainly ‘pacifists’ who ‘might do considerable 
harm.’ It would be better, the Cabinet felt, to send ‘a strong delegation from the Labour 
Party, who could represent our national aims.....in their true light.’ It was also considered 
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that whilst Henderson would be an obvious candidate to lead such a delegation, he would 
be debarred on account of his position within the Cabinet. Unable to reach any immediate 
conclusion, and aware that the Labour executive was meeting later the same day, the 
Cabinet commissioned Henderson to ascertain the views of the NEC’s pacifist minority as to 
the peace formula being propagated by the Russian socialists, and to consider who in the 
party might form an appropriate delegation for Stockholm, should the need arise.11 
 
Henderson’s first response to this startling volte face was to persuade his party to adopt the 
much safer option of a second Allied socialist conference in London at as early a date as 
possible. It quickly transpired however that the Russians had no interest in this and 
remained committed to a full gathering of the Socialist International. A further difficulty 
arose when the Petrograd soviet objected to the practice of the European Allies in ensuring 
that only majority socialists were permitted to travel to Russia. Members of the ILP and BSP, 
as well as equivalent groups elsewhere, had by now been invited to meet with the Soviet 
and a request to ‘grant facilities for the journey to Russia’ for such persons was formerly 
lodged by the foreign ministry in Petrograd. The War Cabinet proposed to the French and 
Italian governments that whilst it would be inadvisable simply to refuse this request, ways 
could be found to stall on its implementation.12 Shortly thereafter applications for passports 
to Russia were received at the Foreign Office from MacDonald and Fred Jowett (ILP 
members of the NEC) and Albert Inkpin of the (by now militantly ‘pacifist’) BSP.  
 
These various matters were debated at length in the War Cabinet on 21 May and again two 
days later, when some inter-related conclusions were finally reached. Having delayed for a 
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week any decision regarding passports for the three ‘pacifists’, it was agreed that these 
could be issued, although not immediately. This decision was dependent on the latter being 
accompanied by ‘a strong delegation of the British Labour Party.’ The possibility that such a 
delegation might include Henderson, whose leadership would undoubtedly enhance its 
strength, was again debated. It was finally agreed that the earlier French decision in sending 
Thomas to replace the current ambassador to Russia, Maurice Paléologue, whose closeness 
to the attitudes of the previous regime was now judged an impediment, could also be 
applied by the British government. Considering that their own ambassador in Petrograd, Sir 
George Buchanan, might also have become less than ideal in this role, the War Cabinet 
decided that Henderson could be more effective in influencing ‘the democratic elements 
which now predominate in Russia’ and invited him to ‘make a personal sacrifice and go to 
Petrograd on a similar footing to......Thomas.’ Since it was important that the right rather 
than the wrong socialists should be first to arrive in the Russian capital, it was also proposed 
that Henderson should ‘leave at the earliest possible date.’13 Henderson set off on his 
mission the following evening. 
 
Clearly one major part of this mission was that he should judge on the basis of firsthand 
experience of the situation in Petrograd whether to recommend to his colleagues in London 
attendance or otherwise at the Stockholm conference for British labour. How seriously 
should we expect Henderson to have taken such a responsibility? Given his behaviour over 
the previous two years in office we may assume he would not have treated the matter 
lightly. We may also assume that he would have recognised the strength of the Cabinet’s 
argument: that a situation in which Russian and German socialists might confer in a forum 
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from which Allied voices were absent was potentially very dangerous. He would probably 
not on the other hand have relished the task of persuading labour’s own ‘patriots’ to 
reverse a policy they had only recently imposed on the party, let alone getting many of 
them to welcome sitting in conference with loathed German socialists. Admittedly the 
reversal of the French socialist position would have made his job a little easier, but it would 
still surely leave him with a hard case to sell. 
 
The disagreement between Winter and Mayer as to whether Henderson was ‘set against’ or 
‘uncommitted’ to Stockholm is clearly not as black or white as Winter imagines, unless of 
course Winter is deemed to be speaking only of Henderson’s personal view on the merits of 
an international socialist conference at this stage of the war. But as we must repeatedly 
observe such personal views are always in Henderson’s case hard to determine. Moreover 
the most significant evidence in support of Winter’s opinion lies in Henderson’s own 
subsequent statements which we have reason to consider less than fully reliable. 
 
As a footnote to the disagreement between Winter and Mayer it is worth quoting how the 
latter continues after his observation that Henderson was ‘uncommitted’ on Stockholm. 
Henderson, Mayer writes, ‘seems to have felt that provided the.......Conference were 
limited to a restatement of nonannexationist war aims it might exert a healthy influence on 
the excessively rigid war cabinets.’14 This is arguably a more challengeable statement than 
the one with which Winter takes issue, on the grounds that it appears premature. This is a 
position with which we may confidently identify Henderson later in the year, but less so at 
this particular time. It is though interesting to note that discussions surrounding non-
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annexationist war aims were already taking place between members of the 
Dutch/Scandinavian Committee such as leading Swedish socialist, Hjalmar Branting, and 
Camille Huysmans, and that visiting socialist delegations were providing their views on such 
pertinent matters preparatory to the Stockholm conference. Branting and Huysmans were 
the men with whom Henderson would speak whilst en route back to Britain in mid July, and 
indeed many times thereafter. 
 
We may also note at this point that we have already uncovered no less than three reasons 
to ‘support’ Stockholm, all of which can plausibly at one time or another be attributed to 
Henderson: the first being that of the standard account, as a means to bolster the struggling 
Russian government; the second being that raised in the War Cabinet, to prevent German 
socialists driving wedges between their Russian counterparts and the Allies; and the third 
being that indicated by Mayer, the exertion of pressure in favour of non-annexationist  war 
aims on ‘excessively rigid’ belligerent governments. 
 
We may now move on to the second and most important component of the standard 
account and consider if it is possible to elucidate just when and why during his stay in Russia 
Henderson became convinced of the need, on behalf of his hosts, to promote British 
attendance at Stockholm. As we have suggested, Winter is the only historian who has so far 
offered a comprehensive answer to this question and it is with his explanation we must 
start. Winter argues that Henderson’s change of direction can be pinpointed to the 
beginning of July and directly related to the trauma of the Russian army’s 1 July military 
offensive and its resulting rout at the hands of the Germans. He quotes from a telegram to 
Lloyd George of this date, in which Henderson warns the Prime Minister that ‘we must be 
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on our guard’ against any ‘appearance of coldness or neglect in our dealing with Provisional 
Government. Anything which injures their credit here can only operate to strengthen forces 
of disorder and to postpone the Restoration of Russia.’ His message goes on to distinguish 
between Bolshevik and Menshevik ways to achieve peace, the former relying on ‘direct 
action on Western proletariate to provoke uprising against capitalism and war together.....’; 
the latter for Constitutional action to convert labour movements which could then exercise 
pressure on their own governments. These differences, he suggested, corresponded to a 
general distinction between the ‘agitator and idealist in all countries.’15  
 
Henderson’s ‘firm support for the “idealist” provisional government,’ concludes Winter, 
‘eventually brought him to favour the Stockholm project.’ The military offensive and the 
subsequent disintegration of the Russian army persuaded him ‘that support for Stockholm 
was probably the only way to keep Russia in the war and to keep a moderate government in 
power.’ In support of this last point Winter adds in a footnote that ‘Buchanan’s opinion was 
similar’ and he cites as evidence a telegram from the ambassador of 5 July stating: ‘Nothing 
would I think help Kerenski so much at the present moment as announcement that Allied 
Government had accepted Russian proposal for Conference in early September.’16 
 
There are several observations that can be made in relation to the above. In the first place 
there was nothing new in Henderson’s view of 1 July about the dangers of injuring the credit 
of the Provisional Government. Buchanan as well as Thomas had been making the same 
points since the formation of the Kerensky led coalition. Henderson himself had said much 
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the same in an earlier letter to Lloyd George, stressing the need ‘to go steadily forward 
losing no opportunity to strengthen the hands of the Government and being most careful to 
avoid any act or word which might give the Extremists a handle against them.’17 Nor is it 
clear that the launching of the military offensive at the beginning of July deepened 
Henderson’s concerns regarding the vulnerability of the Provisional Government.  
 
As he reports in the 1 July letter referenced by Winter, the offensive actually met with 
‘initial success’.18 The first two days of fighting saw remarkable advances against Austrian 
forces accompanied by mass surrenders of enemy troops. When news of these successes 
reached Petrograd the popularity of the government understandably soared. Even the 
determinedly defeatist Bolsheviks carefully avoided puncturing the euphoric mood.19 It is 
true that Henderson had doubts as to whether the offensive could be successfully 
maintained, but his doubts were based on the ‘profound......industrial disorganisation’ 
behind the front lines.20 He had already reported to Lloyd George two weeks earlier a 
common feeling that the ‘disorganisation’ of the country was so great as to render ‘a 
successful offensive’ impossible.21 Finally the ‘rout’ of Russian forces which Winter sees as 
decisive in Henderson’s commitment to Stockholm did not really begin until German troops 
launched a counter-offensive on 19 July, by which time Henderson had left Russia.22 
 
These points surely weaken Winter’s argument, but the footnote on Buchanan creates a 
further misleading impression: that the ambassador too had become an advocate of 
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Stockholm. In fact the conference to which Buchanan was referring on 5 July was not 
Stockholm but a different one proposed by the Russian foreign minister, M. I. Tereshchenko, 
inviting Allied governments to discuss possible modifications to their war aims. The fact that 
there was an alternative conference to Stockholm which could equally be of assistance to 
the Russian leadership is something to which the exponents of the standard account have 
paid virtually no attention. This is unfortunate, since as we shall see, it was the 
governmental rather than the socialist conference that Henderson, like Buchanan, 
consistently advocated throughout his stay in Russia.23  
 
It has been noted by an early historian of the Stockholm episode that the multiplicity of 
conferences being proposed or discussed at this time created ‘considerable confusion in the 
public mind’ – a confusion which affected even ‘journalists, politicians and diplomats.’24 
Three separate conferences which could have involved Russian and British participants were 
under protracted and often fruitless discussion during the summer of 1917. It will at this 
point be of considerable value to examine more fully these proposed encounters, to 
consider the objects which their various advocates hoped to achieve by them, and to better 
understand the context in which Henderson was required to make decisions as to which 
conferences he should ‘support’ or ‘oppose’. 
 
Let us consider first the Allied Socialist conference in London which Henderson himself 
proposed on 9 May. As we have noted, this was first and foremost a safer and more 
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acceptable way of parleying with Russians than by meeting in Stockholm. Such a gathering 
would clearly be dominated by Allied ‘patriots’. Once it was clear that Russian socialists 
remained wedded to Stockholm, Henderson continue to proselytise for the London 
conference as a necessary preliminary, enabling Allied socialists, including Russians, to 
hammer out common positions to take to the full International. But this too was 
unacceptable to the Russians. For although still fighting against German and Austrian forces 
(in order to liberate occupied areas of Russian territory, rather than in support of the wider 
goals agreed between Allied governments earlier in the war) Russian  socialists by now saw 
themselves less as belligerents than as ‘a conciliating force between the two enemy blocs.’25  
To identify themselves with either bloc for the purposes of preparatory discussions was to 
defeat their principal objective, which was to persuade fellow workers on both sides to put 
pressure on their respective governments to conclude an early peace.26 
 
The Allied governmental conference proposed by Tereshchenko was on the other hand 
acceptable to the majority of socialists in the Petrograd soviet. It was designed after all to 
bring Allied governments into line with the non-annexationist peace formula which had 
emerged in the first place from the Soviet. Allied governments were clearly reluctant to 
enter any such dialogue, but were pressed by their representatives in Russia to at least give 
the appearance of compliance with Tereshchenko’s request, for fear of undermining the 
government’s fragile stability.  
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As the Russian socialists mostly supported their government’s efforts to achieve a war aims 
conference, so too did Tereshchenko and many of his colleagues welcome the prospect of 
the Stockholm conference. The pressure that might thereby be placed on Allied 
governments could be helpful in bringing about a readiness to renegotiate Allied war aims, 
which could in turn pave the way to wider international negotiations leading to the 
possibility of an early peace. Whilst tensions inevitably existed between Russian ministers 
and the powerful Petrograd soviet there was a general consensus on the need for Russia to 
extricate itself from the war.27 The extensive social, economic and political demands 
emanating from the newly liberated Russian masses, as well as the widespread popular 
longing for peace, placed immense pressure on the Provisional Government. Unwilling 
however to take the option later adopted by the Bolsheviks of a separate peace with the 
Central Powers, the leadership, supported by the Soviet, were therefore dependent on 
Allied governments,  without whom they would be unable to move towards an overall 
settlement. Any assistance that could be provided by a revived socialist internationalism 
would therefore be welcome both to the government and the more moderate of the 
Russian socialists.28 
 
Allied governments were no less reliant on the Russians, whose armies were needed to keep 
large numbers of German troops away from the Western front. It was above all this 
realisation that encouraged the conciliatory response towards the Provisional Government 
on their part. This mutual dependence was ultimately however of limited value to the 
Petrograd leadership, who could not ignore the brutal realities of wartime diplomacy. 
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Whatever leverage they might otherwise exert on the Western capitals, they could achieve 
little without keeping their armies effectively engaged, a supremely difficult task in the face 
of immense anti-war sentiment. This of course was a major reason for the launching of the 
July offensive, as well as for its almost inevitable lack of success. Its eventual failure, once 
confirmed, led to increasing indifference to Russian concerns in Allied corridors of power.29 
 
Russian ministers may initially have hoped for the success of Stockholm. They did not 
however formally sponsor the conference, which they treated as a purely socialist affair. The 
conference was in fact independently sponsored by both the Petrograd soviet and the 
Dutch/Scandinavian committee. All three of these groups - the government and the Soviet 
in Petrograd and the northern neutrals - shared the hope that the conference would reveal 
some measure of common ground within international socialism on the need for and nature 
of a potential peace settlement. There were however significant differences between them. 
The Petrograd government could do little more than give verbal encouragement to their 
own socialists, whilst avoiding as far as possible any rupture with Allied governments. The 
northern neutrals were primarily engaged in an attempt to revitalise the fractured 
International, the prospects for which had been considerably enhanced by Russian events. 
Yet the premises and aims of the Petrograd soviet, observes David Kirby, ‘had more in 
common with the anti-war proclamations of the Zimmerwald movement than with the 
cautious and pragmatic endeavours of the “neutral” socialists.’30 
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Like the Executive of the ISB, with which it was closely linked, the Dutch/Scandinavian 
committee considered it futile to try to ignore the strength of feelings within the patriotic 
majorities of the belligerent socialists. Their search for sufficient common ground between 
these majorities to make an international conference moderately fruitful was obviously a 
delicate task. It was for this reason that a lengthy period of individual preparatory 
consultations continued throughout the summer of 1917. At the same time however, 
majority socialists on both sides were harbouring hopes that the Stockholm process could 
be turned to their national advantage. The British War Cabinet’s worry that enemy socialists 
would use the absence of their Allied counterparts to damaging effect was not therefore 
without foundation.31 The very fact that both German socialists and their government 
appeared to favour Stockholm led not surprisingly to the branding of the project in Allied 
nations as a conspiracy hatched in Berlin.32 Meanwhile in Russia, visiting Allied socialists 
were doing their best to persuade their Soviet hosts to adopt procedures for the eventual 
conference which, by way of conditions for attendance or shaping of the agenda, would 
promise embarrassment or humiliation to enemy socialists, ideally sufficient to persuade 
them to stay away.33 
 
Prior to Henderson’s arrival in Russia these and related matters were issues of contention 
between the Petrograd soviet, led by its most prominent figure, Irakli Tsereteli, the principal 
link between the Soviet and the Provisional Government (of which he was also a member) 
and French and Belgian socialist delegations, led respectively by Thomas and Vandervelde 
(the latter acting in his capacity as a socialist minister in the Belgian government rather than 
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in his ISB role). Disagreements between the Russian and Allied socialists were an inevitable 
consequence of their fundamentally contrasting perceptions of the war, which for the 
Russians was a classical conflict between imperialist powers and for the Allies a legitimate 
war of defence against naked aggression. At the same time, neither side could afford to 
walk away from the discussion: the Allied socialists because they needed to persuade the 
Russians to stay militarily committed; and the Russians because they needed to persuade 
the Allied socialists to push their governments towards a negotiated peace. These 
conflicting needs determined the nature of the debate over Stockholm, which had less to do 
with support or opposition to the conference than with the terms under which it would be 
convened and the conditions which might be demanded of participants. A major 
confrontation on such matters happened to coincide with Henderson’s arrival in Petrograd. 
 
The confrontation was a consequence of the unexpected decision of the Petrograd soviet to 
issue its own invitation to an international conference, and to declare that the purpose of 
such a conference would be to encourage socialists ‘to liquidate the policy of “national 
unity” with the imperialistic governments and classes which make a struggle for peace 
impossible.’34 Henderson’s first encounter with the ‘moderate socialists’, including Kerensky 
and Tsereteli,  in support of whom he would later campaign for British attendance at 
Stockholm, was a ‘stormy discussion’ on the evening of 3 June in which he joined with 
Thomas and Vandervelde in castigating the Russians for their unwarranted action.35 The 
following day the Allied Socialists drafted an open letter to the Petrograd soviet in which 
they declared their ‘complete agreement’ with the idea that socialists should rupture their 
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agreements with ‘governments or classes whose war aims are tainted with imperialism’, but 
that a ‘national union against aggressive imperialism’ was ‘a duty incumbent on all 
classes.’36 As Thomas and Vandervelde had been contending for some time, this was an 
argument for excluding from any international conference only those socialists who refused 
to renounce their support for the ‘aggressive imperialists’ of the Central Powers. 
 
The fundamentally divergent perspectives on the war between the Allied and Russian 
socialists could manifest themselves in many ways, one of the most difficult of which for the 
Allies was the question of war aims. Though they stuck rigidly to the position that their 
nations were fighting a legitimate war of defence against unprovoked aggression, they 
found it hard to counter the Russian contention that it was not only the Central Powers 
whose war aims were ‘tainted with imperialism’, not least because their hosts had evidence 
to this effect in the form of the ‘secret treaties’ agreed between the Allies during the course 
of the war.37 In attempting to argue that their own governments’ war aims were consistent 
with the ‘no annexations, no indemnities’ formula of the new Russian government the 
Western socialists were very much forced onto the defensive. Whilst this was principally a 
problem for the French and British, even the Belgians had some post-war territorial 
adjustments in mind, including a claim for the ‘reclamation’ of Luxembourg as well as some 
bits and pieces of both Germany and neutral Holland.38 
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Under considerably greater pressure than their Belgian comrades, the French socialists in 
Russia addressed the defence of their national war aims with neither conviction nor 
consistency, giving way with little resistance on the sensitive matter of Alsace-Lorraine.39 
French policy on these provinces demanded their restoration to France as a matter of 
right.40 The more progressive view, to which the French socialists acceded under pressure 
from the Soviet, suggested that the province’s own populations had a right to decide under 
whose jurisdiction they should be placed, and that a post-war plebiscite would be the 
means by which this could be determined. Thomas would later substantially qualify this 
concession, claiming that Berlin had long flooded the territory ‘with German peasants and 
officials’ and that ‘many natives’ had fled to France on the outbreak of war to avoid service 
in the German army and to enlist instead in the French forces.41 
 
For the French socialists the greatest difficulty came however with the revelation of the 
most recent episode of Franco-Russian diplomacy which had occurred only days before the 
revolution. The two governments, conferring in the absence of Britain and Italy, 
provisionally agreed that they would support each other’s claims on German territory. In the 
east, Russia would be licensed to annex areas of Prussia with Polish populations; in return 
Paris would be given Petrograd’s blessing not just for the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine 
within its pre-1870 borders, but within the more extensive boundaries established during 
France’s Napoleonic ascendancy. These borders were to ‘be drawn in such a way as to 
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provide for strategic necessities’ and would include the coal rich Saarland. Other territories 
on the left bank of the Rhine were to be completely severed from German rule, or any other 
form of political or economic dependence on Berlin. Such territories not incorporated in 
France would form ‘an autonomous and neutralized State’ and be subject to French military 
occupation until such time as all terms and guarantees ultimately stipulated by a future 
peace treaty had been fully carried out by the enemy States.42 For the French socialists this 
was incendiary stuff. It may well have contributed to the turning of two former majoritaires 
into adherents of the growing minoritaire camp.43 Certainly Marcel Cachin and Marius 
Moutet returned to Paris committed to the Stockholm conference and were influential in 
bringing about the reversal of SFIO policy in late May.44  
 
Though perhaps less flagrant than those of the French, British war aims were also a source 
of some embarrassment. Britain was now revealed in the secret treaties to have claimed its 
‘sphere of influence’ within the Ottoman Empire and within neighbouring Persia. It was also 
widely believed by Russians that the British Empire intended to retain the German colonies 
it had already captured. Since plebiscites in ‘backward’ areas of the Middle East or Africa 
were not seen as practical in this era, the British claim that in freeing populations from their 
German or Turkish oppressors they would be acting in conformity with the inhabitants’ 
desires could not be tested, allowing the British to affect veiled annexations.45 Russian 
suspicions on these counts were creating difficulties for Buchanan during the period in 
which Henderson arrived in Petrograd. Tereshchenko’s request of Allied governments to 
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provide parallel responses to Russia’s own revised position on war aims became a matter 
into which Henderson was soon drawn.46 
 
Buchanan’s role in these diplomatic exchanges involved taking successive Foreign Office 
drafts of the requested British statement to Tereshchenko in order to ensure that the text 
contained nothing likely to arouse public anger. It eventually became clear that, however 
carefully worded, British justifications for territorial changes following the war would be 
interpreted as annexationist by the Petrograd soviet. Buchanan would eventually report to 
London that an apologetic Tereshchenko had ‘come to the conclusion that passages about 
Arabs and German Colonies would give rise to dangerous discussions’ and that it would ‘be 
better to express sentiments conveyed in Note in more general terms without citing special 
cases.’ Agreeing with Tereshchenko that any such discussions could be used as propaganda 
within the army to the effect that Russian soldiers were being asked to fight ‘for British 
Imperialistic aims’ and believing too that ‘our only hope of saving internal situation from 
anarchy and chaos rests on successful offensive’, he went on to discuss the matter with 
Henderson and Thomas, who also agreed that ‘passages to which [Tereshchenko] takes 
exception’ should be omitted.47 The note, as finally submitted, made no reference at all to 
specific territorial aims under consideration by the British government. It merely alluded in a 
general way to the object of ‘liberating populations oppressed by alien tyranny’ as one of 
several justifiable war aims.48  
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Henderson then had clearly been introduced to the sensitivities within Russia surrounding 
his country’s territorial goals and the manner in which they were habitually justified. Yet on 
9 June when he addressed the Petrograd soviet in order to explain the views of the ‘British 
proletariat’ he appeared to throw caution to the wind. Having started with safe statements 
to the effect that British workers were ‘fighting only to defend their country and to force the 
respect of international agreements’, he moved on via wider considerations concerning the 
futures of Poland and Belgium to state that ‘in the interests of maintaining peace in the 
future, the population of Mesopotamia and Africa must be liberated, even if it has to be 
done through special international commissions, from the yoke of Turkish and German rule. 
Little indeed was to be left of Ottoman sovereignty, as ‘Armenians and Arabs’ would also 
have to be protected, the Dardanelles ‘internationalized’ and Constantinople made ‘a free 
port’.49  
 
One Russian witness to this speech later characterised it as displaying a ‘unique kind of 
naiveté.’ Henderson, in his undiplomatic readiness to call a spade a spade, had ‘expounded 
the war programme of British finance.’50 This appears to have been a common view 
amongst Petrograd’s socialists. The reaction was also strong further afield. Robert Bruce 
Lockhart, British representative in Moscow, reported severe criticism of Henderson’s speech 
amongst the city’s moderate and extremist groups alike, who saw his words ‘as purest 
doctrine of annexation.’51 How is this curious lapse to be explained? Could he have believed 
perhaps that in broaching these issues as a representative of the labour movement rather 
than as a government minister the message would have been somehow more palatable? 
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Did he possibly imagine that the reference to ‘special international commissions’ would 
suffice as a non-annexationist gloss? Clearly no such commissions yet existed. Nor had plans 
to create them been officially formulated. Nor could anyone have had any idea as to exactly 
what role they would play in the envisaged transfer of sovereignty.52 The most probable 
explanation may be that it was simply a matter of carelessness or disorientation (Henderson 
had been in Russia for little more than a week). The language he used would obviously have 
been uncontroversial in Britain.  
 
It can well be imagined then that after a week in Russia Henderson would not have been 
greatly enamoured of native socialists.53 He would surely have recognised that the politics 
of even the most moderate amongst them had far more in common with the British 
‘pacifists’ he had been opposing for over two years than with the positions of his own party 
majority.54 There is no reason to doubt that in this early phase of Henderson’s mission he 
may have felt little personal sympathy for Russian socialists and would clearly have had 
reservations about  attending an international conference the purpose of which was to 
persuade Allied (as well as enemy) delegates to go home and oppose their government’s 
war policies. This part of the conventional narrative can be readily accepted. What is more 
difficult is to locate the change in perspective historians have perceived. Winter, as we have 
seen, regards the 1 July letter to Lloyd George, in which Henderson elaborates on the 
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distinction between Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, as indicative of the forthcoming change; 
but these remarks appear in a context which Winter ignores. Henderson is clearly describing 
the approaches of the two Russian factions as divergent means to a shared end, which they 
‘called general peace, but in truth would be general surrender.’55 
 
Both the widespread Russian scepticism regarding Allied war aims and the strong popular 
hunger for peace provided Henderson with powerful disincentives towards Stockholm, 
which would at the very least have weighed heavily against the incentives imagined by 
Winter and others. Exactly how these conflicting impulses operated during the latter part of 
his stay are not easy to assess. What is certain however is that he did in his communications 
with Britain positively promote the proposed governmental conference on war aims, whilst 
avoiding any similar advocacy of Stockholm.56 In noting this however we should consider 
one important distinction between the two conferences of which Henderson would have 
been fully aware. The governmental conference was already under discussion between the 
respective ministries. Henderson was involved only in so far, as a member of the War 
Cabinet who happened to be in Russia, he would obviously be expected to offer informed 
advice. In the case of Stockholm, on the other hand, discussions between the respective 
Allied and Russians socialist parties had effectively stalled. 
 
Following the angry rejection by the Allied socialists of the Soviet’s 2 June invitation to an 
international conference, the formal process of finding agreement effectively foundered. 
Though never formally withdrawn, nothing was done to actually convene the conference 
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which the Soviet had scheduled for 8 July. This was in part a consequence of Soviet leaders 
becoming distracted by a different matter: the question of their own democratic legitimacy. 
For although it posed as the authentic voice of the Russian revolution, the Petrograd soviet 
formally represented only the workers and soldiers of the Russian capital. Moves were now 
afoot to create an ‘All Russian’ Soviet in Petrograd which could claim to be the democratic 
voice of the whole nation.57  
 
Requiring as it did the election of worker, peasant and soldiers’ delegates across the entire 
country, this was inevitably a slow process. Nevertheless, in the interests of acquiring 
greater legitimacy, the leaders of the Petrograd soviet decided to wait until the new ‘All 
Russian Congress of Soviets’ was assembled before proceeding in this body’s name with 
their Stockholm initiative.58 The Congress was convened on 16 June when over a thousand 
delegates gathered for an event that did not conclude until three weeks later.59 At its close 
the dominant ‘moderate’ groups in the Petrograd soviet could claim a mandate from an 
estimated eight million soldiers, five million workers, and four million peasants. A new All-
Russian Central Executive Committee was created, in which the factions close to Tsereteli 
were bolstered by the provincial delegates who at least temporarily shifted the balance of 
power away from the Zimmerwaldist tendencies which had been growing within the 
Petrograd soviet.60  
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The new executive recognised the need for a more inclusive approach to the Stockholm 
question, instructing a Stockholm bound delegation to converse with representatives of 
both the Dutch/Scandinavian committee and the Zimmerwaldist International Socialist 
Committee (ISC), an organisation trying at this time to agree its own position on the 
conference.61 Arriving in the Swedish capital on 2 July the Russian delegation did after some 
difficulty reach an accord with the Dutch/Scandinavians though not the ISC. This partial 
success was reported in Izvestiia on the 14th, two days before Henderson left Petrograd.62 
How much detail Henderson could have gleaned from these first reports may be in question. 
He did of course have the opportunity of finding out more by speaking personally to 
Branting and Huysmans as he passed through Stockholm on his way home. It may be 
concluded therefore that as he left Petrograd he still possessed only limited knowledge of 
what was being proposed in the Swedish capital.  
 
A further unanticipated aspect of Henderson’s stay in Russia also enabled him to remain 
safely uncommitted on the conference. It had been expected that he would be joined soon 
after his arrival by a Labour party delegation from Britain. Had this delegation arrived one of 
its foremost tasks would have been to discuss Stockholm with the Russian socialists. 
Henderson could not have envisaged conducting such talks on his own. Initially the delay in 
the delegation’s departure was attributable to the NEC. In what seems like a re-run of the 
1915 situation when the executive had struggled to find a willing ‘patriot’ to take over from 
Henderson as secretary of the British Section of the International, there again appeared 
little enthusiasm amongst committee members for engagement with foreign socialists.  
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Henderson had indicated to party colleagues before he left London that he wished the 
executive delegation to follow him ‘at the earliest opportunity.’ Over the next two weeks no 
less than five proposed members of the ‘patriotic’ part of the delegation had advanced 
reasons as to why they should not be included.63 It would eventually require intervention 
from the War Cabinet to prompt Roberts, a junior minister who had used his position in the 
government as his reason to withdraw from the proposed delegation, to reconsider.64 
Following Roberts’ enforced change of heart, others finally followed. The grounds for 
withdrawing that had been offered by reluctant delegates had been varied. Frank Purdy, the 
current NEC Chairman, was the only one whose stated objections were overtly political. In 
an interview following his refusal to travel he declared himself ‘entirely opposed’ to action 
that might bring into question the previous January’s resolution against British attendance 
at an international socialist conference. He declared also ‘the strongest possible objection’ 
to the inclusion of ‘pacifist’ members of the executive in the delegation.65 It seems likely 
that, to one extent or another, these considerations played some part in the decisions of the 
others. 
 
In the event Purdy would have had no need to worry about the minority delegates. When 
the delegation was eventually about to embark on the journey to Russia members of the 
militantly patriotic National Sailors and Fireman’s Union refused to set sail with the ILP 
‘pacifists’.66 Rather than depart without the latter the ‘patriots’ themselves decided not to 
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travel. From Petrograd Henderson urged the seamen’s leader, Havelock Wilson, to lift the 
embargo, warning of difficulties that would otherwise be created for the Russian 
government, and even suggesting that MacDonald might be willing to promise to act whilst 
in Russia ‘consistently with decisions of Manchester Conference.......’67 Wilson however 
remained immovable. Henderson finally advised his executive on 5 July that it would be 
inadvisable to send only a majority delegation since this would ‘only strengthen rumour 
here that MacDonald has been prevented by Government agents.’68 By this stage Thomas 
and Vandervelde had left Russia, leaving Henderson as the sole significant representative of 
Allied labour. Meaningful negotiation over the terms of Stockholm was on this count also no 
longer possible. 
 
Of course, the absence of negotiation cannot preclude informal discussion. Henderson’s 
hosts must have been keen to elicit his views on Stockholm even if commitment was 
something he remained unable to offer. It seems likely nevertheless that he would have 
responded to this sort of probing with caution. What may well have been a typical response 
can be seen during his brief visit to Moscow, where he told the Chairman of the local Soviet 
that whilst British labour did not at all share the latter’s views, he and his party would ‘give 
serious consideration to the propositions advanced here.’69 One final consideration we 
cannot of course ignore is that even if he was not yet ready to make any commitment to 
Stockholm, the reasons he would eventually do so, as advanced in the standard account, 
were already forming or had formed in his mind. 
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We cannot rule out the possibility that he may, as Hamilton in particular suggests, have 
come to sympathise with the hard pressed ‘moderate’ socialist leaders, all of whom were 
undoubtedly keen that British and Allied socialists should be present at Stockholm.70 The 
vulnerability of the Provisional Government was a common theme in the discussions on 
Russia within the British government. The advice of both Henderson and Buchanan was that 
this vulnerability could be eased by the agreement of Allied governments to attend 
Tereshchenko’s proposed war aims conference. A key question we must ask then, is why 
Henderson might have persuaded himself that attendance at Stockholm would also have 
been required. The standard account falls down badly here because the historians 
concerned, with one exception, appear either to have disregarded or been unaware of the 
proposed governmental conference.71 This is a serious omission, not least because what 
many in Petrograd hoped for from Stockholm was that it could change the political climate 
in the Allied countries, in such a way as to oblige reluctant Allied governments not only to 
attend Tereshchenko’s conference but also to consider significant modifications in their 
aims.  
 
Henderson was certainly aware of this hope. As a Cabinet minister he was clearly in a 
position to act, if he so wished, directly in support of this primary ambition, without the 
difficult and possibly dangerous expedient of Stockholm. As we have seen, Henderson does 
indeed advocate a positive response to Tershchenko’s invitation. He does not however go 
further and advocate actual concessions on war aims as a way of easing the Russian plight. 
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Like Buchanan he leaves it to ministers in London to decide whether the most that Russia 
might now contribute to the war ‘is worth purchasing, and if so, at what price.’72 
 
The one main contributor to the standard account who shows awareness of the 
governmental conference is Bridgen. His treatment of the matter is however rather sparse. 
He acknowledges that for a time Henderson did consider that it would be sufficient to deal 
with the threat to the Provisional Government through ‘an inter-governmental 
conference.....to review war aims.’ By ‘the middle of July’ however he was ‘convinced that 
the pressure on the Provisional Government had become so great that outright rejection of 
the Stockholm conference was no longer appropriate.’73 Bridgen does not say however what 
exactly happened in mid-July that increased the threat to the Petrograd government. More 
importantly, he does not explain why Henderson changed his mind on the efficacy of the 
inter-governmental conference as a means of staving off this growing threat, and why he 
could have believed that Stockholm could better serve this important purpose? To suggest 
that mid-July was the moment when Henderson became convinced that ‘outright rejection’ 
of Stockholm was inappropriate ignores the reality that we have already described: that for 
the Allied socialists outright rejection had for weeks been something they wished to avoid. 
The ‘middle of July’ also happens to be the time that Henderson left Russia, but whether 
this has any relevance to Henderson’s change of view on the relative importance of the two 
conferences is not mentioned. Clearly Bridgen is no more effective than Winter in 
discovering either the moment or the reason Henderson became committed to Stockholm. 
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For Bridgen, as for Hamilton and Winter, the fear of an extreme left wing (or Bolshevik) 
government taking power in Russia is seen as a major concern for Henderson. As we noted 
at the beginning of this chapter Henderson’s response to the Bolshevik coup when it took 
place in November included the suggestion that had he been listened to by the War Cabinet 
three months earlier this unfortunate event may have been avoided. It is not at all clear 
however in Henderson’s despatches from Russia that he possessed any such awareness 
regarding the potential of the Bolsheviks to seize power. The impression he gives, rather, is 
that Bolshevism was one of many problems faced by the Provisional Government, most of 
which appeared decidedly intractable. It was the fact that the Leninist takeover occurred 
when it did that allowed him and his sympathisers to argue that he had foreseen this event 
and that his campaign for Stockholm had been largely designed to forestall it. 
 
Henderson had raised the issue of a Bolshevik takeover in a letter to Roberts of 21 June. 
Referring to a conversation with ‘an active but moderate socialist’ whose view that the 
backers of Kerensky and of Lenin would soon be in a battle as to which would prevail was, in 
Henderson’s opinion, ‘not far wide of the mark’. He went on to predict however that if the 
extremists triumphed ‘we shall have a few months of anarchy’ followed by counter-
revolution.74 Henderson was aware that some Russian conservatives seemed to welcome 
such an outcome, precisely to achieve this end result.75 He later adopted a more positive 
stance on the survivability of the Provisional Government. In the substantial and 
comprehensive report he drafted for the War Cabinet at the end of his stay, he now judged 
that ‘a Bolshevik rising’ did not ‘appear to be likely’.76 He did nevertheless recognise that an 
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unholy alliance of Bolsheviks, anarchists and other leftist groups represented a seriously 
disruptive force within the country, preventing the Provisional Government from achieving 
that degree of political and economic stability which could secure its long term future and, 
most importantly, revive its military commitment to the war. 
 
Significantly though, he took the view that the chronic disorder he witnessed in Russia could 
not be attributed solely to the pernicious activities of extremist groups. The revolution had 
been hampered by decades of poor government under the Tsars, without whose symbolic 
leadership ‘the Russian State fabric’ had simply disintegrated, he believed. Had there been 
‘a tradition of diligent and honest administration the Central Authority [of the revolution] 
would have at once a solid basis and an effective machine through which to work.’77 In 
recommending a course of action to the War Cabinet, Henderson conceded that it would 
not be easy to ‘help Russia because her chief trial to-day is anarchy, which no amount of 
foreign sympathy advice will mitigate or restrain.’78 But if he believed that Allied 
governments could do little to influence events in Russia, what made him believe that Allied 
socialists, through the Stockholm conference, could do anything more? Governments could 
after all provide sustained material as well as moral resources on a scale that mere political 
parties could not. Meeting briefly outside Russia’s borders, those socialists willing or able to 
attend the conference could in theory endorse this or that political view current in 
Petrograd. In practice, the divisions between them would almost certainly prevent any clear 
message emerging.79 Even the language in which disputes would be aired by the Stockholm 
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delegates, Henderson seems to have believed, would be alien to the distant Russian 
masses.80 
 
Henderson never satisfactorily answered the all-important question as to how exactly 
Stockholm could preserve the Provisional Government from the various threats of 
Bolshevism, anarchy or counter-revolution, nor did he ever pose this question in such 
specific terms. Once back in Britain he repeatedly referred in a general way to the problems 
in Russia, but the one issue he highlighted above all others was the propaganda deployed by 
‘extremists’ against the supposedly self serving nature of Allied war aims. He had clearly 
been shocked on his arrival in Russia by the ‘slanderous statements....freely published 
against Great Britain....’81 As we shall see, one of the principal arguments he would later use 
in favour of Stockholm was that the conference would provide an opportunity for British 
labour to refute these slanders. After the fall of the Provisional Government he would 
suggest that ‘the suspicion, fostered by the extremists who have usurped power, that we 
are fighting for imperialistic ends.....is responsible for the downfall of Kerensky and for the 
rise of the Bolsheviks.’ He went on to argue, as he had done earlier, that had ‘the Russian 
people’ realised that the Allies were ‘not seeking to prolong the war for ends inconsistent 
with the principles of the Revolution.....’ they would have resumed ‘the struggle with us for 
victory of the ideals of democracy.’82  
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One point that Henderson was clearly making in December, however, was that if the War 
Cabinet had listened to these arguments in August, and not effectively prevented the 
Stockholm conference, this catastrophe may not have occurred. This is clearly a less than 
credible judgement. The idea that ‘the Russian people’ would have been greatly affected by 
what were bound to be at Stockholm rather abstract opinions on the nature of the war is 
unconvincing. It takes no account either of all the other issues on which Russian ‘moderates’ 
and ‘extremists’ disagreed. It must also be noted that in December, unlike in August, 
Henderson was freely voicing his own suspicions as to the true nature of Allied war aims. All 
this has led to a confusion we see clearly stated in Hamilton’s account of the Stockholm 
episode: that between the wider political and ideological struggle within the revolution and 
the narrower question of Russia’s participation in the war.83 Henderson had been sent to 
Petrograd principally to keep Russia in the war. The survival or otherwise of Russian 
democracy was for Allied governments a matter of secondary concern. When persuading his 
party in favour of Stockholm Henderson could appeal to both concerns. Inducing Russia into 
renewed commitment to the war had obvious appeal to ‘patriots’, whilst the survival of the 
new post-tsarist Russian democracy appealed to ‘patriots’ and ‘pacifist’ alike. 
 
Following his return to Britain, none of the ideas Henderson articulated on the relationship 
between Allied war aims and the survivability of the democratic revolution bore much 
resemblance to those he had provided to the War Cabinet before his departure from Russia. 
It is clear however from these earlier comments that he knew what the ‘moderate’ socialists 
he championed wanted from Stockholm. At the centre of their conception was the hope 
that the conference would generate a powerful, co-ordinated and irresistible campaign by 
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the world’s oppressed classes which would force the warring imperialists into concluding a 
negotiated peace. Henderson would doubtless have realised that this hope was chimerical 
and that his own party would anyway refuse to align itself with any such campaign. As we 
have suggested, this remained amongst the most powerful impediments to committing 
himself to the conference. 
 
Confirmation that this impediment remained strong can be found in his concluding mission 
statement to the War Cabinet, in which he refers to an interview with Tsereteli towards the 
end of his stay. ‘When I pressed the idea of an Allied Socialist Conference in London,’ 
Henderson writes, ‘he showed little interest in the proposal.’ His real interest was ‘to have 
the Stockholm Conference before the meeting of the Allied Governments.’ This was the 
policy, continues Henderson, of the Menshevik group, ‘which is to bring pressure from 
within to bear upon all Governments the direction of a general renunciation of Imperialist 
aims.’84 This encounter was clearly an echo of the initial confrontation of the two men 
several weeks earlier in which Henderson had unsuccessfully tried to promote the Allied 
conference to an unreceptive Tsereteli, whilst Tsereteli had promoted Stockholm to an 
unresponsive Henderson. Evidently, very little had changed.  
  
We have shown in this chapter that there is practically nothing in the historical record to 
support the proposition that Henderson changed his mind over Stockholm whilst in Russia, 
or that he did so as a consequence of his growing awareness that the revolutionary regime 
was under serious threat, in particular from its Bolshevik opponents. His readiness to score 
polemical points against Lloyd George in the aftermath of the Leninist coup, whilst it has 
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been taken by sympathetic historians as evidence of this awareness, must surely be 
discounted. His statement at the 10 August conference that his change of mind on 
Stockholm had occurred in Russia can also be seen, as we have indicated, as a means of 
achieving an important political goal. Have historians then been too reluctant to challenge 
Henderson’s own subsequent account of events in this instance, despite their inability to 
find convincing corroboration of this account from the available sources? Or have they 
failed to examine and interpret these sources in a sufficiently diligent manner? 
 
The answer would seem to be a bit of both. Two rather remarkable historiographical failures 
are certainly worth highlighting. The first of these - the failure to note the existence of the 
governmental conference and Henderson’s obvious preference for this over Stockholm as a 
means to bolster the position of the Provisional Government - we have already mentioned. 
The second is equally surprising. Of all the documentary evidence available from 
Henderson’s time in Russia the most valuable single item must surely be the lengthy final 
report Henderson writes for the War Cabinet. It is valuable indeed for a variety of reasons: 
its length, its scope and its timing. Running to something in the region of 10,000 words it 
covers in some depth the military, industrial and political circumstances in Russia as 
Henderson perceives them at the end of his stay.85 This document has been cited on several 
occasions during the course of this chapter, yet not a single reference to it is to be found in 
any of the studies we have been examining in this thesis.   
 
To conclude this chapter we must move from Russia to Sweden, where we find the first 
clear demonstration of the support for the Stockholm conference which Henderson would 
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carry back with him to Britain. He knew as he travelled to Stockholm that an agreement had 
been reached between the Dutch/Scandinavian committee and the visiting Soviet 
delegation regarding the holding of the international conference. He was probably aware 
that an outline agenda had been agreed and that the conference was scheduled to take 
place on 15 August. He may also have known that an account of the negotiations published 
in Izvestiia on 14 July suggested that the Dutch/Scandinavians had fought to exclude 
conditions which ‘would create difficulties for France and England.’86 The involvement in 
particular of Branting on this agreement would also have been encouraging, since this 
veteran Swedish socialist was widely known to favour the Allies.87 
 
Branting and Huysmans had every incentive when they met with Henderson to present their 
achievement in reaching agreement with the Russians in the most positive light. Prior to this 
success the prospects for the conference had not looked good. The governments of France, 
Italy and the United States had made clear that they would not permit their citizens to 
attend. The discussions with the visiting socialist delegations had shown little sign of 
common ground on which to build, leaving some to suggest that the project was doomed.88 
Britain was the one Allied state which had not yet closed the door on the conference. If 
Henderson could be persuaded to give his personal backing to Stockholm, and if he could 
then induce his party to follow suit, this, coming in the wake of the all important agreement 
with the Russian delegation, would totally transform the situation. 
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We do not know what was said at the crucial meeting with Branting and Huysmans. We do 
know that on the day of the meeting Henderson gave an interview to The Times Stockholm 
correspondent in which he declared himself ‘fully convinced of the desirability’ of the 
international conference.89 Henderson gives no indication at this point as to why he felt the 
Stockholm conference was desirable. Whether he still shared the War Cabinet view of May 
and considered the conference as a defensive necessity to prevent the Russian socialists 
being wooed by the Germans into a desire for a separate peace, or whether he was driven 
by concerns over the rising threat of Bolshevik extremism, was not revealed. A third 
alternative motivation - that he had been persuaded by Branting and Huysmans that the 
time had at last come for a revival of the Socialist International - was, given the context, 
certainly possible. The beliefs that Mayer attributed to him, probably prematurely, on his 
arrival in Petrograd could well have been lodged when he left Stockholm six weeks later.  It 
is only on his return to Britain that he begins to explain his surprising conversion to a 
wartime international conference. Whether his explanations provide full and credible 
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The eighteen days between his return to Britain on 24 July and his resignation from the War 
Cabinet on 11 August constitute a critical episode in Henderson’s (and by extension, the 
Labour party’s) war. The currently accepted interpretation of this short but highly significant 
period is uncomplicated. Henderson returned from Russia firmly convinced of the need for 
British labour’s attendance at Stockholm and devoted himself throughout these eighteen 
days to securing this outcome. Henderson’s conviction on this matter has been seen as 
sufficiently powerful to ensure that he would not be deflected by the wide ranging 
opposition to his plans from the Cabinet, parts of his party, and most of the press. His 
character was such that once convinced that a course of action was justified and correct he 
would stubbornly pursue it until the bitter end. This facet of Henderson’s nature had been 
commented upon approvingly by Clynes at the 1917 annual party conference and is cited by 
both Hamilton and Wrigley in their biographies.1 Hamilton in particular perceives Henderson 
as pursuing his campaign not only stubbornly, but consistently and transparently as well.2  
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Hamilton’s articulation of the standard account again leads the way, portraying this period 
in essentially linear terms, during which neither Henderson’s objective nor the means by 
which he pursued it were in any significant way modified. It will be argued in this chapter 
however that this perceived linearity is not easy to sustain. During the course of his 
Stockholm campaign Henderson actually faced obstacles and opportunities that he evaded 
or exploited in a manner that involved not only tactical changes in the pursuance of his 
objectives, but ultimately also in significant tailoring of these goals. Henderson may well 
have shown a stubborn determination to pursue some kind of end result; questions can be 
raised however as to precisely what this was.  
 
This chapter will argue that Henderson’s essential objective was not as presented in 
standard accounts. Careful examination of these eighteen days will suggest that the 
conviction he is believed to have held that British attendance at Stockholm was vital to the 
beleaguered Russian revolution is far from the explanatory key to his actions it is supposed. 
Going to Stockholm, for whatever reason, may initially have seemed to him desirable, but 
ultimately what mattered to him most was securing the vote at the 10 August special 
conference. What finally gives these eighteen days their coherence is Henderson’s 
determination to open up the possibility of an ongoing involvement for the Labour party 
with the ambitions of Branting and Huysmans for a revived Socialist International. As for the 
supposed transparency with which he conducted his campaign, this notion can only be 
sustained in as far as the charges of deception levelled by Lloyd George can be dismissed. 
Contrary to the prevailing judgements of the standard account, it will be argued here that 




Henderson made clear in his 17 July interview his conviction that the Stockholm conference 
was ‘desirable’. He had plenty of time during the slow journey home to consider how best 
he could achieve British involvement in the venture.3 Clearly there would be difficulties. He 
would have to campaign on three separate fronts: firstly, he needed to persuade his party to 
attend; secondly to ensure that the War Cabinet would sanction British attendance; and 
thirdly, to prevent the conference organisers imposing conditions that his party, or he 
personally, could not accept. Not only would he have to campaign in these distinct areas, he 
would also need to achieve success in all three. Failure in any one would be sufficient to 
scupper the project. There were dangers too that difficulties and doubts in any one of these 
areas would impact on the possibilities of progress in the others. Continuing uncertainties as 
to the conditions of attendance could for example provide fuel to those in the Labour party 
reluctant to go to Stockholm on any terms, as would signs of opposition within government. 
 
In his Stockholm interview Henderson made specific reference to some of these potential 
problems. He singled out three particular difficulties which would need to be overcome. The 
first of these concerned representation at the conference. The basis on which national 
sections had appointed delegates to pre-war conferences of the International, he argued, 
were no longer appropriate, partly because these would fail to afford adequate 
representation to two of the most important delegations, the Russians and the Americans, 
and partly because in the British case, the old rules would ensure that the minority would 
‘be gravely over-represented’. This latter point had emerged as a matter of concern to 
British ‘patriots’ during earlier discussions on the proposed Allied socialist conference in 
Paris, and would do so again at the 10 August conference in London.  
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A second concern was ‘the binding or semi-binding character’ that the Russian delegates 
sought to attach to conference resolutions. Although this would eventually persuade him 
that British attendance could not be considered, Henderson was confident at this point that 
the Russians would ‘modify their attitude’ when they realized that not to do so would 
exclude from the conference ‘the majority of……influential leaders of working-class opinion 
throughout the world.’ 
 
His third issue stemmed from the belief, shared by Branting, that the conference should be 
attended by the most prominent leaders of the Entente socialists. Since many of these had 
become members of their respective government, some arrangement ‘involving perhaps 
temporary relinquishment of their offices’ could be required to enable them to attend. 
What is curious about this observation however is that it makes no reference to the widely 
known fact that the governments of France, Italy and the United States had already 
declared that they would permit none of their citizens, let alone Cabinet ministers, to attend 
the conference.4 This omission could perhaps be explained by Henderson’s continuing belief 
(or hope) that the War Cabinet might still see advantages in allowing British labour to go to 
Stockholm, and could conceivably induce Allied governments to follow suit.5 
 
The selection of issues Henderson chose to highlight at this stage clearly anticipates the 
problems he would later face. However the manner in which these difficulties would 
present themselves and the means by which he would be able (or unable) to overcome 
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them obviously remained very uncertain. In grappling with these uncertainties he was 
increasingly required to improvise solutions, which took his campaign in unanticipated 
directions. It is the striking improvisatory nature of his actions that will be highlighted in the 
pages below. In drawing attention to these complex tergiversations we will hopefully 
provide a fuller and more compelling account of these extraordinary days than has been 
offered in earlier studies.  
 
Once back in London, Henderson’s first moves in the accomplishment of his goals were 
directed at his party. Meeting senior figures on 24 July he discussed with them matters to be 
raised within the NEC the following day, and no doubt elaborated on the content of his 
Stockholm interview which had appeared in the press that morning. He gave a further 
interview the same day, outlining his views on the deteriorating situation in Russia. In this 
interview he repeated many of the observations he had made earlier in Petrograd, pointing 
out that even the moderate socialists in Russia were suspicious of Allied war aims, and 
critical too of the majority Allied socialists who continued to back their imperialist 
governments. Their full commitment to the war would be dependent on modifications of 
these imperialist aims, which they urged the Allied socialists to promote.6 The moderate 
socialists were however vital to Russian stability, forming as they did the democratic 
majority within the All-Russian soviet which had supported and would continue to support 
the Provisional Government. Noting their anxiety to see both the Stockholm and Allied 
government conferences convened, Henderson doubted that they would ‘give of their best 
for the successful prosecution of the war’ should these conferences be denied them.7 
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When the NEC met the following morning Henderson briefed members on his consultations 
with Russian soviet leaders, his talks with Branting, and his further conversations with four 
Russian delegates from Petrograd, who had accompanied him on the journey to London and 
who were intending to meet with European Allied socialists in the hope of securing their 
presence in Stockholm. He made clear his own view that the Labour party should itself be 
present and he proposed that a special conference should be convened to consider this. 
Despite objections from the more determined ‘patriots’ he won the assent of the 
committee. Winter attributes his success in this forum to Henderson’s unparalleled prestige 
within the party, a judgment which need not be contested.8 Another important factor 
however was his direct experience of Russian events, not shared by other committee 
members, which allowed him to present the situation in Petrograd in a manner that could 
not easily be challenged by his opponents. The presence of the four soviet delegates who 
joined the meeting for part of the discussion may also have been of some assistance.9  
 
Much of the ensuing conversation centred on the scheduling of the three conferences now 
envisaged. The Stockholm organisers had proposed 15 August for the opening of their 
conference and the Russians were reluctant to change this. For Henderson however it was 
essential that both the special party conference to sanction attendance at Stockholm and 
the long proposed Allied socialist conference should first take place. His idea was that the 
Allied socialists should meet first, that the decisions reached at this gathering would be 
reviewed by the special conference, which would then be enabled to take an informed 
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decision on whether or not to go on to Stockholm. Unable to persuade the Russians to allow 
more time for all this conferring, the NEC decided it had no option but to call the Allied 
conference for 8th and 9th August, immediately prior to the special conference on the 10th. 
 
Further discussion took place over whether at the special conference the executive should 
itself recommend attendance at Stockholm. A proposal that any decision on this should be 
deferred was rejected in favour of a motion in support of a positive recommendation. Two 
further significant decisions were also taken at this meeting. Firstly in response to an 
invitation from the SFIO, the executive appointed a delegation comprising Henderson, 
MacDonald and Wardle to travel to Paris to join scheduled meetings between French and 
Russian socialists to settle remaining questions relating to the Stockholm process. The three 
British delegates to Paris were instructed to form on their return a wider sub-committee, to 
which would be added Jowett, Roberts and Sidney Webb, charged with drafting a report for 
presentation to the 10 August special conference.10 
 
Henderson had achieved a great deal in the mere forty eight hours he had been back in 
Britain. The Stockholm ball was well and truly rolling and he must have been pleased with 
this initial success. From this point however difficulties and complications were quick to 
arise. Between 27 July and 10 August he faced a succession of hurdles, and much ingenuity, 
as well as the customary determination, was required to keep his effort on track. Broadly 
speaking this period falls into three separate phases, the first of which involves the Labour 
delegation’s trip to Paris and the negative consequences this generated back in London. This 
was followed by a sort of interregnum in which Henderson was required to wait for the 
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inevitable formal decision on the part of the War Cabinet to debar a Labour delegation from 
travelling to Stockholm. The third phase constitutes Henderson’s peculiar perseverance in a 
campaign which to all appearances was already lost. 
 
 
Paris and its Consequences 
 
The visit of the three labour delegates to Paris during the weekend following this meeting 
provides a perfect demonstration of the negative impacts that setbacks in one (or in this 
case two) areas could have on success in another. If Henderson could be pleased with his 
progress on 25 July, on his return to London a week later he faced major problems in 
relation both to the Russian socialists and the War Cabinet. The Stockholm venture now 
appeared highly controversial in British politics, giving encouragement to his labour 
opponents.  
 
The meetings in Paris proved for the most part disappointing for Henderson. He could take 
some comfort at least over the agreement of the French, and more reluctantly the Russians, 
to attend the Allied socialist conference in London to which he attached great importance.11 
With the help of the French he was able to persuade the Russians to loosen the excessively 
tight timetable for the successive conferences. Stockholm was now postponed until 9 
September and the Allied socialist conference rescheduled for 28th and 29th August. On two 
of the troublesome questions he had highlighted in his 17 July interview however, he 
suffered disappointment. On the issues of representation and of the binding or non-binding 
                                                 
11
 Manchester Guardian, 1 August 1917, p.5. 
149 
 
nature of conference resolutions, the British position was opposed by both the French and 
the Russians.  
 
Opposition from the latter could certainly have been anticipated, but the position of the 
former may well have come as an unpleasant surprise. For whilst the French had already 
conceded the point that the Americans and Russians were special cases to whom the pre-
war procedures of the ISB could not be applied, and had also allowed that the Italian 
socialist party, having earlier chosen to detach itself from the Second International, should 
not thereby be excluded from the conference, they insisted nevertheless that in the case of 
established members of the International including themselves, the British and the 
Germans, historic procedures should be retained. Their purpose in this may have been to 
ensure the exclusion of the various leftist groups within the Zimmerwaldist ISC.12 The virtual 
parity in strength between the majoritaires and minoritaires in Paris also rendered the party 
unsympathetic to British attempts to disenfranchise their own minorities. In a lengthy 
submission to the Stockholm organisers (the French government had prevented the party’s 
delegates from travelling in person) the SFIO had insisted on a formula which would ensure 
that where parties affiliated to the pre-war International had since become divided the 
separate ‘fractions’ should retain their rights of representation.13 The Russians, whilst 
unsympathetic to French attempts to exclude the Zimmerwaldists, were perfectly happy 
with their hosts’ proposals regarding the Western minorities. Henderson was obliged to 
concede on this point.14 
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On the question of whether the conference should be ‘mandatory’ or ‘consultative’ the 
French and Russians were again aligned against him. The confidence he had expressed on 17 
July that the Russians would eventually defer on this matter seems to have been based on 
the assumption that the most powerful parties would not agree to be bound by resolutions 
passed by combinations of their wartime enemies, neutrals and leftist Russians. Again, he 
may not have anticipated that the French socialists might actually support the Russian 
position. An alliance of convenience nevertheless emerged to frustrate the British. Whilst 
the Russians hoped that binding resolutions would force the belligerent socialists into 
greater efforts for peace, the French sensed an opportunity to confront the Germans. 
Believing that they rather than their enemies could secure majority support for contentious 
resolutions on the war, such as its cause, or the justice of returning Alsace-Lorraine to its 
pre-1870 status, the former majoritaires in particular saw the possibility of inflicting serious 
embarrassment on the SDP, who could face the prospect of being ‘bound’ by the conference 
to adopt positions they simply could not accept.15 
 
On this issue Henderson refused to succumb to the majority. His party, he insisted, could 
only accept a consultative conference. Disagreement on this point, according to one 
account, ‘almost brought the Paris talks to an abrupt end’ as ‘Henderson rose from his seat 
and began gathering up his papers, ready to leave.’16  A compromise of sorts was finally 
accepted, though hardly one that would have appealed to Henderson.  The communiqué 
issued by the three parties spoke of ‘the future and the action of the International being 
dependent on the loyalty with which the resolutions passed by the Conference will be 
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adhered to’ and demanded an undertaking of the national sections that they ‘declare 
definitely at the meeting of the International what effect they intend to give to [conference] 
decisions.’17 This hard won formula was ultimately ineffective. It allowed the Russians to 
maintain that the resolutions at Stockholm would indeed be binding, a view for which they 
would find further encouragement on the succeeding leg of their European tour in Rome. 
The Italian socialists, like the French, were in favour of the Soviet position. They and their 
Russian guests issued a joint statement on 7 August declaring that both parties would 
accept the decisions of the Stockholm conference as binding.18 
 
These results of the Paris meetings were clearly for Henderson discouraging. To make 
matters worse, another significant difficulty had emerged domestically as a consequence of 
the arrangements he had made for the British delegation’s travel to Paris. Following the NEC 
decision to appoint himself, MacDonald and Wardle as the British delegates, Henderson had 
arranged transport to France on a naval vessel for the 27th, without having discussed this 
with the Cabinet. He had in fact missed three successive daily Cabinet meetings, being 
otherwise engaged on each of these mornings. We have seen that on the 24th and 25th he 
had been busy with party matters. On the 26th he was invited for an audience with the King 
in Aldershot.19 Having been in London since the morning of the 24th, Henderson’s only 
contact with the War Cabinet by the afternoon of the 26th amounted to a telegraphic 
exchange with Lloyd George, who was himself in Paris attending an inter-Allied conference. 
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Henderson’s telegram to Lloyd George quickly became a matter of controversy and 
confusion. Whilst still in France the Prime Minister would acknowledge to the Cabinet in 
London that he had received a telegram from Henderson regarding his proposal for an Allied 
socialist conference, but that no mention had been made of the intended visit to Paris.20 
Lloyd George had replied approving of the Allied socialist conference and the ‘subsequent 
labour conference to receive report’ therefrom, but suspending judgement ‘as to later 
steps’ until he could meet with Henderson and discuss ‘Russian situation in light of 
conclusions’ of the governmental conference he was currently attending.21 This was not 
however a reply to the telegram Henderson would later claim he had sent. Lloyd George’s 
telegram was despatched on the morning of 25 July only an hour or so after the NEC 
meeting of that day had begun. Henderson’s claim was that he had sent the Prime Minister 
a telegram informing him of the key decisions of the executive, presumably those including 
the delegation to Paris, once they had been made.22 But this would have been despatched 
to Paris after Lloyd George had responded, presumably therefore to an earlier message. The 
Prime Minister did later recall the telegram Henderson claimed he had sent on the 25th. He 
admitted also that it had included details of the Labour delegation to Paris, but insisted that 
it contained nothing about the purposes of the meetings in France.23 
 
Disputes over telegrams, although indicative of the later mistrust between Henderson and 
Lloyd George, were not the most important matter Henderson’s actions raised at this point. 
More significant was his tardiness in informing the Cabinet in London of his plans. Hamilton 
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has remarked, correctly up until this point, on Henderson’s strong belief in the notion of 
Cabinet responsibility, particularly in a wartime context.24 If this had remained so in July 
1917, how might we have expected him to have acted? Recognising that Stockholm was a 
matter of great political sensitivity, would he not have seen fit to inform Cabinet members 
in London through the acting chairman, Bonar Law, of the matters he had telegraphed to 
Lloyd George? He could easily have explained on the afternoon of the 25th why he had been 
unable to attend that morning’s Cabinet, and why he would be unable to attend the 
following morning. He could have summarised the Labour resolutions and volunteered to 
discuss their implications with the Cabinet at a time of mutual convenience. He could also 
have stressed the imminence of the Paris meetings and the urgency therefore of arranging 
transport to France. In failing to do any of this he permitted a situation to arise whereby the 
Cabinet learned only from the Foreign Office on the morning of the 26th that he had already 
made arrangements for the Labour delegates to travel the next day.25 
 
Clearly perplexed by Henderson’s untypical behavior, the Cabinet decided during its 
morning meeting on the 26th to invite him to provide explanations at a further ad hoc 
meeting that evening. In what clearly involved a number of angry exchanges, ministers at 
this evening meeting expressed concern over the ‘very grave embarrassment’ in which the 
government would be placed once it became known that a member of the War Cabinet had 
travelled to Paris with the ‘pacifist’ MacDonald in order to discuss ‘questions regarding a 
Socialist Peace Conference at Stockholm.’ They also made plain their more general 
objections to ‘the Stockholm project.’ Henderson explained that he was going to Paris in his 
capacity as Secretary of the Labour party and as a consequence of the decisions taken by 
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the party executive. If his colleagues were dissatisfied with his behaviour they should 
demand his resignation from the War Cabinet. Ultimately tempers cooled sufficiently for 
Bonar Law to recognise that with the Prime Minister away, Henderson could neither be 
asked to resign, nor prevented from travelling to Paris as arranged. On his part, Henderson 
conceded that even though his experiences in Russia had persuaded him personally of the 
merits of the Stockholm conference, the government itself was not in any way committed, 
and the Labour party would itself not decide until 10 August. All agreed that the matter 
should be fully discussed when Lloyd George and Henderson had returned from Paris. 
 
Despite pulling back slightly at the end of the meeting, Henderson undoubtedly gave the 
impression of a weakening commitment to his ministerial obligations. As far as can be 
gleaned from the minutes and his own subsequent statements, he informed the Cabinet 
that he had become persuaded that it was his ‘duty to his country’ to go personally to 
Stockholm, that he had himself encouraged his executive to commit to the conference, and 
that he now felt politically bound to honour this party decision. He finally warned that if he 
did not go to Stockholm, he could not see how he could retain his position as Secretary of 
his party.26 Alongside his challenge to colleagues to demand his resignation, this may have 
suggested that Henderson was now placing obligations to his party above those to the 
Cabinet. Whilst such impressions could be attributable to the bad tempered atmosphere in 
which these remarks were engendered, they could also indicate a change in his attitude 
towards Cabinet membership already in place before he had returned to Britain. 
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Lloyd George would describe Henderson’s behaviour towards Cabinet colleagues at this 
time as a ‘profound blunder’.27 Given that he would have to rely on government 
acquiescence to succeed in his ambition to go to Stockholm, Henderson’s actions could 
legitimately be seen in this way.28 Why then did he make such an unfortunate error? The 
most likely explanation centre’s around the choice the executive made to include 
MacDonald in the labour delegation to Paris, a choice that Henderson would have known 
would be particularly controversial.  
 
In May the War Cabinet had judged, with some trepidation, that MacDonald could be 
considered one of the more responsible members of the Labour minority, and that this 
made him a suitable and potentially persuasive addition to the largely ‘patriotic’ delegation 
to be sent to Russia. By early June however this confidence was eroded, largely as a result of 
MacDonald’s leading role in the infamous Leeds conference of 3 June, at which minority 
supporters outraged both ‘patriotic’ labour and the wider nation by praising the Russian 
revolutionaries’ peace programme and by proposing the creation of ‘soviets’ in Britain 
itself.29 As a consequence the War Cabinet’s original decision came under review on 7 June. 
Pointing to the unease of Allied governments in allowing minority socialists to travel to 
Russia or attend the Stockholm conference, Cecil cited fears that ‘pacifists’ could force Allied 
governments ‘into a premature and unsatisfactory peace.’ It was being suggested, he 
continued, ‘that we were paying too high a price and risking too much to support a 
Government in Russia whose prospects were at best very uncertain, and who were probably 
unlikely to exercise any further influence on the war……’ The Cabinet decided that they 
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should ‘solicit the views of Henderson in Russia’ before reversing, as Cecil recommended, 
the original decision.30 When Henderson and Buchanan jointly replied that it would be ‘a 
great mistake’ to prevent MacDonald travelling, the War Cabinet gave its approval, subject 
to MacDonald accepting undertakings to stop no longer in Stockholm ‘than was absolutely 
necessary to change trains’ and to communicate with nobody there ‘except Mr Branting’. 
Lloyd George would personally secure this undertaking. It was also reaffirmed that minority 
delegates should be comfortably outnumbered by ‘patriots’.31 
 
The fallout from Leeds may have dissipated somewhat by the time Henderson returned to 
Britain. However the epithet ‘pro-German’ widely attached to MacDonald since the 
beginning of the war was at this moment about to gain new currency. Unhappy over the fact 
that the progressively worded resolution on peace terms passed on 19 July by the Berlin 
Reichstag had been largely ignored or dismissed by the British press, MacDonald had agreed 
to initiate a Commons debate on this striking initiative. On 26 July therefore MacDonald was 
to read out to MPs the full Reichstag resolution and to propose that the House of Commons 
respond in kind.32 This was the day before he was due to travel to Paris with Henderson, 
who would surely have realised how difficult the Cabinet would find it to permit 
MacDonald’s departure on this mission immediately after he had offended the great 
majority of MPs on the Conservative, Liberal and Labour benches.33 It is quite possible that 
this realisation played its part in Henderson’s decision to make the delegation’s travel 
arrangements prior to any discussion with the Cabinet.  
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We may therefore recognise Henderson’s decision less as a blunder than an enforced 
improvisation, made possible (and necessary) by the twin circumstances of MacDonald’s 
initiative and Lloyd George’s absence. Whilst on the one hand the MacDonald situation 
made it hard to imagine that he could gain the assent of the Cabinet to the latter’s inclusion 
in the Paris delegation, on the other, the absence of the Prime Minister made it possible to 
adopt a semblance of keeping ministers informed without incurring the risk of a full and 
difficult conversation with ministers. We cannot now know what Henderson would have 
done on the 27th had the Cabinet not summoned him the previous day. Perhaps he would 
have attended Cabinet to inform ministers that he was sailing to Paris that afternoon, 
trusting that it would by then be too late for the Cabinet to prevent the trip - perhaps not.34 
In the event ministers were unable to persuade Henderson into any change of plans even on 
the 26th, largely it seems because they believed that the Prime Minister had already 
authorised the arrangements. When it became evident that this was not so, Lloyd George 
and other senior Cabinet members discussed in a succession of meetings how they should 
respond to the several serious ramifications of this episode.35 Henderson had succeeded in 
retaining MacDonald as part of the Paris delegation, but this was at the expense of gravely 
weakening his standing within the government. 
 
Henderson could of course have avoided this particular problem. It would surely have been 
within his power to persuade the NEC that the risk of including MacDonald in the Paris 
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delegation was under the circumstances too great. Whilst it was expected by both the 
Russians and French that a ‘minority’ delegate should be included, there were options in the 
executive other than MacDonald, for example Jowett. On the other hand MacDonald, by 
virtue of his seniority in the party and his international reputation, would certainly have 
been considered by the Russians and the French minoritaires as the obvious candidate. One 
other consideration was the earlier prevention of MacDonald’s expected appearance in 
Petrograd. Given the preconceptions of most Russian socialists regarding the character of 
imperialist governments, it had been hard to convince them that the block on MacDonald’s 
visit had been solely attributable to a rogue trade union. A further failure to permit him to 
engage with international socialists would certainly have created a negative effect. Might 
Henderson have felt that MacDonald’s exclusion would have weakened the British position 
in the vital arguments over the mandatory or consultative nature of the conference and the 
hoped for adjustments to the system of representation? 
 
Henderson has never provided an answer to this question. At the time he concentrated on 
denying his own responsibility for MacDonald’s inclusion in the delegation. Whilst ready to 
admit his own major role in the central Stockholm decision, he gave the impression that the 
selection of MacDonald for Paris had not been made by him personally. He suggested to the 
Cabinet on 26 July that MacDonald had been imposed on him by the executive, who had 
decided that the delegation should comprise ‘the Chairman, Treasurer and Secretary of the 
Labour Party’. The implication here is that MacDonald was chosen because he was party 
treasurer rather than for any more obvious political reason. Henderson provided no 
explanation as to why the Executive should have chosen this unusual manner of selecting a 
delegation to an international meeting. He himself would apparently have been included for 
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no better reason than that he was party secretary. Earlier in the meeting however he had 
stated that his own inclusion in the delegation was ‘essential’ in order ‘to ensure that the 
conditions governing attendance at the Stockholm Conference were satisfactory.’36  
 
Six days later in the House of Commons Henderson began a discussion of the 25 July NEC 
meeting by stating that ‘when our executive met a week ago we had to consider’ the 
invitations to Stockholm and Paris. (emphasis added). In the following sentences, during 
which the decisions regarding delegates to Paris are discussed, Henderson’s ‘we’ becomes a 
‘they’. When the invitation to join the delegation was extended to him, he tells MPs, ‘I 
determined to accept it.’ One reason he reveals for this acceptance was that his own 
inclusion would allow him, given the executive’s decision to also appoint MacDonald, ‘to do 
what I could if I found him going astray.’37 
 
All of this is wholly unconvincing and must surely be seen as an attempt to shift 
responsibility for a controversial decision. In reality Henderson was very much in control of 
the Stockholm process at this time. His decision to sanction if not promote his ‘pacifist’ 
colleague’s inclusion in the Paris party should surely be seen then as a strategic choice – a 
judgement, in effect, that it was more important to secure his goals in relation to the French 
and Russian socialists than to gamble on his ability to persuade the War Cabinet of the 
continuing case for a British presence at Stockholm. Whilst it was obvious that an 
unconvinced Cabinet could prevent British attendance, it was no less true that the hopes of 
persuading his party to accept Stockholm would themselves be dependent on his ability to 
convert Russian socialists to his views on the conference arrangements. 
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The handling of this episode in standard accounts has been generally inadequate. Neither 
Winter nor Bridgen directly consider the issue. In the three biographies the 26 July Cabinet 
confrontation is mentioned, but treated in terms of a strong disagreement between 
Conservative ministers and Henderson on the merits of Stockholm rather than as a 
perceived dereliction of duty on the latter’s part in failing to keep his colleagues properly 
informed.38 The biographers have generally accepted Henderson’s subsequent defence on 
this count, delivered to the House of Commons following his resignation.  Yet this defence is 
clearly evasive. Henderson accuses ministers of having intimated ‘that the whole of the 
arrangements for my going to Paris were done without their knowledge.’ This, he declares, 
was factually incorrect. His telegram to Lloyd George on the 25th and the ‘special meeting of 
the Cabinet’ the following day informed ministers of his plans. No reference is made to the 
fact that the ‘special meeting’ had been called precisely because ministers had by then 
learned that Henderson had already booked the delegation’s passage to Paris very much 
‘without their knowledge’.39 Fortunately perhaps, Bonar law chose not to make this point. 
 
Before moving on to the events following his return from Paris, we must consider a little 
further a point made above. If we are to conclude that Henderson was adopting in the pre-
Paris period an approach towards his Cabinet responsibilities very different to that he had 
maintained over the previous two years, this has unavoidable implications regarding our 
interpretation of the more significant dispute with the Cabinet a fortnight later. The relative 
neglect by historians of this first dispute with the Cabinet, alongside a tendency to take 
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Henderson’s explanations too uncritically, may have permitted the taking of a similarly 
defensive view to in relation to the graver circumstances leading to his resignation. 
 
The events of 1 August, the day of Henderson’s return from Paris, have been amply covered 
by historians. At a private meeting between Lloyd George and Henderson in the morning the 
Prime Minister ‘could not disguise the unpleasant character of the situation’ his colleague 
had created, whilst Henderson responded with a ‘full’ and ‘faithful’ statement of his 
‘personal position’.40 Disagreeing on substantive matters they resolved to continue the 
conversation at a meeting of the Cabinet that afternoon. This led to the memorable 
‘doormat’ incident, when Henderson arrived at the scheduled time only to be asked to wait 
outside the Cabinet room whilst other ministers discussed the issues his actions had raised. 
Although Lloyd George maintained that Henderson’s hour long wait in the antechamber had 
been intended ‘to spare him personal unpleasantness’, it is easy to imagine that the Prime 
Minister and his senior colleagues had another purpose in mind.41 This is evident from the 
minutes of the recent Cabinet meetings at which the situation had been repeatedly 
discussed.  
 
These discussions had taken place against a background of serious criticism in parliament 
and the press as to how it was that the government had permitted Henderson and 
MacDonald to travel to France in ‘a Government transport’ to discuss a conference of which 
the bulk of the nation disapproved.42 The embarrassment this caused was not however the 
sole or most serious problem. The fact that Henderson had ‘acquiesced in, if not advocated’ 
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the decision of the Labour executive to attend Stockholm was itself a major concern. The 
government’s position in regard to the conference was ‘gravely compromised’ by a member 
of the War Cabinet taking this position, even if he was acting in his capacity of Labour 
secretary. Senior trade unionists may have believed that Henderson’s advocacy of 
Stockholm ‘implied consent on the part of the Government.’43 It was further suggested that 
the processes initiated by the NEC could provide opportunities for ‘Pacifist organisations’ to 
influence events unfavourably, perhaps leading to an Allied socialist agreement to attend 
Stockholm, from which the British party would find it difficult to demur. The presence of 
Allied socialists at a Stockholm conference could ultimately create a situation in which ‘the 
making of peace might be taken, to a great extent, out of the control of governments.’ 
Ministers recognised that they could prevent this outcome by refusing to grant passports to 
appointed delegates, but were reluctant to be forced into a position which could damage 
hitherto good relations with the Labour movement.44 
 
It was also agreed that if Henderson were to persevere in his promotion of Stockholm it was 
‘difficult to see’ how he could remain in the government. At the same time however the 
Cabinet feared that a resignation over the issue on his part would have negative 
consequences in relation both to Russia and the domestic labour situation. It was clear too 
that Henderson’s contribution to the war effort over a long period in government had been 
very valuable. It was also thought possible that his recent lapse in judgement could be 
partially explained by a lack of awareness that the War Cabinet now viewed the Russian 
situation as significantly changed since May, when they had reluctantly contemplated British 
attendance at Stockholm. For these reasons it was considered important to take no action in 
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relation to Henderson until he had been given the chance to discuss the situation with Lloyd 
George.45  
 
The ‘doormat’ incident and the apparent reconciliation within Cabinet which immediately 
followed can be readily understood in terms of the conflicting concerns highlighted above. 
The humiliation inflicted by the former was one way of demonstrating to Henderson how 
seriously colleagues had viewed his earlier behaviour; once he had been admitted and 
allowed to register his protest at being excluded from the Cabinet room, an atmosphere of 
restored harmony was encouraged, demonstrating the readiness of ministers to put the 
matter behind them in the hope that Henderson would revert to type and ultimately 
support whatever position the government would take on the Stockholm issue. 
 
To cement this restored harmony Henderson was asked to make a statement to the House 
of Commons, where MPs were still demanding explanations of recent events. Ministers 
agreed that he could dispose of some of the expected criticism by stressing that the 
difficulties had arisen as a consequence of his dual role as Labour party secretary and 
government minister. He could admit that whilst on this occasion misunderstandings had 
been entailed, on balance this arrangement possessed great advantages. This, it could be 
added, was clearly the opinion of other Allied governments, who adopted similar practices 
regarding the inclusion of labour leaders in their administrations.  As for MacDonald, as 
party treasurer he could not simply be excluded from party business. The two men had been 
obliged to work together throughout the war without illusions as to their conflicting views. 
‘By taking some such line as this, and by combining it with a strong war speech,’ the Cabinet 
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concluded, Henderson ‘should succeed in satisfying the House of Commons.’46 Henderson 
then addressed the House that evening very much along these lines, after which Lloyd 
George also asserted that his colleague’s dual role as Cabinet minister and leader of the 
Labour party had been of great benefit to the government. As for the Stockholm 
conference, the government was by no means committed to British attendance but would 
continue to discuss the matter before stating its final position.47 
 
 
Waiting for Lloyd George 
 
By the morning of 2 August then the initial crisis was to some extent defused. This, as it 
happens, was the precise mid-point in the period between Henderson’s return to London 
and his departure from the Cabinet. It will be useful therefore to consider how matters 
stood in relation to his campaign at this juncture. The position in the Cabinet now assumed 
a superficial normality. At the same time however a formal decision on Stockholm had still 
to be taken. Henderson clearly expected this to be reached sooner rather than later.48 Nor 
could he have had much doubt as to the nature of this final decision. In the meetings of 
both 26 July and 1 August it had been plain that ministers were opposed to British 
attendance. Significantly, Allied governments had by now been informed of that fact.49 On 2 
August Bonar Law told the Commons that although the government had not yet formally 
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decided on Stockholm, permission to attend would not be given without ‘the most careful 
consideration’ and ‘probably not at all’.50 
 
But if Henderson could be all but certain regarding the views on Stockholm of his colleagues, 
they in their turn remained in some doubt as to his position. In his address to parliament on 
1 August Henderson had explained why he had come to believe whilst in Russia that it 
would be to the Allies advantage to allow socialists to attend the conference. Though as 
requested he had sounded a firm ‘patriotic’ note during his statement, he fell short of any 
clear declaration that his opinions had since changed. He did not suggest either that his 
views remained the same. He neither confirmed nor denied that it remained his intention to 
urge his party to vote in favour of Stockholm. He did however make remarks concerning his 
party’s traditional ‘ideals’ and the need for a peace settlement which would meet with ‘the 
approval of the common people’ which showed continuing sympathy to the internationalist 
cause.51 The remaining uncertainty clearly concerned some ministers, who wished to see 
matters brought speedily to a head through a swift and unequivocal statement of the 
Cabinet’s view. Lloyd George, on the other hand, evidently preferred to delay a potential 
confrontation which he presumably feared could needlessly damage the government’s 
sensitive relations with Labour.52 
 
In relation to the Cabinet then, Henderson was obliged to play a waiting game. In relation to 
Allied socialists there was nothing he could do to reverse the agreements reached in Paris. 
But what now were his prospects as regards his own party? These it seemed were decidedly 
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mixed. There were certainly signs that the controversy surrounding the Paris expedition had 
encouraged Labour opponents of Stockholm to raise their voices. On the morning of his 
return from France Henderson would have seen in The Times a demand from the leader of 
the BWL that the government should insist on his resignation. In Fisher’s view Henderson 
was guilty of a ‘gross impropriety’ in failing to consult either with the War Cabinet or with 
his Labour colleagues in the government before setting off to Paris to discuss the Stockholm 
conference. Reminding readers that Henderson had formerly been a member of the UDC, 
and doubting how completely he had since severed himself from these earlier ‘pacifist’ 
connections, Fisher went on to state that in endeavouring to lead his party into ‘treasonable 
negotiations for peace with enemy delegates’ Henderson had brought about the gravest 
political crisis to confront the nation since the outbreak of war. He urged labour ‘patriots’ to 
stand firm against their ‘erratic colleague.’.53 
 
There was evidence that Labour ‘patriots’ were already doing just this. Alongside Fisher’s 
diatribe in The Times, the Daily Mail reported the same morning on a meeting of Labour 
members of the government. Observing that ‘great opposition’ to Henderson’s Stockholm 
proposal had been evident at the gathering, the Mail noted the determination of ‘the 
strongest of the Labour Ministers not to follow this line.’ It was also stated that the 
ministers had not been consulted and ‘did not know of the Paris visit with…….MacDonald 
until the arrangements were complete.’54 The several ministers who were members of the 
NEC and who had attended the 25 July meeting could not of course legitimately have made 
this final claim. It was nevertheless suggested several days later that Henderson had only 
succeeded in securing his resolution in the NEC by a narrow margin, which he achieved 
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when two of his opponents, Roberts and Clynes, had been drawn away by business in the 
House of Commons.55 
 
However little his opponents liked it however, a Stockholm momentum was now gathering 
within the party. Affiliated bodies were beginning to state their views.56 The matter would 
of course be settled by the block votes of the unions, and in the following days many of 
these were ready to declare their intentions. It soon became clear that the numbers on 
either side remained close. We might imagine in the light of this that Henderson would have 
been keen to influence this nationwide debate. In fact, he chose to remain silent, making no 
further public statement on the matter until the moment he addressed the 10 August 
conference. No doubt his earlier difficulties with the Cabinet played a major part in this 
decision to withhold his council. Any statement designed to persuade the nation’s trade 
unionists in favour of Stockholm would inevitably have reignited the carefully doused 
Cabinet crisis. Anyway, the outlines of his pro-Stockholm position, as articulated in the 
period before Paris and in the parliamentary address on his return, were already well 
understood. It was also the case however that the political difficulties surrounding the 
question left room for uncertainty as to his present or future intentions. In retaining his 
silence he simply allowed this uncertainty to grow.  
 
A further reason for Henderson’s silence may be added. The failure of the Paris meetings to 
provide satisfactory solutions to the problems of the mandatory or consultative nature of 
the Stockholm conference and the issue of representation was not something to which he 
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would have wished to draw attention. Personal engagement in the ongoing Stockholm 
debate could all too easily have obliged him to address these matters and all too easily as a 
consequence provided weapons to his labour opponents. We may also note one very 
curious aspect of this policy of silence: it extended beyond personal statements by 
Henderson himself to matters of practical communications between the party and its 
affiliates. This was to generate a quite remarkable state of confusion.  
 
One of the decisions taken in Paris was to postpone the Allied socialist conference 
scheduled for 8 and 9 August to later in the month. But this information appears not to have 
been formally passed on. Discussions surrounding Stockholm continued to assume that the 
inter-Allied conference was taking place on the originally scheduled dates. The political and 
the labour correspondents of the Manchester Guardian reported on consecutive days prior 
to the 8th that the Allied conference was taking place as planned.57 An editorial in The Times 
of 7 August still spoke of ‘Labour and Socialist organizations of Allied countries’ meeting 
prior to the British conference on the 10th.58 If journalists of the national press remained 
unaware of this significant change in the party timetable, the political and trade union 
leaders with whom they were daily conversing must presumably have shared their 
ignorance. 
 
The silence of the party leadership on this deferment, though undoubtedly odd, also had 
political significance.  The original process established on 25 July had envisaged the inter-
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Allied conference taking place immediately prior to the 10 August special conference and its 
outcomes being germane to the decision on Stockholm which would be taken by the British 
party.59 It came then as a considerable surprise when, at some point on 7 August, it was 
generally realised that there was to be no Allied conference the next day. The significance of 
this change was immediately recognised. The Daily Mail portrayed the postponement of the 
Allied gathering as representing a ‘sudden and dramatic change......in the arrangements for 
taking a Labour vote on the......Stockholm proposal.’60 The Manchester Guardian similarly 
declared that the situation had been ‘materially changed’. It was now ‘by no means 
impossible or unlikely that the Labour Party Conference will adjourn consideration of the 
whole thing until the Allied Socialists’ Conference has met.’61 The Times agreed that the 
Labour party might well now choose to postpone its decision on Stockholm, pointing out 
that there would be ‘ample time’ between the end of the Allied socialist conference on 29 
August and the commencement of the full international conference 9 September for the 
party to meet and decide ‘in the light of the proceedings’ of the first of these conferences 
whether it would go to the second.62  
 
Unsurprisingly, rumours regarding Henderson’s position on this new found opportunity for 
delay began to circulate. Although he himself continued to maintain silence, information 
received ‘from a quarter in close touch with Mr Henderson’ suggested that he may have 
been ‘modifying very greatly his attitude towards the Stockholm conference.’63 This 
widespread press speculation as to Henderson’s intentions clearly casts doubt on the claim 
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forcefully made by Hamilton that by the time of the critical 8 August Cabinet meeting 
‘Henderson’s attitude was known; by now even familiar.’64 This was a judgement of pivotal 
importance in the claims and counter-claims which would surround the proceedings of that 
meeting.  
 
Meanwhile, there was little sign during the early days of August that the wider difficulties 
facing the Stockholm venture were easing. The Soviet delegates, continuing their European 
tour, still insisted that participants at the conference would be expected ‘to give an 
undertaking to carry into effect, without any hesitation and without any deviation, the 
decisions arrived at.’65 In an increasingly desperate attempt to bridge the gap between the 
British and Russians on this question, the Dutch/Scandinavian committee revealed a 
complicated procedure by which parties in dispute would have their separate cases 
scrutinised by a committee comprising delegates from all participating parties with a view to 
constructing a generally acceptable position, which would then be binding on all. Should an 
acceptable compromise not be achievable the question at issue would be referred back to 
the various nationalities for further discussion ‘with a view to possible future conferences 
until unanimity is attained.’66 This proposal was not even raised by Henderson on 10 August; 
nor was the formula devised in Paris almost a week earlier. He told delegates instead that as 
things now stood the condition for British attendance at Stockholm had not been met, and 
that neither he nor the party executive would contemplate going to the conference under 
unacceptable terms.67 
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Further problems arose over another matter to which Henderson had attached great 
importance. In the interview he gave in Stockholm on 17 July he stated that ‘the Labour and 
Socialist parties of all Entente countries, including America’ should be ‘fully represented’. 
There was already serious doubt at this time as to whether Belgian socialists would agree to 
attend the conference, and the American position was also unclear. Ensuring sufficient time 
for the American Federation of Labour to dispatch a delegation to Stockholm was a major 
reason behind Henderson’s desire to have the conference postponed.68 News from the 
United States however dashed his hopes. In language that was far from helpful to his cause, 
the President of the AFL, Samuel Gompers, brusquely rejected the invitation. Arguing that 
since the working people of the United States, Great Britain and France were ‘doing all in 
their power to aid in the war against autocracy’ whilst German workers were helping ‘the 
Kaiser to win the war’, Gompers declared on 4 August that in his opinion an international 
labour conference was ‘impractical and positively injurious.’69 He reaffirmed a few days later 
that no representative of the AFL would ‘go officially to Stockholm.......even if Britain and 
France send delegates.’70  
 
Also, as Henderson discovered whilst in Paris, the French party too was again bitterly 
divided on its approach to Stockholm. Former majoritaires, whilst accepting the party’s 
earlier decision to attend the conference, were now contriving to scupper it at the earliest 
opportunity. As Thomas would explain to his parliamentary constituents, he would go to 
Stockholm with the sole purpose of delivering a démarche to the enemy socialists. The case 
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for German responsibility for the outbreak of war would be put at the opening of the 
conference, after which the French delegates would at once return home ‘if the German 
majority were not immediately disavowed......by the Internationale.’71  
 
Added to these international disappointments were continuing indications of dissent on the 
part of senior Labour figures in Britain. For the more traditional trade union leaders of 
‘patriotic’ labour, Fisher’s insinuation that Henderson had all along been a closet ‘pacifist’ 
was generally a step too far. Nevertheless personal criticism of a more or less veiled nature 
was directed towards the embattled party Secretary during the following days. Charles 
Bowerman, Secretary to the Parliamentary Committee of the TUC and Labour MP, whilst 
objecting to the calling of a conference at a time when Labour efforts would be better 
employed in encouraging the military campaign, pointedly added that he ‘did not wish to 
pass any reflection upon any member of his own party, but he did resent certain things that 
had been said and done at a time when the nation was in death grips with a powerful 
opponent.’72  
 
Henderson had won round the NEC on 25 July, but he failed to gain the backing of the 
party’s other main bodies. The smaller of the two main union groupings, the General 
Federation of Trade Unions (GFTU), declared its opposition to the NEC resolution on 2 
August.73  The Parliamentary Committee of the larger TUC did at least, after protracted 
debate, decline to follow the GFTU, postponing its final decision on Stockholm to the 
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forthcoming annual congress in September.74 Labour MPs constituted another focus of firm 
opposition, with a significant majority hostile to Henderson’s plans. The PLP formally raised 
its objection to the actions of the NEC, giving rise to a tense discussion within the executive 
as to what should be the proper relationship between the two bodies regarding the 
formulation of the party’s international policy.75 
 
Little joy was offered to the parliamentarians in this debate and resentment on the part of 
the PLP over these proceedings remained strong. Speaking at a second labour conference 
on the Stockholm question on 21 August, Will Thorne, MP, complained that as far as he 
could remember Henderson ‘had never said a single word to the Parliamentary Party as to 
his views and what he proposed to do’ following his return from Russia. This was a clear 
break, he observed, with ‘the usual practice’ of consulting the PLP on important questions.  
Thorne’s notion of what had been usual practice appears correct, certainly during the first 
three years of the war. On the decisions to join both Asquith’s and Lloyd George’ coalitions 
and on the formulation of party policy regarding conscription, joint meetings of the NEC and 
PLP had been instrumental. Why then did Henderson choose to deny Labour MPs their 
customary say on the Stockholm question? Given the views of the bulk of the parliamentary 
party, Thorne’s answer to this question was fairly obvious. If there had been a joint 
conference, he claimed, ‘it was very questionable’ as to whether the Stockholm resolution 
‘would have been put forward.’76  
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Henderson’s supporters could of course insist that far from being a crude attempt to 
overcome the opposition to his Stockholm policy, the calling of a full labour conference 
represented a more democratic solution to the party’s differences than the alternative of 
leaving decisions to narrow leadership groups. This however was widely contested. Labour’s 
prominent patriots were largely and probably correctly convinced that the majority of rank 
and file trade unionists – the democratic bedrock of the party - remained opposed to any 
form of discussion with enemy socialists whilst the war continued. But the timescale under 
which the NEC was operating, seeking a decision on the Stockholm question in a mere 
handful of days, precluded the possibility of any meaningful canvas of grassroots opinion. 
This invalidated, in the view of many, the decision in Henderson’s favour at the 10 August 
conference. As Roberts would charge the following day: ‘the party had no right to agree to 
go into the Conference with the enemy until the rank and file had been consulted in a 
constitutional fashion.’77 Henderson had succeeded not only in bypassing the views of 
elected MPs, but also the opinions of the multitude of ordinary workers, it was believed.  
 
This denial of constitutional propriety legitimised in the minds of the more militant ‘patriots’ 
a resort to unconstitutional means. The Seamen’s union had already shown that it could 
thwart ‘pacifist’ plans merely by refusing to carry its opponents overseas. Despite pressures 
to reverse its decision to refuse passage to Russia for MacDonald and Jowett, the union had 
been able to garner sufficient support to uphold its decision.78 Claiming vengeance for the 
souls of ‘the men who have gone down in our ships’ and rejecting all attempts at ‘a patched-
up peace’, ‘Captain’ Tupper, one of the most militant of its representatives, had promised 
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on 26 July to again ‘keep pacifists from being conveyed to Russia or any other country.’79 
The union’s president, Havelock Wilson, affirmed on 8 August that his members ‘would not 
carry peace delegates to Stockholm, no matter what consequences followed.’80 At a BWL 
gathering on the eve of the 10 August conference, a meeting attended or publicly supported 
by Labour members of the government and by Labour MPs, Wilson reiterated to ‘Loud and 
prolonged cheers’ that whatever was to be decided the following day ‘seafaring men will 
absolutely decline to carry any peace delegates.’81 
 
As the 10 August approached it must have been obvious to Henderson that however the 
conference would vote the possibility of a British delegation actually travelling to Stockholm 
would be prevented, either by the denial of passports or the intransigence of seamen. Even 
had these obstacles not existed, Henderson himself would have vetoed attendance should 
the Russians have continued to insist on a binding conference. He appeared to doubt 
moreover that he would even succeed in securing the conference vote.82 In the final days 
before the conference it was indeed generally recognised that the decision would be close. 
Calculations based on the votes that would be mustered by those unions which had already 
revealed their intentions suggested that the outcome would be dependent on the large 
miners’ union, whose decision had yet to be made. It was known that the representatives of 
the different coalfields were divided on the Stockholm question. The Yorkshire miners had 
already declared their opposition; those of South Wales on the other hand were clearly in 
favour. There had been a possibility that on this unusual and contentious issue the separate 
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regions would be permitted to vote independently of each other and the miners’ vote 
apportioned accordingly.83  
 
By the time the MFGB delegates assembled to make their decision on 9 August, this option 
had been abandoned in favour of the established procedure by which an overall majority on 
the executive, however narrow, would determine which way the union’s 600,000 votes 
would be cast.84 The conference was opened by Robert Smillie, President of the Federation, 
who began by lamenting the lack of information the Labour executive had so far provided 
on the many issues involved in this major decision. It was possible, he believed, that the 
next day’s conference would be adjourned, and that no vote on Stockholm would then be 
taken. If however it became clear that the conference was to proceed to a vote, he 
proposed that the miners themselves should call for an adjournment during the meeting, 
once the executive had more fully explained its position, in order that they might then be 
enabled to reach an informed decision. This procedure was accepted by the delegates. 
Clearly much was going to depend on what Henderson said, which was as yet shrouded in 
uncertainty.85  
 
Against this difficult background on the Labour front, Henderson finally on 7 August faced 
the confrontation with the War Cabinet he had been expecting for the better part of a 
week. The decisions Henderson would take over the following three days are at the core of 
this thesis. They represent the most serious challenges to the standard account, both in 
terms of the political morality apportioned between Lloyd George and Henderson, and to 
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the presumed motivational drive of the latter. But if they cannot convincingly be rendered 
consistent with the tenets of the standard account, it will be shown that they can be 






Henderson had been expecting that a political decision on Stockholm was about to be taken 
by the Cabinet. What he discovered on 7 August was that prior to this political decision a 
legal ruling on the question had been obtained from the Attorney General. The initiative for 
this move had been taken by Edward Carson, one of the ministers most opposed to Lloyd 
George’s policy of delay on reaching a Stockholm decision. Carson had a strong legal 
background and had served as Attorney General in Asquith’s coalition. He would have been 
aware of the principle of common law ‘that in time of war, intercourse between subjects of 
this country and enemy subjects is forbidden’ and that the meaning of the term 
‘intercourse’ had been broadened during 1915 to include ‘not merely commercial 
intercourse, but all intercourse with an alien enemy.’86 He was clearly confident that the 
current Attorney General, whose judgement he sought, would reach the conclusion he 
desired and expected: that to ‘take part in a Peace Conference with enemy subjects 
would…..clearly constitute “intercourse”.’87 
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Following the circulation to Cabinet members of this ruling, Henderson and Lloyd George 
spoke privately on the evening of the 7th, but their recollections of what was said differ 
significantly. Henderson would maintain that he put two alternative suggestions to Lloyd 
George: firstly, that if the government was going to act on the Attorney General’s opinion, 
this should be immediately announced so that he could go to the Labour executive and 
point out ‘that this legal position would compel me to consider my personal position’. He 
would then be forced to choose between giving up either his Cabinet or his party post. His 
second suggestion was that the government should allow the party conference ‘to 
decide....apart altogether from the legal aspect of the case’ whether or not they wished to 
go to Stockholm. If they did decide to attend, then the government, he proposed, should let 
them go. In order that the Cabinet ‘might officially disassociate itself from the conference,’ 
he helpfully suggested, ‘no member of the Government should form part of the delegation, 
even including myself.’88 Lloyd George appeared to have a less detailed recollection, but 
would insist that the main message he had received was that Henderson, in part because of 
the Attorney General’s intervention and in part because of his recognition that the position 
in Russia had changed, had indicated ‘that he would use the whole of his influence to turn 
down the Stockholm Conference’ at the upcoming labour meeting.89 
 
A further conversation the same evening, this time between Henderson and the other 
Labour ministers, led to Henderson’s deciding definitely against the first suggestion he had 
made to Lloyd George: that the legal judgement be immediately announced. Exactly how 
this conversation proceeded is unknown. What is clear is that Henderson and the other 
ministers, although their hopes for the outcome of the 10 August conference were 
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divergent, did nevertheless agree that ‘the conference should be left absolutely free from 
Government influence to come to a decision.’ Henderson then informed Lloyd George of the 
unanimous view of the Labour ministers, and maintained that view at the critical Cabinet 
meeting the following day.90 Lloyd George concurs with this part of Henderson’s account.91 
He would inform Carson on the 9th that he would delay any announcement on the legal or 
Cabinet position ‘on the advice of the anti-Stockholm Labour men’, who were confident that 
they could win the battle on the 10th ‘provided the Government does not put up the backs 
of the trade unionists by telling them in advance that we take no heed of their opinions.’92 
 
In the absence of any definite knowledge of the conversations Henderson had on the 7th it is 
not possible to form a full picture of the events of that evening.  It does nevertheless appear 
certain that both Henderson and Lloyd George entered the Cabinet room the following 
lunchtime united on the course that had been agreed: that it would be desirable to make no 
announcements prior to the 10 August conference. Although it was reiterated that ministers 
no longer believed, as they had done in May, that the political situation in Russia warranted 
a British attendance at Stockholm, they felt ‘that it would be much more convenient to the 
Russian Government, and more conducive to the maintenance of good relations between 
the British Government and the Labour Party, that the working men themselves should 
refuse to attend rather than that the Government should announce their decision and 
thereby appear to dictate to the Labour Party.’ It was acknowledged that this procedure 
involved some risk. The possibility that the conference would vote for Stockholm could not 
be ruled out. This, in the characteristically understated language of Cabinet minutes, would 
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place the government ‘in a difficult position.’ What nobody raised, presumably because they 
thought it irrelevant (or in Henderson’s case for some other reason), was how much more 
‘difficult’ would be the government’s position should one of their own members, present at 
this discussion and uniquely able to exercise influence on the Labour decision, strive to 
obtain the result the Cabinet feared.93  
 
No dissent to any of these propositions was recorded in the minutes. Neither in the course 
of this meeting then, nor at any time in the following forty eight hours, did Henderson let 
the Cabinet know that he planned to persuade his party to vote contrary to their clearly 
expressed hopes. How then did he seek to justify this neglect? Tellingly he offered several 
explanations, a sign perhaps that none of them actually addressed the issue at all 
convincingly. His main response to the charge that he had misled the War Cabinet was 
simply to deny that he had done any such thing. He had ‘never hinted’ to any of his 
colleagues, either collectively or individually, that he was ‘going to do otherwise than 
continue the course’ to which he was known to have committed himself.94 As we have seen 
however, there were many, inside and outside the Cabinet, who doubted that Henderson 
would ‘continue the course’ he had earlier followed, and he himself had contributed to that 
doubt by remaining silent on the question. Although we cannot know what, if anything, he 
did say at his final Cabinet meeting which, according to Lloyd George, had convinced all 
those present that he would speak against Stockholm, we can be certain that he did not say 
anything to suggest that he would speak for the conference.95 Had he done so ministers 
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would surely have done their utmost to persuade him otherwise, or failing that would have 
taken steps to avert what would be a major embarrassment.  
 
The weakness of this defence is self-evident. It is possible that Henderson had never said 
anything to the effect that he would oppose Stockholm at the conference. We must assume 
however that he knew perfectly well that his Cabinet colleagues were presuming that he 
had abandoned his former commitment, and that he nevertheless chose to remain silent 
until after he had delivered his pro-Stockholm address. Henderson could defend himself 
against the charge of a sin of commission, but hardly deny a sin of omission. This could be 
perceived perhaps as a lesser transgression, but a breach nevertheless against the 
conventions of Cabinet responsibility. 
 
Other explanations he provided sought to imply that he may not in fact have been 
committed to his subsequent action on the day of the Cabinet meeting. He told parliament 
the following week that the decision was effectively forced upon him on the 9th when the 
NEC met to confirm arrangements for the following day’s conference. Recommendations 
adopted on 25 July were, he admitted, challenged at this meeting, but a fresh vote revealed 
a majority in favour of the earlier position. The executive then invited me, he informed the 
House, ‘to state their case at the conference the following day.’ Anyone who knew the 
history of the Labour movement, he continued, would realise that it ‘would have been 
impossible’ to then go to the conference and put the government view. ‘If I had done so, I 
should have had to resign the secretaryship. There is not a shadow of doubt about that.’96 
This explanation is disingenuous. He had earlier sought to distance himself from 
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controversial decisions by posing as a mere servant of the party executive, and this defence 
should be seen as in similar vein.97 More importantly, he had had plenty of time to inform 
the Cabinet of this new development before addressing the conference on the 10th.  
 
Henderson’s initial explanation of his unexpected address may also be considered. In a note 
sent from the conference venue he had informed Lloyd George ‘that after the most careful 
consideration, I came to the conclusion that I could take no other course than to stand by 
the advice I had given the day after my return from Russia.’98 Since this ‘careful 
consideration’ had not been mentioned previously, the implication was that Henderson’s 
decision had been reached very recently, perhaps too recently to have let the Prime 
Minister know until after he had spoken. This again appears wholly unconvincing. It must 
obviously be assumed that ‘careful consideration’ of the position he would adopt at the 
conference would have taken place over some longer period of time. Particularly damaging 
to this line of defence was the revelation that he had almost certainly made up his mind the 
previous evening. Evidently anxious that the morning papers were about to publish reports 
suggesting that he was intending to speak against Stockholm, he had contacted editors to 
tell them that this was not so. Lloyd George was understandably unimpressed by the fact 
that his colleague had felt it more important to clarify his position to the press than to the 
Cabinet.99 
 
If Henderson had contrived to give three distinct explanations of his questionable 
proceeding in this matter, the historians we have been considering go one better. Wrigley, 
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Leventhal, Winter and Bridgen each deal with the questions raised in differing ways.100 
Wrigley has characterised the disagreement over what was said or implied on 8 August as a 
‘misunderstanding’. Although the Cabinet majority genuinely came away from the meeting 
believing that Henderson would now oppose Stockholm, Henderson himself ‘came away 
believing he was free to follow his own course.’101  As we have seen however, whilst it is 
very likely that ministers failed to understand Henderson’s true position, it seems 
implausible that the reverse could have been the case. Leventhal, whilst allowing that 
‘considerable confusion’ surrounded these events, nevertheless concludes that Lloyd 
George ‘later professed’ to believe that Henderson had changed his mind on Stockholm 
despite ‘clear evidence to the contrary’. What this evidence may have been is not disclosed. 
Despite this Leventhal believes that the Prime Minister may in this case have been 
‘propagating a deliberate misconception’.102 
 
In Winter’s account the accusations of deception against Henderson are simply ignored. The 
War Cabinet on the other hand is charged with having made a ‘pointed and condescending 
suggestion’ in proposing that the Labour conference should be allowed to choose of its own 
volition to reject Stockholm, thereby sparing ministers the political embarrassment of 
appearing to dictate to the party. According to Winter, Henderson took offense at this idea 
and was now ‘no longer prepared to carry out Lloyd George’s orders’. At a more general 
level, suggests Winter, this alienation from his Cabinet colleagues was a consequence of the 
fundamental disagreement with them over Russia, which had by now persuaded him ‘that a 
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political collision was inevitable.’103 For Winter this realisation on Henderson’s part is 
evidently more important than the detailed circumstances surrounding the ‘inevitable’ 
break with the Cabinet. 
 
Bridgen apparently adopts a similar position but also provides a significant new twist. He 
implies that Henderson understood, but chose to ignore ministerial expectations, in the 
belief ‘that ultimately Lloyd George would back him rather than risk his resignation.’104 It is 
certainly true that Lloyd George was reluctant to break with Henderson, with all the 
consequences this may have had for relations with the Labour party. We have seen how 
significant a consideration this had been during the Cabinet discussions over the Paris 
episode. But we have seen also how finely balanced these discussions had been. There was 
no acceptance on the part of Lloyd George, still less other ministers, that Henderson could 
continue to adopt a semi-detached approach to his Cabinet responsibility, in which 
conflicting commitments to party and government would be resolved according to his own 
personal judgement.  Even those who supported his position on Stockholm could distinguish 
between the substance of the debate and the question of Cabinet obligation. Commenting 
on the earlier row over the Paris affair the Manchester Guardian had concluded that 
everything ‘depends on whether Mr Henderson took the Government into his confidence. If 
he did, he is amply justified; if he did not, he is to blame.’105 Could Henderson seriously have 
imagined that the Cabinet would have sat back helpless once they learned what he had 
done on 10 August? The evidence would suggest not. 
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Lloyd George’s blend of reprimand and rehabilitation by which Henderson was greeted on 1 
August may have appeared to the Prime Minister to have been successful in demonstrating 
the Cabinet’s view that whilst the errant behaviour of the previous days could be put behind 
them, no repetition would be tolerated. He appears nevertheless to have felt it wise to ram 
home the message a few days later. Speaking on 4 August at the launch of the NWAC Lloyd 
George concluded with appropriate comments about the need for national patience in the 
pursuit of victory and about the dangers of listening to those who were ‘more concerned 
about ending the war than about winning it.’ His final words are for our purposes of 
particular interest. To cheers from his audience he proclaimed it essential ‘to keep our eye 
steadily’ on winning the war before continuing in the following intriguing manner: 
 
May I say let us keep both eyes? Some have a cast in their eye, and while one eye is fixed 
truly on victory, the other is wandering around to other issues or staring stonily at some 
pet or partisan project of their own. Beware of becoming cross-eyed. (Laughter and 
cheers).......If anyone promotes national distrust or disunion at this hour he is helping the 
enemy and hurting his native land. And it makes no difference whether he is for or 
against the war. As a matter of fact, the hurt is deeper if he is for the war, because 





With Henderson having been so much the focus of political attention during the previous 
week few could have doubted to whom Lloyd George may have been referring. This was 
surely a message Henderson himself could have understood. Had he for whatever reason 
been unwilling or unable to read the runes, help from his fellow Labour ministers was at 
                                                 
106
 The Times, 6 August 1917, p.4. 
186 
 
hand. Barnes would later claim that he had spoken to ‘his friend Henderson.....with all the 
earnestness and persuasiveness of which he was capable’ of the dangers he foresaw in the 
continuation of his leader’s course.107 But we must surely doubt whether Henderson 
actually needed outside advice to appreciate the almost certain outcome of the challenge 
he was about to issue to the War Cabinet. Both in the patriotic press and on the government 
back benches Lloyd George was already under attack for his dilatory response to the 
Stockholm affair.108 For all his concern to avoid damaging relations with the Labour party, 
the Prime Minister’s critics on the right represented a greater threat to his administration 
and could not safely in such circumstances have been ignored.  
 
The attempts by labour historians to explain the events of 8-10 August do little to dispel the 
impression that Henderson knowingly concealed from the War Cabinet his intentions prior 
to the Labour conference. Such a conclusion is of course difficult to accept for those who 
wish to uphold Henderson’s sense of political propriety. For the proponents of the standard 
account however a still greater problem arises when the question is posed as to why 
Henderson chose to adopt this course. The supposed firmness and consistency of his core 
belief that British labour’s attendance at Stockholm would aid the survival of the moderate, 
pro-Allied sections of Russian socialism obviously loses its potency once it is recognised that 
Henderson knew during these forty eight hours that British attendance was no longer a 
serious possibility. The most he could achieve for Petrograd was the modicum of moral 
support that would follow an ineffectual pro-Stockholm resolution, but even this would be 
undermined by the fact that, largely due to Henderson’s own objection to the Russian 
insistence on a mandatory procedure, the party was actually itself rejecting the conference 
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invitation.109 Had he however failed to persuade the party to support the resolution, a 
possibility he certainly could not rule out, his position would have been dire. Gratified no 
doubt that labour ‘patriots’ had won the day, the War Cabinet would still have been 
painfully aware that this was despite not because of the efforts of their own most senior 
Labour member. He could simultaneously have faced defeat at the hands of his party and 
ejection from the government. This was an extraordinary risk to take for what would 
amount to a very limited gesture towards Russia.   
 
It could be argued that Henderson may have baulked at reversing his position on Stockholm 
so flagrantly at the behest of the War Cabinet.110 We should therefore explore whether 
there were options available to him other than those of simply supporting or rejecting the 
Cabinet position. Almost certainly, such options did exist. The widespread speculation that 
Henderson might postpone a final decision provided an obvious opportunity. This 
speculation was after all based on the significant rescheduling of the Allied socialist 
conference which had originally been presented as an essential preliminary to the 10 August 
conference. Had he wished to extricate himself from the dilemma created by the War 
Cabinet decision he could credibly have run with this argument.  
 
It was also the case that not all details of the Stockholm process were likely to be settled in a 
single day. A Memorandum on Issues of the War, which had been intended for submission 
to the Inter-Allied conference and would indicate the party’s view on matters inevitably 
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arising both at this and the Stockholm conference, had not yet been circulated to members. 
No full discussion on the question of representation at Stockholm had yet taken place. 
When the executive met on 9 August it was agreed that a second conference, scheduled for 
21 August, would be required to deal with these and other outstanding questions.111 A case 
could surely have been made to defer a decision on whether or not to attend Stockholm to 
this second conference, at which a fuller understanding of all the implications could be 
achieved. 
 
The 9 August meeting of the NEC provided Henderson with another way he could have 
avoided the head on crash with the Cabinet. His claim in the House of Commons that the 
NEC had obliged him to speak in favour of Stockholm fails to tell the full story of this 
meeting. The executive did, as he stated, finally decide by 9 votes to 5 that the executive 
should recommend conditional acceptance of the invitation to Stockholm, but immediately 
prior to this an amendment proposing that the executive should avoid any such 
recommendation was defeated by the much narrower vote of 8 to 7. This amendment was 
submitted by Clynes on the grounds, as the vote on it would demonstrate, that the 
executive was itself divided on the Stockholm question.112 Given the closeness of the vote 
on the amendment it would seem likely that if Henderson had chosen to give it his personal 
support this would have ensured its success, thereby freeing him from any obligation to 
speak at the conference in the manner which would cost him his place in government. 
According to the Manchester Guardian however, Henderson had stuck to his opinion that 
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the executive should recommend attendance despite the ‘very heated’ nature of the 
debate.113  
 
Whether by means of lending support to the proposed amendment, or by other proposals 
which he himself could have brought to the meeting, Henderson could surely have used his 
influence within the NEC, as well as his centrality since returning from Russia to the 
Stockholm debate, to either secure a postponement on the vital vote or to ensure that he 
personally would not be seen as primarily responsible should the conference vote in favour 
of attendance. For the Cabinet, postponement would have undoubtedly been a less 
satisfactory outcome than a clear rejection, but presumably not a matter for removing 
Henderson from his post, particularly had he made the case that a neutral position had been 
forced on him by the party. His position in the Cabinet may still in such an instance have 
become very difficult, but the challenge to ministerial colleagues would obviously have been 
far less egregious. 
 
One further dimension of Henderson’s decision making at this time should be highlighted. It 
is generally supposed that he acted as he did in the belief that British attendance at 
Stockholm would bolster the fortunes of the Provisional Government in Petrograd and its 
supporters. We have seen however that for most of the time he was in Russia he had 
apparently believed that the proposed governmental conference on war aims would be 
more effective and less dangerous than Stockholm. Leaving aside the fact that no 
satisfactory explanation has been offered as to why he might have reversed this judgement, 
it would surely have been natural under the circumstances he faced after 8 August to 
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reconsider his position on the relative merits of the two conferences. The prospects for the 
government conference may not have been good, but for Stockholm by this time they were 
undoubtedly much worse.114 
 
It is in fact surprising that Henderson failed to promote both conferences throughout his 
campaign. In his final message to the War Cabinet from Petrograd he had expressed 
pleasure that the Russian foreign ministry’s proposal had, as he believed, been accepted.115 
On his first day back in London he had drawn public attention to the desire of the All-
Russian Congress of Soviets to see both conferences convened.116 Thereafter the 
governmental conference was effectively dropped from his campaign. The only reference to 
it found in the minutes during his remaining tenure in the War Cabinet was the desultory 
suggestion that the Labour party’s attitude towards Stockholm, which was ‘to postpone it as 
long as possible’ was ‘precisely the same’ as that of the Government on the proposed war 
aims conference.117 There was no particular reason however why he should not have 
continued to make the case for the latter as well as the former, a course of action which 
would have cost him little.  Since he was already facing opposition in the Cabinet over 
Stockholm, he would scarcely have added to his difficulties by simultaneously promoting the 
more respectable conference of Allied governments. He could not easily have been accused 
on that count of taking ‘matters of peace out of the hands of Governments.’118 
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Could his failure to pursue the war aims conference within Cabinet be accounted for by the 
realisation that his colleagues were no longer interested in discussing war aims with Russian 
socialists, as indeed was the case? In the light of his comments on 1 August he had 
presumably consulted War Cabinet minutes for the period of his absence in Russia. He 
would have seen that on 16 July the War Cabinet had discussed the matter and had agreed 
that in ‘the present state of the War it was desirable to postpone the discussion of War Aims 
as long as possible, as, once it was known that we were discussing these questions, the 
effective prosecution of the war might be rendered more difficult.’ Discouraging as these 
observations may have been, Henderson could have drawn some comfort from the fact that 
no final decisions on the proposed conference had been taken, this being ‘deferred’ until his 
own return from Russia.119 The Cabinet never did engage seriously with Henderson on the 
merits or otherwise of this conference, possibly in part as a result of the rumpus over Paris 
and the commencement of his own campaign for Stockholm. 
 
It must be recognised also that the war aims conference was not the only area in which the 
interests of the Russian government would be at stake. Dealings of all sorts continued 
between London and Petrograd, and following the smoothing over of the Paris affair on 1 
August Henderson could, by remaining in the Cabinet, have brought some influence to bear 
on these various matters.  A case in point actually emerged over the following days in 
relation to a conference of Allied leaders in London scheduled for 7 and 8 August.  One item 
on the agenda for this conference was to be the response of western governments to the 
failure of the Russian military offensive. It had long been pointed out by Allied military 
missions in Petrograd that the revolution had had a dire effect on discipline within the 
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Russian armies.120 In the light of these many gloomy warnings the collapse of the offensive 
could have come as little surprise. During his time in Russia Henderson had joined with 
Buchanan in advising caution in dealings with the Provisional Government. Pushing too hard 
over the need to re-establish effective military discipline could, they had at this point 
argued, fuel the extremist propaganda that the Allies were intent on driving Russian soldiers 
into battle to further their imperialist ambitions.121 By early August messages from 
Buchanan were adopting an altogether more forceful tone towards the Provisional 
Government.122 Similar views were gaining ground in London. 
 
The ‘exceedingly bad’ news that had reached Britain from the eastern front, including much 
evidence that Russian troops ‘had lost all discipline’ and were ‘yielding, like a rabble, before 
the German armies’, inevitably encouraged Cabinet ministers to take a firmer line with 
Petrograd.123 On 2 August the War Cabinet resolved to discuss at the upcoming Allied 
conference the question of ‘putting pressure on Russia to restore discipline and resume the 
offensive, as a condition of further supplies of guns and officers.’124 On the eve of the 
conference it was affirmed that ‘while we were ready to make any sacrifice to help a Russia 
which had a strong Government’ the advisability of such a course could be questioned 
should the Russians delay taking ‘the necessary steps to restore discipline.’125 There is no 
indication in the Cabinet minutes during these days that Henderson objected to this change 
of attitude towards the hard pressed Russian government. He may indeed have taken a 
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similar position in discussions with the Soviet representatives with whom he travelled back 
to Britain.126 
 
When the Allied conference opened on 7 August Lloyd George proposed to the French and 
Italian delegations that a joint protest should be made to the Russian government, but that 
this should be combined with an assurance that support would be provided ‘to help Russia 
to become an effective Ally.’ Although a Russian delegation had attended the previous  
Allied conference in Paris, no delegation from Petrograd had been invited to London. 
Following protests from the Russian chargé d’affaires, Konstantin Nabokov, however, 
Nabokov himself was granted a last minute invitation to represent his country at the 
conference. His response to Lloyd George’s proposal was predictable: any reproach to the 
Provisional Government would strengthen those in Russia who claimed their people were 
‘fighting only for the cause of others.’ Disapproval of the British proposal came also however 
from the French and Italians, and in particular from Henderson’s erstwhile socialist comrade 
in Petrograd, Albert Thomas. 
 
Thomas made much of his experience in Russia, during which time ‘he had pressed in 
private conversations…..for the re-establishment of discipline’. He was convinced that 
Kerensky was doing as much as he could in this regard and that a formal protest from Allied 
governments would be counter-productive and dangerous, both to Kerensky’s own position 
and to the Allied cause. Thomas’s intervention led finally to the suggestion that he himself 
should draft an Allied note from which all suggestion of ‘protest’ would be diplomatically 
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removed.127 Having won this early tussle on behalf of Petrograd Thomas returned to the 
topic of Russia during the final session of the conference the following afternoon, expressing 
his concern that too little attention was being paid to the Russian situation, which could yet 
be rescued were the Allies prepared to provide greater technical and material support to 
their still potentially important ally. Lloyd George however doubted that Russia could 
provide ‘any powerful aid’ in 1918.128 Nevertheless Thomas’s concerns were finally reflected 
in the conference’s conclusions, which included a commitment to assist in the 
reorganisation of Russia by providing ‘material and personnel for that object.’129 
 
There was inevitably some room for doubt on 8 August as to how much the Allies would be 
willing to contribute to the reorganisation of Russia as circumstances in that country 
continued to deteriorate, but Thomas could certainly feel that he had achieved something 
for Petrograd through his interventions at the conference. We may well believe also that he 
achieved rather more in this respect than did Henderson in securing his party’s vote for 
Stockholm two days later. Henderson had attended the first three sessions of the inter-
Allied conference, but was absent, presumably by choice, from the final afternoon session 
on 8 August. There is no indication in the minutes that he gave any backing to Thomas, or 
contributed at all to the conference discussion on Russia. If Henderson was engaged, as is 
commonly believed, in a battle to save democratic Russia, he appears to have chosen to 
fight on only one front, this moreover being the one least likely to yield positive results. 
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Proponents of the standard account are agreed that what Henderson believed was at stake 
in the Stockholm dispute was ‘the fate of the socialist revolution in Russia’.130 But nowhere 
do they address the strangely selective means by which he sought to sustain the Petrograd 
regime. A still greater challenge to the tenets of the standard account lies in the domestic 
implications of Henderson’s decisions in the days between 8 and 10 August. We have seen 
how unconvincing are the attempts of historians to avoid the conclusion that Henderson’s 
failure to inform the Cabinet of his intentions regarding the Labour conference was 
deliberately chosen in full knowledge of the likely consequences. We have also seen that 
opportunities to avoid the break with the government were not only spurned, but actively 
opposed. Bearing in mind also the Attorney General’s ruling and the clear position against 
permitting attendance at Stockholm of the War Cabinet, not to mention the impediments to 
attendance still insisted upon by the conference organisers, as well as those loudly asserted 
by the seamen’s union, the obvious question arises: why did Henderson choose to sacrifice 
his position within government for what on the face of it appears to have been a lost cause? 
 
This question is neither posed in any clear way nor answered in any detail in standard 
accounts. The answer nevertheless appears obvious. Henderson clearly attached more 
importance to winning his party’s support for a resolution on Stockholm, which in 
superseding the Manchester resolution would permit future involvement in any wartime 
revival of the Socialist International, than he did to retaining his place in the War Cabinet. 
Must we not accept this is an indication of his true priorities? May we not therefore 
recognise his otherwise barely explicable response to the 8 August Cabinet decisions as just 
the latest and ultimately most effective improvisation of his campaign? The decision of 
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ministers to delay revealing either their own views or the Attorney General’s ruling provided 
Henderson with a window of opportunity, which he evidently decided to take. The labour 
audience he would address on 10 August would be wholly unaware of the political and legal 
implications of a vote for Stockholm. Henderson would still be speaking as a member of the 
Cabinet, and could be presumed therefore to be advocating a course acceptable to the 
government.131 Ministers, in their turn, would remain unaware of his intentions.132 As the 
conference opened on the morning of the 10th Henderson had succeeded in putting himself 
in the remarkable position of being the sole participant in this political drama who fully 
understood the context in which he was acting. 
 
Having successfully exploited what would prove to have been a tactical error on the part of 
the Cabinet, Henderson created conditions relatively favourable to the achievement of his 
principal goal. The format for the conference, which he had successfully shaped on 9 
August, was also advantageous to his purpose. The meeting would be dominated by the 
debate on the main resolution: ‘That the invitation to the International Conference at 
Stockholm be accepted on the condition that the Conference be consultative and not 
mandatory.’133 A second resolution, proposing the make up of the Labour party delegation 
(as distinct from the delegations of the affiliated socialist societies which had been 
traditionally treated by the International as separate entities) was to be discussed following 
the vote on the first. For Henderson to achieve his main objective, all he needed to do on 
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the morning of the 10th was to deliver an address that would persuade the party to support 
the resolution quoted above. 
 
Commenting on Henderson’s conference address, Hamilton writes: ‘In effect, though 
probably not in design, this was a speech of great artistry.’134 We can certainly agree with 
the second part of this statement. Considering however what we have argued in the pages 
above, we must dissent from the proposition that Henderson’s stunningly effective address 
was ‘probably not’ a consequence of careful ‘design’. The lengths to which he had gone to 
put himself in the position he now occupied, and the price he seemed ready to pay in the 
future, both strongly suggest that he would have used every available means to construct a 
speech that would have the desired effect on his audience. We may now consider both the 
artistry and design of this memorable address.   
 
As expected the argument centred on Russia. Henderson explained, as he had done in 
parliament nine days earlier, why he had decided to propose conditional acceptance of the 
invitation to Stockholm. The first part of this explanation had a somewhat negative feel. 
Since the Russian socialists, with the backing of the Provisional Government, had been 
determined to hold the conference, he had been faced with the difficult choice of either 
accepting or rejecting their invitation. After much reflection he had come to believe that 
neither of these courses would have been acceptable, the first because public opinion in 
Russia would have rendered such a position ‘about the most fatal……I could have taken up’, 
the second because it would be counter to the decisions reached by the party in 
Manchester. His solution to this dilemma was to propose a third alternative, to the effect 
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that if Stockholm could be changed ‘from an obligatory Conference to a consultation for the 
purpose of exchanging views’ he could then recommend to his party ‘so far to reverse its 
[Manchester] decision as to make such a consultation  possible.’135 
 
He then went on to cite a more positive reason for going to Stockholm. He had been struck 
by the fact that ‘the most confused ideas…...as to the aims for which our country continues 
the struggle’ were current in Russia. He had even found ‘confused’ and ‘prejudiced’ ideas 
regarding the willingness of British labour to support the war. Our objects, he declared, had 
been perverted, and ‘enemy agents’ were utilising these perversions ‘to the full.’ 
Attendance at Stockholm would provide an opportunity to challenge these dangerous 
misunderstandings. Conversely, he had decided, British absence from the conference would 
raise the potential dangers of ‘Russian representatives’ meeting ‘representatives from 
enemy and neutral countries alone.’136 This of course was the argument earlier used in the 
War Cabinet, an argument still upheld in Petrograd by Buchanan.137 Henderson’s case rested 
finally on ‘the condition of affairs in Russia’ which had been, and may still have been, 
‘positively appalling’. There was little by way of elaboration on this comment nor, more 
pertinently, a clear explanation as to just how British attendance at Stockholm would help 
resolve the country’s manifold problems.138 
 
This then was how Henderson presented the conclusions he had reached in Russia. He now 
addressed the question as to how far current circumstances still justified these conclusions. 
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A particular difficulty he had to overcome here was the widespread speculation in the West 
over whether the leadership of the Provisional Government, as opposed to the Soviet, still 
actively supported the Stockholm conference. Some indications in recent days suggested 
otherwise. This was not a matter he could safely ignore, since it would surely be raised by 
his opponents. He had therefore decided, as he told the conference at the beginning of his 
address, that he would present ‘a fair yet a frank statement of the position’, fully 
acknowledging that ‘the political situation in Russia is, and has been, constantly 
changing.’139 In this spirit he provided pieces of evidence that suggested there may have 
been ‘some modification’ in the government’s attitude towards Stockholm, although he 
described the weight of this evidence as ‘very slight’. Having at least admitted that there 
was some room for doubt on this crucial question, he turned to other matters pertaining to 
the ‘purely British point of view.’140 Towards the end of his address, when he returned to 
the topic of Russia, the earlier hint of doubt regarding the current position in Petrograd was 
forgotten, replaced by the following much quoted plea: 
 
Let us remember poor struggling Russia, whose great miracle we all welcomed with such delight 
a few weeks ago, and of whom it was universally admitted that it had done the finest thing that 
had ever been done during the whole War. Let us remember poor Russia, and if we cannot give 
the newest Democracy, the infant of Democracies, all she asks, I beseech you not to give her an 




This transition from a dispassionate weighing of the available evidence concerning Russia to 
a passionate and personal concluding appeal may be seen as a fine example of oratorical 
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‘artistry’. Other politically effective techniques may also be observed. For example, 
Henderson deployed his own status and image within the party to good effect. It was his 
personal vision of an international conference, not the ‘Russian programme’ for Stockholm, 
that his speech promoted. His ‘full and frank’ explanation of the reasons why, in Russia, he 
had changed his mind on the matter gave the impression of careful consideration and 
sincerity. The painful abuse and vilification to which he had been subject since returning to 
England for advocating what he genuinely believed was a patriotic cause (to which he made 
reference on three separate occasions during his speech) further encouraged a sympathetic 
response on the part of delegates. It is reasonable to perceive the party vote on 10 August 
as in large measure a vote of confidence in Henderson himself.142 
 
We may consider also the approach he adopted to those two awkward outcomes of the 
Paris discussions with French and Russian socialists: the representation of minorities and the 
obligatory nature of conference resolutions. These were matters on which he had hitherto 
not wished to be drawn. On the minority issue this remained the case. He did nevertheless 
avoid the disparaging tone he had adopted on 1 August when referring to the minority. The 
effort on that occasion to sharply distinguish his own views from those of MacDonald, and 
the suggestion that not only Russian extremists and enemy agents, but British pacifists too, 
had been responsible for promoting false ideas as to the self-serving nature of British war 
aims, were conspicuously absent from the 10 August address.143 He was by this time more 
concerned to play down political differences, both in Britain and in Russia. The case for 
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Stockholm he was now keen to make rested on a strained and unconvincing perception that 
‘the great British Labour and Socialist Movement’, a clearly disunited entity at this time, 
could, by stating its own convictions on the war, help a no less divided entity - ‘Russia’ - 
achieve a renewed sense of purpose and unity in support of Allied war aims. 
 
Henderson could keep political divisions out of his own address, but they quickly surfaced 
when others took the floor. ‘Patriots’ and ‘pacifists’ strongly disagreed over whether Russian 
ministers and the Soviet were now divided over Stockholm, and over the still uncertain 
question of minority representation at the conference. An amendment successfully 
proposed by the miners’ confined a prospective British delegation to those selected only by 
the Labour party itself.144 After a series of vexatious exchanges Henderson, unable to 
persuade delegates to reject the amendment, agreed to defer the question to the proposed 
adjourned conference on 21 August. Henderson again tried to reverse the embargo on 
minority groups at this second conference, but again failed. He suffered also the further 
embarrassment of a loss of support on the main resolution, largely as a consequence of the 
miners reversing their earlier decision. What had been on 10 August a convincing majority in 
favour of Stockholm of over a million votes was now reduced to a paltry 3,000 votes out of a 
total of nearly two and a half million cast.145 
 
More remarkable than Henderson’s treatment of the minority problem was his handling on 
10 August of the Russian insistence on a mandatory conference. There were obvious 
reasons why he had not wished to be drawn on this question in previous days. If it had 
become widely understood that the terms of the invitation to Stockholm were unacceptable 
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to the Labour executive, it would have been easy to conclude that the 10 August conference 
would no longer serve any purpose. Once the conference was actually under way, this 
difficulty disappeared. Henderson now spoke at length on the mandatory versus 
consultative issue. He repeatedly drew attention to the unacceptability of the Russian 
position and to the unlikelihood of its being changed.146 He made it quite clear that as a 
consequence there could be no British acceptance of the invitation to Stockholm. Although 
the resolution on which the party was to vote remained unchanged, supporting it no longer 
involved any immediate meeting with foreign (including enemy) socialists. It was now simply 
a case of avoiding a snub to poor struggling Russians who, as Henderson reminded the 
conference, had bravely fought the common enemy for the previous three years, and whose 
overthrow of tsarist tyranny had been widely applauded by British labour.147 
 
Following Henderson’s address Barnes seemed puzzled as to why he should have attached 
so much importance to the mandatory versus consultative issue.148 Undoubtedly, Barnes 
had a point. No International Labour conference had ever possessed the power to prevent 
individual national parties making their own decisions. Moral pressure to conform was the 
only real sanction. The insistence of the Soviet on a mandatory conference was not in 
practice going to change this fundamental reality. Henderson argued that the attempt to 
make resolutions binding ‘would destroy the effectiveness of the Conference, lead to angry 
recriminations, and make the Socialist and Labour Parties the laughing-stock of the 
world.’149 Given the diversity of goals of the several participants, and the massively high 
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stakes involved, he must surely have realised that ‘angry recriminations’ would have been 
inevitable even had the Conference declared itself consultative.150  
 
It had of course made sense in the early stages of the Stockholm campaign to push for a 
consultative conference. However notional the binding character of any resolutions would 
have been, the mere fact that an attempt could be made to bind British ‘patriots’ to 
positions they may have wholeheartedly rejected would have heightened resistance to the 
conference. But once it was clear in the later stages of the campaign that there was no real 
prospect of British attendance it was eminently sensible, from Henderson’s point of view, to 
take the position he did. One of the strongest cards Henderson’s opponents were able to 
play against him was the genuine abhorrence many felt to the idea of conferring with 
German socialists, widely seen as willing accomplices of the German government.151 
Henderson’s ability to remove this prospect from the agenda must surely have made it 
easier to win the conference vote. 
 
One final dimension of Henderson’s speech must also be considered. Although firmly 
rejecting the conference actually being convened by the Russians and Dutch/Scandinavians, 
he devoted part of his address to making the case for the alternative international 
conference he would have supported. Having already referred to the possibility of 
countering negative perceptions amongst the Russian people regarding Allied war aims, he 
now broadened this argument to cover other nations. The British case had ‘never been 
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properly stated either to the German Socialists or to those of the Neutral Countries.’ The 
opportunity to present these arguments at an appropriately structured international 
conference could have been as effective in persuading these socialists as those of Russia. In 
relation to Germany especially, the results could have been dramatic and perhaps even 
shortened the war. The Allied case, Henderson confidently asserted, was ‘so strong.....that if 
it were presented by responsible working-class representatives it would materially assist in 
convincing the German people that it was the crime of their rulers that caused the War, and 
it is the crime of their rulers that now prevents its just settlement.’ This was followed by a 
denial that he was in any way wavering in his determination to reach ‘a final and complete 
settlement’, but in a war that had already taken a terrible toll, ‘it appears to me not only 
wise but imperative that every country should use its political weapon to supplement.....its 
military organisation, if by so doing it can defeat the enemy.’152 
 
This was a clearly a call for an active and wide ranging labour diplomacy which stood 
independently of the plea to aid Russia. At the very end of his address, following his 
beseeching of delegates not to give Russia ‘an entire point blank refusal’, Henderson went 
on to repeat this wider point. If the conference were ‘to determine for the whole period of 
the War, not to use the political weapon to supplement our military activities, not only shall 
I regret it, but I will venture to predict that you as a Movement will regret it hereafter.’153 
 
 Historians have acknowledged that Henderson’s Stockholm campaign did have twin 
objectives. Whilst the fate of Russia is always treated as the principal concern, there is 
agreement that the revival of the International was also an objective. Winter believes that 
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following the discussions with Branting and Huysmans on 17 July Henderson became 
dedicated to the task of reconstructing the Socialist International.154 Wrigley too suggests 
that Henderson did ‘seem to regain his faith in socialist war aims’ during his time in 
Russia.155 Hamilton quotes approvingly from his 1 August parliamentary statement in which 
he asserts Labour ideals regarding the rights of common people to have some sort of say in 
the settlement.156 These ideals were doubtless to be found in pre-war socialist 
internationalism, and in the strictures for a progressive peace agreed by the Allied socialists 
in February 1915. 
 
The belief that Henderson’s concerns over Russia were more central to the Stockholm 
campaign than his hopes for a revived International accurately reflects the emphases both 
in the 10 August address and in his preceding public statements. What has not been 
sufficiently considered however is the extent to which Henderson might have perceived that 
an emphasis on Russia would have been more effective in winning over Labour ‘patriots’ 
than a direct avowal of internationalist sentiment. Decisions taken as to the best means of 
achieving particular ends do not necessarily reveal the true or full nature of those ends. Too 
great a reliance on Henderson’s words appears to have led historians into misperceptions 
regarding the balance between his stated objectives. Henderson’s words were anyway often 
belied by his actions. Take for example his determination throughout the Stockholm 
campaign to deny that he had in any way softened in his ‘patriotic’ convictions.  
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As we have seen, war time ‘patriotism’, as espoused not least by Henderson himself, placed 
great importance on a strong national display of unity and determination in the fight against 
Prussian militarism. Yet in the final period of the Stockholm campaign Henderson pushed 
ahead determinedly with a project that appeared to offer no significant gain either to 
Russia, its supposed beneficiary, or to political unity in Britain. The principal and predictable 
consequence of this action was a governmental crisis resulting in an enforced Cabinet 
resignation, and in the longer run an open division between the Labour party and the other 
main parties on their respective attitudes towards vital questions concerning the objects 
and potential settlement of the war.  
 
It is useful to consider in this respect the first views of the War Cabinet regarding the 
political situation created by Henderson’s unexpected action. Meeting on the morning of 
the 11th ministers ‘agreed that the action of the Labour Party was likely to damage this 
country in the eyes of Foreign Powers, who would say that British democracy had by its vote 
shown itself tired of the war, and that it would also be a serious blow to the Government.’ 
Whilst they hoped that once the government’s position on the matter was known the 
situation might ‘be retrieved’ by the TUC, scheduled to meet on 3 September, they 
nevertheless contemplated taking the issue more immediately to the electorate, either 
partially by means of Labour ministers going to their constituencies to stand in effect for a 
vote of confidence in the government, or by calling a full General Election.  
 
There were significant objections however to both these options. The former was deemed 
unsatisfactory as it could ‘be looked upon as a farce’ and ‘as a partial appeal to the Labour 
Party and not to the country at large.’ The problem with the latter was that the existing 
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electoral register was shortly to be replaced under the planned extension of the franchise 
and that many potential voters (particularly women) would be discontented at their 
exclusion from any such snap election. A further difficulty arose as a consequence of a 
recent peace initiative taken by the Pope. Proposals for peace ‘of a plausible nature but 
tending towards an unsatisfactory peace,’ were, ministers believed, ‘in the air’ and it would 
be ‘inopportune’ to hold an election whilst this was the case. It was believed that this could 
also ‘cause difficulties with our Allies.’ Further consideration of these electoral options, it 
was decided, should wait on events. Henderson had already by this stage somewhat 
alleviated ministers’ concerns by informing them that he continued to share and was ready 
to support in a ‘non-Government capacity’ the Cabinet’s desire that the war ‘should be 
carried to a successful conclusion’.157 With his resignation statement two days later 
springing no further embarrassing surprises, the political fallout doubtless appeared to 
ministers more easily manageable, and the notion of appealing to the electorate was quietly 
dropped. 
 
But even though Henderson was quick to reassure the Cabinet of his continuing 
commitment to the war, the question remains: why did the ‘patriotic’ Henderson put his 
ministerial colleagues in this predicament in the first place? It seems wholly 
incomprehensible that he did so simply to avoid offering ‘a point blank refusal’ to the 
Russians, especially since refusing their invitation to Stockholm was precisely what he was 
doing. The more plausible explanation, by a considerable margin, is that he was opening the 
way to a new policy for his party: a policy which would reconnect with the position agreed 
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in the Allied socialist conference of February 1915, and a policy moreover which he could 
not pursue as a minister in Lloyd George’s government. 
 
 In conclusion, an overview of the eighteen days of Henderson’s campaign would suggest 
that it could be divided into two parts. It seems likely that he did initially hold out some 
hope that he might succeed in leading his party to Stockholm.158 Following his return from 
Paris on the other hand the likelihood is that this hope was largely abandoned. 
Nevertheless, the apparently more limited aim of overturning the Manchester resolution 
remained achievable. But might not this latter aim have been ultimately the more 
important, in that it opened the way to a longer term goal of engaging the Labour party in a 
revived Socialist International?  The argument presented in this chapter is that Henderson’s 
actions during this extraordinary eighteen day period cannot be easily explained on the 
assumptions contained within the standard account, but can be more successfully 
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The conclusion reached in the last chapter, if accepted, clearly necessitate substantial 
revisions in the existing accounts of Henderson’s political journey through the summer of 
1917. Whilst a comprehensive new narrative cannot here be provided, a start can be made 
on this task by consideration of some features such a narrative would need to contain. The 
previous two chapters have obviously gone some way in this direction. In shifting the focus 
away from Henderson’s supposed priority of saving Russia and towards the concern he 
would demonstrate throughout the remainder of the war for the securing of a peace 
settlement in accordance with Labour ideals, the story has already undergone significant 
change. Further implications of this change may now also be highlighted. 
 
This chapter then will construct a sketchy narrative of Henderson’s final period during the 
war beginning on the day of his return to Britain in July 1917 and ending with his reaction to 
the Treaty of Versailles almost two years later. The narrative will be based on the premise 
that he was animated throughout this period by the desire that the Labour party should 
actively contribute to a national and international campaign, the minimum and essential 
goal of which would be a peace settlement in line with Labour ideals and sentiment. For 
most of this period, that is after 10 August 1917, this premise is not particularly 
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controversial. The issues raised in the latter part of the chapter will centre less on the 
premise’s validity, than on judgements made in earlier accounts as to its relative importance 
for Henderson as compared with other concerns – most notably the wider threat he is 
thought to have identified of Russian Bolshevism. It will be concluded that this latter 
concern was in reality of a minor nature, certainly when contrasted with the major effort 
devoted to the securing of an acceptable peace settlement. 
 
The early part of the chapter will engage with a very different problem. If we are to assume 
that the eighteen days of Henderson’s Stockholm campaign were less concerned with 
bolstering the position of the revolutionary government of Russia, and more with the effort 
to change the direction of Labour party policy on the war, what implications may this have 
on the existing narratives of this period? We shall see that these implications are indeed 
significant, particularly in the following three areas: the impact on Henderson of his Russian 
sojourn, leading to the formulation of his plan to convert British labour to a renewed 
internationalist position; the reconsideration of his status in government that this plan 
would inevitably entail; and the presentational problems in carrying off both these 
significant changes in a manner that would not jeopardise the essential ongoing support of 
the party’s ‘patriotic’ majority. 
 
 




At the heart of the standard account is the belief that Henderson became persuaded whilst 
in Russia that the Stockholm conference was the best means by which the troubled 
Petrograd regime could be supported. It will be argued here by contrast that what 
happened to Henderson in Russia should be seen in terms of a realisation that the 
circumstances he encountered in that country provided him with an unexpected 
opportunity to influence events in his own. It was on this basis that he constructed his 
campaign for Stockholm once home. Significantly however circumstances in Russia did in 
fact change following his departure, rendering his carefully fashioned campaign in Britain 
increasingly vulnerable.  
  
This argument shares with standard accounts the great difficulty of pinning down just how 
and when he came to appreciate this important opportunity. The ‘thinking processes’ by 
which he realised this possibility remain as always wholly obscure. One particular handicap 
for the historian in this instance is that these processes may more than usually have been 
undertaken alone. These were not matters he was likely to have discussed with Russians, 
with Buchanan, nor even with other visiting Allied socialists, nor for that matter the Fabian, 
Julius West, the only member of the frustrated Labour delegation to travel to Russia. We are 
forced to speculate then as to how the circumstances he encountered in Russia may 
conceivably have led him to the course of action he later pursued. 
 
On arrival in Petrograd Henderson’s central purpose was to keep Russia in the war. It was 
generally understood that if this was to be achieved concessions would have to be made 
regarding the language at least in which Allied war aims would be expressed. Conferences 
advocated by the Russians to discuss these matters, whether governmental or socialist, 
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could not be easily rejected. Henderson was more amenable, whilst in Petrograd, to the 
former than the latter, but he would have recognised that arguments for both could be 
pitched in similar ways. Once persuaded in favour of Stockholm, he was thereby enabled to 
slip easily from the advocacy of one conference to the other.  
 
In supporting Tereshchenko’s conference, Henderson was doing no more than reinforce the 
opinions of Buchanan. There was nothing controversial in broaching the issue of war aims in 
this context. Indeed, having spent some time in Petrograd and spoken with Russian 
ministers he could confidently inform Lloyd George that ‘frank discussion’ at this conference 
might help ‘idealists’ such as Kerensky and Tsereteli to grasp ‘that aggression of German 
militarism is alone responsible for all sufferings in war and that it is only by drawing 
Germany’s teeth we can hope to secure permanent peace.’1 This line of reasoning clearly 
foreshadows the case he would later make in relation to Stockholm. 
 
Tereshchenko’s conference could equally of course create problems for the European Allies. 
It could expose differences between the progressive war aims of the Russians and 
Americans and the expansionist aims articulated in the secret Allied treaties of previous 
years. It could even lead to a situation in which, under pressure from the Petrograd and 
Washington governments, the European Allies might be induced into making tangible 
concessions. But would this have been unwelcome to Henderson?  If such a conference 
increased the chances of a final settlement more easily reconciled with the principles 
enunciated by Allied socialists in February 1915 why indeed should he object? Although he 
supported the idea of the Allies agreeing to the Russian conference, he never himself 
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proposed that the War Cabinet should make such concessions. He must however have 
recognised that a policy designed to keep Russia in the war could conceivably come at the 
price of developments he could welcome for quite different reasons. 
 
We may say then that the discussions surrounding the Tereshchenko conference provided a 
template upon which Henderson could build, if and when he so decided, to make a case for 
Stockholm. This returns us to the question posed in Chapter Two as to when and why he did 
make that decision. We argued there that the alignment of the Russian soviet with the 
Dutch-Scandinavian committee was the critical factor, primarily because it forced the 
Russians into a more moderate and acceptable position regarding the terms on which 
conference invitations would be issued. We may add here that it also gave Henderson key 
arguments to incorporate in his eventual campaign. It allowed him on the one hand to 
subordinate the ISB’s ambition to generate conversations on peace between socialists to the 
pressing needs of the still fighting Russians. And in as far as the internationalist programme 
had to be admitted, the cautious and pro-Allied position in particular of Branting helped 
soften this blow.2 
 
But if the commitment to Stockholm as such remained beyond the political horizon for most 
of Henderson’s time in Russia, the wider questions of socialist internationalism and labour 
diplomacy were very much in the air. Discussions embracing a diversity of Russian opinion 
and including the several visiting socialists in Petrograd ranged widely over questions of war 
and peace, whilst not far away in Stockholm the more formal process by which the 
Dutch/Scandinavian committee elicited statements from parties preparatory to the plenary 
                                                 
2
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Hansard, H C Debs, 1 August 1917, vol.96, cols: 2190-2191. 
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International conference was ongoing. By July separate delegations from the majority and 
minority German socialists had presented their views in Stockholm, as had the several 
national groups of socialists within Austria-Hungary. The French party had resolved at the 
end of May to send a delegation representing both majoritaires and minoritaires to the 
committee, and although the French government refused passports, the party did 
nevertheless draft a lengthy statement for submission to Stockholm. The Belgian socialists 
too, although refusing throughout to contemplate any face to face meeting with German 
representatives, were happy to submit a full statement of their views to the 
Dutch/Scandinavians. Other European parties of various size or significance also presented 
their opinions.3 The British Labour party however played no part in these proceedings. Prior 
to Henderson’s conversation with Branting and Huysmans on 17 July, West was the only 
Briton to whom the Dutch/Scandinavians  spoke, and he insisted that he represented no one 
but himself.4  
 
Although the actions of the seamen were largely responsible for the failure of British labour 
to become involved in the exchanges of views within international socialism, the wider 
distaste of British ‘patriots’ for the efforts of foreign socialists to draw them into unwelcome 
conversations was a further inhibiting factor. Having spent weeks in the milieu of 
revolutionary Petrograd in which the notion of labour diplomacy, to whatever ends it might 
be put, was thriving, Henderson was well placed to observe that Britain had become ever 
more detached from the socialist mainstream. It seems unlikely that he could have been 
content with this state of affairs. Restricted in his communications with party colleagues to a 
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International Socialism and the World War (New York, 1966), pp: 136-138. 
4
 See The Times, 9 August 1917, p.8. 
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handful of letters and telegrams, he could do little more than impress on them his strong 
desire to see an Allied socialist conference convened in London to which the American 
Federation of Labour, along with the rather reluctant Russian socialists would be invited. 
Whilst reporting also on the exchanges with the Russian soviet regarding Stockholm, 
attendance at this latter conference was not yet advocated.5  
 
One additional means of communication with his party was through the press. Although he 
was not in the habit of giving lengthy interviews to British newspapers, one notable 
exception was made on 3 July, when Henderson spoke on ‘The mind of Russia’ to the 
Manchester Guardian. Beginning in the expected manner of a government minister 
Henderson put a positive gloss on the attitude of the nation to the recently commenced 
military offensive. The Russian people, he suggested, having become convinced that ‘the 
aims and objects of Russia’s allies in the war had become clearly consistent with Russia’s 
declared formula of “no annexations and no indemnities”......would be devoted to the 
continuation until final victory of a strong offensive....’ But almost immediately this 
optimism was heavily qualified by the observation that amongst socialists, whether 
‘extreme’ or ‘moderate’, there was ‘much suspicion and misunderstanding’ regarding Allied 
intentions. After elaborating in some detail as to the apparently expansionist policies which 
fired these suspicions, he referred to the dissatisfaction in these quarters over London’s 
‘recent Note to the Russian Government’ which the socialists considered ‘too vague and 
general.’ Even the included ‘promise to examine and, if necessary, to revise all agreements 
made during the war, failed to convince them that their aims and ours are substantially the 
same.’ 
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Henderson concluded that he was now ‘convinced’ that the proposed governmental 
conference on war aims would be crucial to eliminating these suspicions. Such a conference, 
he declared, ‘must be in the fullest sympathy with the democratic ideals and aspirations’ of 
the Russian people ‘for it is certain that no ordinary meeting of diplomats would satisfy their 
claims.’ The ‘findings of any conference’ he added, ‘must make it unmistakably clear that 
the war is only continued because of the danger to freedom of an uncontrolled military 
despotism.’6 Russian socialists were not only critical however of the British government. 
‘Many throw on British trade unionists the responsibility of prolonging the war,’ Henderson 
stated, ‘owing to their support for an Imperialistic Government.’ He also referred to their 
lack of interest in an Allied socialist conference, even as a preliminary to the conference 
they did want. (Although the word Stockholm does not actually appear in this interview, 
Henderson’s comment that they hoped for ‘an International conference of Socialists who 
are prepared to forget the past and come together as Socialists.....to effect an actual 
settlement of the war’ obviously refers to the Stockholm conference.)  
 
It is clear that on 3 July Henderson was not advocating British attendance at Stockholm, but 
he may be seen as preparing party colleagues for the necessity of engaging with Russian 
socialists, whose views were considerably closer to domestic ‘pacifists’ than ‘patriots’. His 
expectation at this moment may have been that such engagement would take place 
preferably at the planned Allied socialist conference. But in articulating the views of the 
Russian socialists uncritically, and in their own anti-imperialist language, he was surely 
suggesting that Labour ‘patriots’ at home had to appreciate that these views could not be 
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dismissed with the contempt that they generally were when emerging from the mouths of 
British ‘pacifists’. In his readiness to engage with those elements within international 
socialism that were adopting positions unpalatable to the British labour majority, 
Henderson was obviously taking a significant step towards Stockholm. 
 
If we are to see this interview as in part at least a message to the party at home, its timing 
would itself be significant. Had the executive delegation been able to depart for Petrograd it 
would have arrived in Russia by mid-June. Debate could have taken place with Russian and 
other Allied socialists, as well as within the British contingent itself. By 3 July Henderson 
knew that his request to Havelock Wilson to reconsider his union’s decision to prevent the 
full party travelling had been fruitless, and the following day he telegraphed Labour offices 
to confirm that a delegation denuded of those the seamen declared ‘pacifists’ would be 
‘inadvisable’.7 Recognising that party colleagues in London would be unable to 
communicate directly with Russian socialists, at least until such time as the latter might 
agree to attend the proposed Allied socialist conference, it may well have seemed sensible 
to provide a summary of their views. Within a fortnight of his Manchester Guardian 
interview the coming together of the Russian soviet with the Dutch/Scandinavian 
committee had occurred and the meeting with Branting and Huysmans had taken place. 
What may up to this point have been an awareness that a case for Stockholm could under 
certain circumstances be constructed, was now transformed. These developments allowed 
Henderson to take the decisive further step. 
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We have considered so far the way in which Henderson’s encounter with the ferment of 
international socialist endeavour in the Russian capital probably encouraged in him the 
desire to participate, if only initially in the context of Allied socialism. This clearly suggests a 
different process towards the acceptance of Stockholm than that presented in standard 
accounts, in which the key issue is the vulnerability of the Provisional Government. As noted 
in Chapter Two, Henderson fully recognised the difficulties the government faced in the 
form of extensive nationwide anarchy. He could nevertheless point to some encouraging 
factors in the political situation. The alliance between the Provisional Government and the 
dominant ‘moderate’ majority within the Soviet, which he believed had been hardening 
during his time in the country, had ‘saved Petrograd from at least overt anarchy.....’ Political 
stability, he suggested, mainly depended on the continuance of this alliance, about which he 
felt a degree of confidence. He did not judge that either the forces of the right (the Cadets) 
or the left (the Bolsheviks) were likely to succeed in overthrowing this centrist alliance.8 
Almost as soon as he left Russia however, this optimism began to appear unfounded. 
 
Henderson had been aware during the latter part of his stay in Petrograd of demonstrations 
and disturbances launched by Bolsheviks and anarchists in opposition to the war and to the 
presence of Cadet ministers in the Provisional Government. Following his departure a new 
and considerably more menacing wave of armed demonstrations erupted. This violent and 
alarming episode, later known as the ‘July Days’, would be mistakenly seen as an attempted 
takeover of power by the Bolshevik leadership.9 It was on the contrary the lack of political 
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 For the rebuttal of earlier arguments that this had been a premature attempt on the part of the Bolshevik 
leadership to take power, see Alexander Rabinowitch, Prelude to Revolution: The Petrograd Bolsheviks and the 
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leadership provided by Bolsheviks or anyone else that led to the speedy degeneration of the 
revolt into a chaotic bout of riot and looting which provided little resistance to the arriving 
pro-government forces.10  
 
Order was restored within three days, some time before Henderson arrived back in Britain. 
Nevertheless he did allude to the disturbances in his interview of 24 July, emphasising the 
‘extent to which the extremists dominated the [Russian] capital’ and demoralised the army 
and navy. Russia was ‘passing through a crisis so grave and menacing as to expose to real 
danger many of the glorious possibilities of the revolution.’ Despite this, Henderson 
continued to believe that the alliance between the moderate socialists and the Provisional 
Government held the key to the overcoming of the nation’s problems. Reiterating several of 
the points he had made in the 3 July interview regarding the views of the dominant group 
within the All-Russian soviet, he highlighted the importance to these socialists of both the 
governmental war aims conference and Stockholm. Although he referred to the pleas of 
Tsereteli, the effective leader of this group, for British attendance at Stockholm, he still did 
not at this point clearly advocate a positive response (the executive’s decision to propose 
this was only taken the following day).11 But Henderson had of course been personally 
committed to Stockholm for at least a week, having given his view that the conference was 
desirable on the 17th. The much publicised disorder in Petrograd since then could add a 
powerful new element to the argument he would shortly be putting in favour of bowing to 
Tsereteli’s request. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
July 1917 Uprising (Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1968); for a briefer and more recent account of the July 
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In reality however the matter was not quite so straightforward. Although the Bolshevik 
leaders, recognising that they had little support in the rest of the country, had been 
opposed to the Petrograd uprising, it was they who paid a heavy price in its aftermath. 
Accused by the government of having links to the Germans, they in particular were suddenly 
vulnerable. Senior figures were either arrested or, as in the case of Lenin, took asylum 
outside Russia.12  Their immediate political prospects looked decidedly bleak. With the far 
left in disarray, Kerensky emerged as the saviour of the revolution.13 Bolstered by his victory 
over the Bolsheviks, he succeeded in forming a new socialist dominated government, 
committed to maintaining the security of the country and the revolution. By a vote of 252 to 
47, the Soviet granted ‘unlimited power’ to the new administration ‘to re-establish the 
organization and discipline of the army and to wage war to the knife against revolution and 
anarchy.....’14 The temporarily diminished threat from extremists naturally reduced its 
efficacy in Henderson’s campaign. It is notable that in both his subsequent addresses - 1 
August to the House of Commons and at the 10 August conference - his references to the 
vulnerability of the Provisional government are expressed in much vaguer terms than on 24 
July. 
 
A further difficulty for Henderson occasioned by these developments lay in the perception 
outside Russia that the balance of power between the new government and the Soviet had 
changed. Former constraints on the executive, it was believed, had been largely removed. 
This notion would prove important in the revived debate over Stockholm within the War 
Cabinet. Obliged to reconsider their position by Henderson’s unanticipated campaign, 
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ministers argued that circumstances in Russia were now very different to the situation 
prevailing in May, when they had adopted the view that British attendance at Stockholm 
might be advisable.15 As it became clearer ‘that the influence of the Soviet....was steadily 
declining,’ their main object of sustaining the Russian government no longer required the 
dangerous expedient of an international socialist conference.16 Henderson himself, though 
obviously unwilling to reach the same conclusions as his colleagues, did nevertheless agree 
that circumstances had changed since the spring. In a message to Lloyd George on 28 July 
he suggested enquiring of Tereshchenko ‘what view the Russian Government now take of 
Stockholm Conference having regard to domestic developments and in particular altered 
relations between Government and Sovyet.’17 In the War Cabinet four days later he 
admitted that circumstances had ‘changed considerably’ since May.18 On 10 August, as we 
have seen, he continued to acknowledge that the situation in Russia had changed, whilst 
simultaneously playing down the significance of this fact. 
 
We should be aware at this point that the crisis in Russia was deeper and more protracted 
than the brief chaos of the Petrograd revolt. On the eve of, but unconnected with, the mass 
demonstrations, four senior Cadet ministers had resigned from the government over their 
dissatisfaction with many of the socialist inspired policies of the administration.19 Now 
outside government the Cadet defectors, along with the bulk of their party, rushed to blame 
the remaining ministers not only for their readiness to accommodate Ukrainian and Finnish 
separatists (the immediate cause of the resignations) but also for their tolerance of left wing 
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extremists, whom in the eyes of many Cadets included those defined by Henderson as 
‘moderate’ socialists. A general curbing of the power of the soviets now seemed to them 
essential.20 In the face of a faltering military offensive and continuing nationwide disorder, 
there was little on which socialists and Cadets could agree. So deep indeed were these 
disagreements that efforts to recreate a new coalition government staggered on 
unsuccessfully for several weeks. By 6 August when a new coalition government was finally 
formed, the parties remained fundamentally divided. Expectations of ‘effective national 
leadership’ emerging from the new Cabinet were very low.21  
 
The increasingly polarised politics of the revolution formed an unfortunate backdrop to 
Henderson’s campaign, which was largely predicated on a degree of harmony between 
government and soviet as to the value of British attendance at Stockholm. Opinion within 
the War Cabinet, and more generally on the British political right, was increasingly inclined 
to see the disaffected Cadets, whose criticisms of the Kerensky government closely echoed 
their own, as the best hope for Russia’s active return to the Allied war effort.22 This too 
created an atmosphere in which Stockholm, as a means to accommodate the sensibilities of 
the Russian left, was firmly rejected. Henderson’s greatest difficulty at this time however 
was the uncertainty regarding the views on the conference of senior ministers still in the 
Provisional Government. It was clearly fundamental to his campaign’s ‘patriotic’ credentials 
that Russian support for Stockholm was not confined to the Soviet, but backed also by 
responsible ministers in Petrograd. 
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During this lengthy political crisis in Russia few in Britain fully understood its implications. 
Even Buchanan, who could observe from close quarters, struggled to gain any sense of 
where the country was heading. ‘The situation is so obscure that I personally see no 
daylight,’ he wrote on 2 August after a new round of ministerial resignations again muddied 
the political waters. On the same day however he reported that some ministers ‘would 
much prefer that the Stockholm conference should not take place for fear that peace talk 
might have a bad influence on the army.’23 A week later Nabokov relayed to the British 
government a note from Tereshchenko stating that ‘although the Russian government does 
not deem it possible to prevent Russian delegates from taking part in the Stockholm 
Conference, they regard this Conference as a party concern and its decisions in no wise 
binding upon the liberty of actions of the Government.’24 The receipt of this note shortly 
before the 10 August conference was not revealed to the Labour delegates, despite a last 
minute request from Lloyd George to Henderson that he inform the conference of its 
contents. This became a matter of great controversy, with the Prime Minister asserting that 
Henderson had essentially deceived his own party by remaining silent on this critical 
revelation, and Henderson maintaining that he had adequately covered the substance of the 
note in his general comments regarding the Provisional Government’s changed 
perspectives.25 
 
Although Henderson held his own in this particular controversy, striking indeed a significant 
victory when Kerensky and Tereshchenko later denied that they had changed their views on 
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Stockholm, the evidence suggests that indifference rather than opposition to the 
conference may more accurately have described their positions. In Kerensky’s case this was 
revealed in a further message which reached the War Cabinet on 10 August, too late to have 
had any bearing on the Labour conference. This new message came from Thomas in Paris 
and stated that a telegram had been received from Russia ‘to the effect that the Provisional 
Government had disinterested itself in the Stockholm Conference, and that M. Kerensky 
desired that it should not meet.’26 Thomas’s representation of Kerensky’s position is 
thought to have been based on an unguarded remark the Russian leader had earlier made 
to a French socialist that ‘he had completely lost sight of the question of the conference for 
several weeks and had not thought about whether it should meet.’27 This was probably an 
accurate summary of his position. He had been at this point very much involved in military 
matters and frequently absent from Petrograd. Coming to terms with the failure of the 
offensive had been especially difficult. His biographer writes of the emergence at this time 
of a ‘new, chastened Kerensky, his mood somber, his tone authoritarian, his vocabulary 
increasingly traditional.’28 
 
By the evening of 8 August, when Henderson had first sight of the Nabokov note, he had not 
been in Russia for three full weeks. Whilst the situation he left had been moulded by him 
into a narrative that would support his Stockholm campaign, developments since then 
increasingly threatened to undermine this campaign. This was surely one major reason for 
his determination to push ahead and secure the Labour party’s assent before the door 
firmly closed on the Stockholm project. The predictable outcome of this determination was 
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his ejection from the War Cabinet, which leads us to the second part of the standard 




The Resignation Dilemma 
 
The possibility that leaving the War Cabinet was integral to Henderson’s campaign to 
change Labour policy on politically sensitive matters such as war aims and participation in 
the Socialist International has not been considered in standard accounts. This is 
unsurprising, since these accounts largely see the above campaign as only fully emerging 
after Henderson had been forced from the Cabinet. Consideration has however been given 
to the idea that a conflict with the War Cabinet was a possibility (perhaps even a 
probability) inherent in the divided loyalties that Henderson’s position necessarily entailed. 
Wrigley for example has argued in the context of the Stockholm episode that ‘the likelihood 
was that Henderson would resign sooner or later, as his positions as a leading Labour official 
and as a Cabinet Minister were incompatible (industrial unrest repeatedly made this 
clear).....’29  
 
This judgement however seems questionable. Why could Henderson not have continued as 
before in helping to resolve labour disputes, as Barnes and Roberts did after his departure? 
It has been maintained by Trevor Wilson that industrial unrest was in fact no more 
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threatening after August 1917 than before, and was positively transformed in the spring of 
1918 by the national response to dramatic German advances on the Western Front.30 The 
fact that labour disputes were invariably sectional in nature and infrequently blessed by 
strong support on the part of other workers is also significant. Given the approach 
Henderson had hitherto adopted to his ministerial responsibilities, resignation would surely 
have been something he would consider only on a matter of deep principle or of wider 
national relevance.  
 
The issue of conscription had fallen into this category and had briefly compelled his 
resignation in 1916; though in standing firm against a party majority, and in gaining minor 
concessions from the government, he was soon back in ministerial harness. The strong 
convictions within his party against military compulsion, he had argued, were trumped by 
the over-riding necessity of prevailing in the war.31 In the face of the growing manpower 
crisis of 1917 the extension of military compulsion at that time could conceivably have 
drawn a different response from Henderson. On the other hand however, the government 
were clearly reluctant to push trade unionists too far at this moment, even if this meant 
denying the generals the manpower they demanded.32 Had he still been in the Cabinet at 
this juncture, would not Henderson have sought out some compromise as he had done 
before?  
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The issue over which Henderson did leave the Cabinet was of course one of deep principle, 
or as he presented it, of Labour ideals. But it had not been his party which had pushed him 
to act on these ideals. The initiative for Stockholm had come solely from himself. It is true 
that during the course of his campaign and thereafter he repeatedly highlighted the 
difficulties inherent in his dual role as government minister and Labour leader. References 
to this problem were made in the War Cabinet, both on 26 July and 1 August, in his letter of 
resignation to Lloyd George of 11 August, in the House of Commons on 13 August, and in 
conversation and correspondence over the following days.33 It was nevertheless clear to all 
that had Henderson himself not inspired this confrontation, the likelihood of the Labour 
party and the government falling out over the issue was very remote. It is hardly 
contentious to characterise Henderson’s break with the War Cabinet as a consequence of 
what was for him a personal quest – a quest inspired by having regained ‘his faith in socialist 
war aims.’34 
 
On the assumption adopted in this chapter - that by 17 July Henderson already envisaged a 
longer term commitment to a revised International – his future in the War Cabinet was 
obviously in doubt. How and when he would leave government could not yet however be 
determined. His reference in the 17 July interview to the problem of permitting those labour 
leaders who were also in government to attend Stockholm, and a suggestion as to how this 
might be done, indicate that he had not ruled out the possibility that the War Cabinet might 
still be prepared to consider approving a British delegation to the conference. If this were 
so, the first stage of his campaign would be greatly facilitated, and departure from the 
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Cabinet could be postponed until such time as it became clear that the objects he was 
pursuing transcended merely keeping Russia in the war. The alternative possibility, that the 
War Cabinet would follow the course chosen by other Allied governments and rule out 
attendance, had of course also to be considered. 
 
How might Henderson have anticipated responding to this less favourable situation? On the 
evidence we have seen of his actual behaviour, the assumption must be that he would have 
continued in his campaign to win over his party regardless of the consequences in terms of 
his Cabinet position. But again, precisely how this would play out was wholly uncertain. 
Whether Henderson himself or ministerial colleagues would take the initiative in his 
severance from the War Cabinet would depend on specific circumstances. One matter that 
would obviously be of great importance was the likely reaction of ‘patriotic’ labour to any 
such Cabinet departure. If Lloyd George were able to present the break as some sort of 
desertion on Henderson’s part to the ‘pacifist’ camp, this could seriously damage his 
prospect of success on 10 August.  
 
Labour historians have generally seen Henderson’s removal from office as a straightforward 
case of dismissal. Winter allows that he may well have seen the rupture coming, but he did 
not himself offer his resignation to the Prime Minister until the latter had unmistakably 
demanded it.35 Similarly Wrigley, recognising that Henderson and Lloyd George were on a 
collision course over Stockholm, asserts that ‘Henderson did not manoeuvre for a pretext 
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for resignation.’36 Subsequently however Henderson regretted that he had not resigned 
earlier than he did. In a letter to Runciman of 17 August, he wrote that if he were able to go 
through the Stockholm experience again ‘the only thing I would do would be to tender my 
resignation a little earlier. I wanted to leave before going to Paris and ought to have done 
so. Everything I did from that moment left me subject to misunderstanding and suspicion.’37 
He was undoubtedly correct in this observation, particularly in relation to his conduct after 8 
August. What he does not explain however is why during this fortnight he had chosen not to 
resign. 
 
One rather obvious occasion for a resignation came in the wake of the humiliation of the 
‘doormat’ incident, a procedure which Henderson subsequently suggested was without 
precedent.38 Although undoubtedly angered at the time, his response differed from that of 
26 July, at least in the recollection of Lloyd George: ‘There was no longer any question of his 
offering to resign, as he had done at the Cabinet meeting before he left for Paris. On the 
contrary, he challenged us to demand his resignation.’39 We may imagine at this point that 
Henderson would have preferred his departure from the War Cabinet to be forced upon 
him, ideally as a consequence of his acting on instructions from his party executive. This 
would help ensure the continuing loyalty of trade union ‘patriots’. He could well have 
judged also that to have resigned over what amounted to a personal slight would not have 
been wise. The Cabinet had not yet formally resolved to oppose Stockholm, which would 
have given him a clear policy disagreement to add to his understandable indignation. 
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Already in the eye of a political storm he had himself generated, a piqued resignation would 
probably not have enhanced his reputation. The impact it may have had on his ongoing 
campaign could have seemed very uncertain.  
 
The more cautious option he chose at this moment was to steady the ship and simply await 
the inevitable breach once the Cabinet did formally declare its opposition to Stockholm. 
When that day came, he presumably calculated, the impossibility of continuing his dual role 
would be starkly revealed. As Secretary of the Labour party he was committed to support 
the executive’s 25 July resolution in support of attendance at Stockholm; as a member of 
the War Cabinet he would have been obliged to support any decision to deny Labour 
delegates the means to fulfil this resolution. One or other of his offices would have to be 
discarded, and we can surely assume that it would have been the Cabinet seat which he 
would sacrifice. He would then be free to make the case for Stockholm along lines similar to 
those he eventually employed.  The same recognition that nobody would actually be going 
to Stockholm (though obviously for additional reasons which he could in this instance freely 
declare) and the same appeal not to give the Russians a point blank refusal, could perhaps 
have led to the same outcome. 
 
Had matters developed in this way Henderson could have presented his rift with Cabinet 
colleagues as a legitimate disagreement between ‘patriots’ over their differing approaches 
to the problems created by the revolution in Russia. The involvement of the Attorney 
General however introduced a significant complication. Whilst it was constitutionally 
acceptable to leave government in order to pursue a political objective not shared by 
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Cabinet colleagues, it was obviously a different matter if this political objective was contrary 
to the law.  
 
Henderson’s actions on the evening of the 7th show him struggling with this unanticipated 
conundrum. Reading his account of that evening’s discussions with Lloyd George we can 
detect some confusion in his responses. The initial idea that the legal position should be 
made public was quickly abandoned. The further idea that ministers could disassociate 
themselves from the matter by debarring members of the government from forming any 
part of the delegation could scarcely carry conviction. The government could hardly 
‘disassociate itself’ from a decision to provide passports to Labour delegates openly 
intending to act in defiance of the law as determined by the government’s own legal 
authority. Henderson’s readiness to sacrifice his own place on a British delegation may have 
had the appearance of an important concession, but in reality it was meaningless. The 
government was obviously unlikely to consent to a delegation proceeding to Stockholm 
from which Labour’s most senior and reliable ‘patriots’ were excluded. And Henderson had 
already equivocated on 1 August over the question of whether he would attend the 
conference, presumably realising by then that there was little likelihood of any British 
delegation making the journey.40 
 
Wrong footed by the Attorney General’s intervention it is easy to see why Henderson 
responded so uncertainly. It is easy to see also why he would have rejected his first 
impulsive response in favour of the release of the legal ruling and his own consequent 
resignation. This would have allowed him the freedom to present his own arguments to the 
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Labour conference, but could he really have recommended a course of action which his 
audience would know had been declared unlawful?  The alternative course inadvertently 
provided by the Labour ministers, and confirmed by the War Cabinet the next day, was the 
course which on reflection he decided to take. Whilst this would certainly open him up to 
charges of deception, it nevertheless provided him the best remaining opportunity to 
achieve the goal of reversing the Manchester resolution. 
 
There was then no occasion on which it would have been easy for Henderson to resign from 
the War Cabinet without risk to this primary objective. We should repeat however that this 
objective was no more than a necessary first step towards the wider goal of persuading the 
party into an ongoing participation in the politics of the International. His dismissal from 
Cabinet amidst accusations of deceit was in this sense a matter of great importance. To 
refute these accusations in a manner sufficient to keep the bulk of ‘patriotic’ Labour firmly 
on his side was a task that he could certainly not ignore. How he went about this represents 
a third significant area in the historical narrative which requires revision. 
 
 
Protesting Too Much? 
 
Standard accounts see Henderson as the injured party in this episode, with Lloyd George 
conventionally cast in the role of chief villain. Many labour historians have written on 
Henderson’s deep sense of indignation at the treatment he allegedly suffered at the hands 
of his fellow ministers. Some have suggested that ‘the humiliation’ and ‘the injuries’ inflicted 
upon him, particularly by the Prime Minister, provided a stimulus to his subsequent 
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reforming zeal: a ‘determination to avenge his peremptory dismissal’ may have played a 
part in his determination to create a post-war Labour party ‘with a new image, a new 
structure, and a new organizational apparatus.’41 Direct challenges to these views have been 
hard to find in recent decades. One exception, perhaps unsurprisingly, is Lloyd George’s 
biographer, who believed that Henderson showed signs of ‘protesting too much’ over his ill 
treatment.42 There is some merit in this judgement. Recognising as he must have done his 
vulnerability in relation to the charge of deception, Henderson undoubtedly did his best to 
defuse his opponent’s arguments by assiduously presenting himself as the injured party.43 
 
Henderson made little in this respect of his actual departure from the Cabinet. He had been 
given the choice of either relinquishing his post as Secretary of the Labour party or resigning 
from the government. Having made much of the difficulties regarding his dual role, 
Henderson later expressed relief that this problematic duality was now ended.44 He did 
however dwell on the charge of press manipulation which he levelled against Lloyd George 
in the aftermath of his resignation. He declared himself the victim of ‘an unprecedented and 
dangerous Press campaign....organised with....perfection’ by the Prime Minister, who 
controlled the most effective ‘Press Bureau’ in the country. Prior to his resignation he had 
suffered an ‘overdose’ of attacks from this source on his integrity; thereafter, he declared ‘I 
have had a super-dose’.45 This fed in easily to commonly held views regarding Lloyd 
George’s political style: ‘.....you know from experience,’ Henderson said in his letter to 
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Runciman, ‘the kind of politician into whose hands I unfortunately permitted myself to 
fall.’46 
 
Was Lloyd George’s use of the press anything other however than Henderson should have 
expected? His action on 10 August was not only for the Prime Minister personally 
embarrassing, but also for the Cabinet potentially threatening to the conduct of the war.47 If 
the Cabinet briefly felt it appropriate to take the matter to the nation in a general election, 
one would surely expect any Prime Minister to do everything possible to influence public 
opinion. With the exception of the few Liberal papers sympathetic to Henderson’s campaign 
(identified by the Morning Post as the Manchester Guardian, the Daily News and the 
Westminster Gazette, organs which the Post characterised as still hankering after their pre-
1914 warm relations with Germany), practically all the national press were critical of his 
initiative.48 Of this, and the misrepresentation of his position he felt it entailed, Henderson 
had complained at the 10 August conference; but for a politician of the left there was 
nothing unusual about press hostility. Lloyd George had no need to personally orchestrate 
this extensive critical response.  
 
The Prime Minister’s press manipulation cannot bear the weight Henderson tried to give it 
as a factor in the injury and humiliation he supposedly suffered. What else then in Lloyd 
George’s behaviour might have justified Henderson’s widely accepted deep sense of 
grievance? There is perhaps only one episode in the run up to 10 August which may have 
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carried this load: the tangible, comprehensible grievance of the ‘doormat’ incident.49 This 
event would indeed come to play an early and major part in labour folklore surrounding the 
break between Lloyd George and Henderson. Reference was made to it at ‘thousands’ of 
meetings, where it was represented, recalled Barnes, ‘as an affront to Labour.’50 To many 
within the party it seemed plain, in the words of Trevor Wilson, ‘that no upper-class 
member of the Cabinet, whatever his misdemeanours, would ever be treated like that.’51  
 
We need not doubt that Henderson would have felt great irritation as he waited a full hour 
outside the Cabinet chamber, but was his resentment as great or lasting as it later 
appeared? Barnes, who was finally commissioned to invite his leader to join the discussion, 
acknowledges that Henderson was indeed initially angry, but ‘after a few mutual exchanges 
of explanation and good-will left, as all thought, without any rancour remaining.’ Everyone 
present ‘thought that the incident had closed.’ No reference was made to it in the House of 
Commons that evening during which Lloyd George spoke ‘as arranged’ in support of 
Henderson, and the debate proceeded successfully as the Cabinet had planned.52 Barnes 
may however be considered an unreliable witness. His readiness to take Henderson’s place 
as senior Labour representative in the War Cabinet angered many in the party. His action 
was offensively described as that of a political ‘blackleg’.53 Characteristically, Henderson 
distanced himself from this insulting response.54 He also declared his ‘most strenuous 
opposition’ to the proposal that Barnes and other Labour ministers should be pressed into 
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resigning from the government. This would be prejudicial to the national war effort that the 
party had consistently supported and it would ‘retard, if not destroy,’ labour’s prospects.55 
 
Barnes then had no strong personal grievance against Henderson despite their difference of 
opinion on Stockholm. It seems likely too that his recollection of the meeting of 1 August 
having ended on an apparently harmonious note was shared by ministers. Had they felt 
otherwise it seems unlikely that they would have allowed Henderson the latitude they 
subsequently did. But Barnes’ perception of Henderson’s state of mind following the 
Cabinet meeting would later be challenged by a very different recollection on the part of 
another senior party figure, Fred Jowett. Meeting briefly with MacDonald and Henderson in 
a committee room at the Commons shortly after the Cabinet meeting, Jowett recalls that 
whilst he and MacDonald discussed the party business to hand, ‘Henderson, however, was 
“whacked”. His arm lay along the table, his head hung dispiritedly, he seemed broken by the 
blow.’56 The credibility of this recollection, reported second hand, may be questioned. 
MacDonald never himself commented on his distressing scene. As for Henderson, he 
evidently recovered sufficiently quickly to give a coherent and measured address to MPs 
within two or three hours of the conclusion of the Cabinet meeting. 
 
First revealed in Henderson’s 13 August resignation statement to the House of Commons, 
the ‘doormat’ incident provided a weapon capable of deflecting, at least in the minds of his 
party supporters, the charges levelled against him by Lloyd George. We should now consider 
more fully how Henderson attempted to meet these charges in this parliamentary 
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statement and debate. As elsewhere, Hamilton has set the tone for her successors in 
analysing this event. Despite feeling that he had been ‘unjustly traduced’, she observes, 
Henderson, in what he believed to be the national interest, spoke with reserve and 
reticence, thereby letting Lloyd George off the hook. The latter was far less scrupulous, 
delivering ‘an exceedingly clever speech, in which, while enduing all the panoply of the 
responsible statesman.....deprived himself of no weapon of innuendo and suggestion.’ 
Henderson, she concludes, ‘was too simple to fight Lloyd George.’57 Both Leventhal and 
Wrigley, in his two separate accounts of the Stockholm controversy, echo these themes.58 
The accepted view then, from which no labour historian has dissented, is that Henderson, 
despite the inherent strength of his case, was too conscientious and too guileless to land 
effective blows upon his unscrupulous opponent and that Lloyd George, being fully aware of 
the damage that Henderson could do him, deployed his political skills to great effect. 
 
This view of course chimes perfectly with the perceived characters of the two politicians, 
but a careful reading of the debate actually suggests that in this particular instance at least 
the stereotypes should be abandoned. On the principal charges surrounding the period 
between 8 and 10 August - that he had misled the Cabinet regarding his intentions on the 
Stockholm vote and misled Labour delegates by failing to reveal the contents of the 
Nabokov note - Henderson’s case was not strong, especially regarding the first of these 
accusations. Yet by a combination of careful preparation, pugnacious obfuscation, and a 
failure on the part of his opponents to press home their advantage, he nevertheless 
emerged from the contest with his political integrity less fractured than he may have feared. 
References have already been made to the arguments presented in the post-resignation 
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debate on the Paris affair, in which similar techniques had been deployed. Assisted by Bonar 
Law’s failure to make the most of his argument, Henderson had emerged from this part of 
his defence relatively unscathed. We may now examine his handling of the rather more 
serious accusations relating to the later period.59  
 
Henderson devoted many words in his statement to refuting Lloyd George’s main charge. 
He began unsurprisingly by alluding to what he described as ‘the very strange proceeding’ of 
the Prime Minister in raising in the press the issue as to ‘why it was, knowing as I did the 
views of my colleagues, I did not resign.’ Much of his answer to this crucial question was 
essentially irrelevant: the fact, for example, that he had already tendered his resignation on 
26 July and it had been refused; that ministerial statements during his visit to Paris had been 
unwarranted; and that this justified his taking the view that the onus of bringing about his 
departure from the Cabinet rested with his colleagues rather than himself. The only point he 
made which was directly related to his decision to leave ministers uninformed of his 
intentions at the Labour conference was that his prior resignation would have deflected 
delegates from proper consideration of the merits or otherwise of attendance at 
Stockholm.60  
 
Henderson was undoubtedly aided in his defence by the failure of the Prime Minister, like 
Bonar Law earlier, to make the most of his case. Instead of focussing his attack on the above 
stated question as to why Henderson had not offered his resignation, on the grounds that 
he could not support the Cabinet’s goals at the conference, Lloyd George foolishly 
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overstated his argument. He accused Henderson not merely of remaining silent on his 
intentions, but of having clearly indicated to his Cabinet colleagues that ‘he had made up his 
mind....to turn down the Stockholm Conference’ when he addressed the Labour delegates. 
This allowed Henderson to take the offensive, challenging Lloyd George to declare whether 
anything in the Cabinet minutes supported this accusation.   
 
We must assume that Henderson had consulted the minutes and knew very well that they 
did not support the Prime Minister’s specific claim. Lloyd George on the other hand 
appeared unaware of the precise contents of the Cabinet record, but had ‘refreshed’ his 
memory of the words exchanged at the Cabinet and remained confident that these 
confirmed his judgement. He further alleged that Henderson had made similar indications 
on the evening of the 7th. After more cross examination from Henderson however, he began 
to founder, referring vaguely to ‘various conversations’, the times and other details of which 
he clearly remembered less well than his opponent. His final recourse was to maintain that 
not only he, but all those who also attended the 8 August meeting, came away with ‘the 
impression’ that Henderson was going to ‘turn down the Stockholm Conference’ on the 
10th.61 All this allowed Henderson to defend himself against a charge which could not be 
substantiated. Strongly insisting that he had never suggested to his colleagues that he had 
changed his mind over Stockholm, nor had they ever asked him to represent the Cabinet 
position when he addressed his own party, he went a considerable way to letting himself, 
rather than Lloyd George, off the hook.62 
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Hamilton’s contrary view, as we noted above, rests on another proposition that can be 
challenged: her belief that Henderson, unlike Lloyd George, weakened his own case by 
failing to use evidence that was confidential. Henderson certainly claimed this, stating that 
he was ‘content to join the interesting list of ex-Ministers who are awaiting an opportunity 
to state the full facts of their case when they can do so without prejudice to the interests of 
the nation.’63 He was indeed prevented from utilising some classified material which he 
would have found useful, notably Buchanan’s continuing judgement that British attendance 
at Stockholm would not damage British interests.64 Clearly however the revelation he had 
prominently in mind at this moment was the fact that in May Lloyd George had himself been 
in favour of Stockholm. He hinted as much by remarking darkly that there were questions 
regarding the Stockholm affair which the Government would eventually have difficulty 
facing, but which in the public interest he would open up no more than was necessary to 
clear himself of the charges made against him.65 Leventhal records that Henderson 
‘intimated’ to James Middleton, Assistant Secretary to the Labour party, that had he fully 
revealed the Prime Minister’s earlier position ‘it would so embarrass the Government as to 
cause its downfall.’66 Was this however a credible judgement? 
 
The War Cabinet were certainly aware that Henderson might make this point. Meeting prior 
to the debate, ministers discussed how best they would respond should he do so. Having 
rehearsed the main lines of the argument they had been presenting over the previous ten 
days, they concluded that ‘no difficulty would be found in proving.....that the conditions [in 
Russia] had completely changed since May 1917.’ The main problem they apparently feared 
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in having to present this argument was that it might be an embarrassment to Kerensky. It 
was therefore agreed that the Prime Minister should ‘have to use the greatest discretion in 
dealing this matter in Parliament’, but that it would be possible to blame the situation on 
Henderson’s ‘great disservice’ to the Russians ‘in raising this question at this precise 
moment.’67 We should note finally that Henderson’s restraint on this matter was not long 
lived. At the adjourned Labour conference eight days later he stated, to a chorus of cheers 
and laughter from the delegates, that the ‘Prime Minister has been in favour of this 
[Stockholm] Conference once......What was a virtue in May ought not to be crime in 
August.’68 
 
The handling on 13 August of their respective arguments by Henderson and Lloyd George 
show the former rather than the latter as the more successful. Henderson was obviously not 
able to win over a House of Commons which was predominantly and fundamentally 
opposed to Stockholm, but this was not his real concern. The real battleground, both for 
him and for Lloyd George, was the labour movement. One especially interesting exchange 
during the Commons debate is worth noting in this respect. In defending his decision not to 
resign from the Cabinet, Henderson offered the curious argument that had he done so he 
would have secured an even larger vote at the Labour conference. Contending that the issue 
foremost in delegates’ minds would have been that of his own resignation, party loyalties 
would have ensured this more emphatic personal victory. This opinion was probably shared, 
he believed, by the other Labour members of the government. Lloyd George dismissed 
Henderson’s contention as ‘an insult to intelligent people.’ Was it likely, he asked, that ‘the 
responsible Labour leaders of the kingdom’, if informed that Britain and the Allied 
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governments all considered the sending of delegates to Stockholm ‘a dangerous expedient’, 
would have flouted this collective official opinion by a bigger majority?69  
 
But whose views were in this instance the more credible? It is probably impossible to say, 
since the specific manner in which a pre-conference resignation might have occurred, and 
the extent to which either party may have succeeded in presenting the facts favourably to 
their cause, would have had a major bearing on the outcome. It may be doubted whether 
either man could really be confident in his assumptions. The situation was after all without 
precedent. We have already seen that Lloyd George took seriously the possibility that some 
members of the labour movement could take umbrage over the government laying down 
the law on what might have been seen as a party matter, and the consequent departure 
from government of the party’s most senior figure would certainly have been seen as an 
additional concern. Regarding Henderson the evidence is more circumstantial. Had he been 
confident that a break with the government really would assist his cause at the Labour 
conference (and it must be remembered that before 10 August the question was not how 
large a majority he was to receive, but whether or not a majority could be secured at all) 
then why would he not have acted to bring his resignation about, particularly since this 
would have the additional benefit of removing the aura of devious and misleading 
behaviour which was likely to accompany his alternative course? 
 
As we have argued above, all the options open to Henderson during the days leading up to 
the conference were to some degree problematical, and a pre-conference resignation would 
undoubtedly have raised serious difficulties, not least in relation to the legal position. For all 
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the risks involved in the course he finally chose, in the end this choice proved successful. 
Opposition to Stockholm remained strong within Labour, but when the party met at the 
adjourned conference on 21 August not one of Henderson’s opponents took up the charges 
of deception levelled against him elsewhere. It is interesting to note also that Henderson 
was on this occasion leaving nothing to chance. Offered the opportunity to make a ‘personal 
statement’ at the beginning of the conference, he again provided a lengthy rebuttal of the 
case against him, concluding with the confession that whilst he may in some ways have 
failed or erred, this ‘has only been because of my loyalty to labour’.70 
 
The battle for the hearts and minds of Britain’s trade unionists was undoubtedly won by 
Henderson, but he was again helped by difficulties faced by Lloyd George. The Prime 
Minister was keen to pin the charge on Henderson that he had deceived not just the War 
Cabinet but the Labour conference. He had failed to let delegates know that the Cabinet 
was opposed to Stockholm, and had failed also to reveal the information contained in the 
Nabokov note, which would have shown them that Russian leaders were no longer 
supporters of the conference. The first part of this charge was of course difficult to press 
home. It had after all been the Cabinet’s own decision on 8 August that the government’s 
opinion should be withheld from the Labour conference. To fully explain why this decision 
had been taken could only put ministers in a bad light. The fact that as a still serving 
member of the government, the views Henderson expressed at the conference were likely 
to be seen by delegates as ‘not inconsistent’ with the views of the Cabinet was a valid point, 
but under the circumstances a hard one on which to place too great an emphasis.71 The 
Prime Minister chose therefore to attach greater weight to the second element of 
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Henderson’s alleged deception: that he had failed to reveal the contents of the Nabokov 
note.  
 
This too however was to prove ineffective. Henderson had two reasonable responses to the 
note, firstly that he had been aware of its contents since 8 August and had adequately 
covered its substance in his address to the conference; and secondly, that what 
Tereshchenko was actually quoted as saying in the note, as opposed to the gloss put on it by 
Nabokov himself, was uncontroversial.72 Henderson would subsequently win his moral 
victory on this question when Tereshchenko stated that neither he nor Kerensky had 
changed their minds on Stockholm, that they both still emphasised the necessity ‘of issuing 
passports to Allied Socialists for Stockholm’ and that Nabokov’s personal comments ‘arose 
exclusively through his own interpretation of what appeared in certain English papers 
regarding Russia’s relations with the Stockholm Conference.’73  
 
Henderson appears to have had some good fortune in the ways in which the post-
resignation war of words with Lloyd George played out. In important respects however the 
cards were very much stacked in his favour. The great esteem in which he was held by the 
nation’s trade unionists, even if this came under strain at times in 1917, contrasted 
markedly with attitudes towards Lloyd George.  Persistent complaints within the labour 
movement over profiteering, rising prices, extended conscription and ‘dilution’ of 
longstanding trade union practices in the interests of increased war production were readily 
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focussed on the Prime Minister personally.74 Although these complaints did not seriously 
erode Labour support for the war, trade unionists were not immune from the growing 
doubts by now surrounding the nature of Allied war aims. Traditionally aligned on foreign 
affairs to a ‘moderate internationalism’, some at least amongst the nation’s workforce were 
ready to challenge the expansionist war aims actively promoted by the political right.75 
 
 
Henderson’s victory in the post-resignation war of words with Lloyd George, at least as far 
as the majority of his party was concerned, was vital. If 10 August was but a necessary first 
step to Henderson’s wider ambition, it was imperative that he should not be perceived as 
having won this first round by dubious means. Onward movement from the Stockholm vote 
was in any case likely to be difficult, since it was obvious that the conference, if it took place 
at all, was unlikely to engender anything amenable to Allied socialists and their 
governments. During the remainder of August the prospects for British involvement in the 
affairs of the Socialist International actually appeared to recede rather than to develop. In 
the adjourned conference of 21 August, and still more so at the Allied socialist conference 
the following week, the conspicuous rifts between ‘patriots’ and ‘pacifists’ did nothing to 
encourage those who hoped to see progress on the international front.76 Ironically, 
Henderson did at last succeed in moving forward on his long term agenda at the very venue 
on which the War Cabinet had pinned its own hopes for a reassertion of labour ‘patriotism’ - 
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the autumn gathering of the TUC.77 As Labour party fraternal delegate to the Congress, 
Henderson noted that people were now declaring Stockholm dead. But whilst he accepted 
that this was so as far as the planned conference of the summer was concerned, he 
forcefully repudiated the suggestion that the ‘idea’ of Stockholm had died.78 We may now 
consider how Henderson put flesh over the coming period on this ‘idea’. 
 
 
The Campaign for a Labour Peace, 1917-1919 
 
On the second day of the TUC annual congress (4 September), the Parliamentary Committee 
declared ‘that a Conference at Stockholm at the present moment could not be successful.’ 
But it chose against leaving the matter at that and returning to its earlier wartime 
perspective. Instead it proposed a new course of action involving an ‘attempt in every 
possible way to secure general agreement of aim among the working classes of the allied 
nations’ as a prelude to a future International Labour conference, subject to the by now 
familiar strictures regarding national representations. Although the discussion on this new 
course revealed much strongly expressed opposition, both within the Parliamentary 
Committee itself and on the floor of the Congress, the proposals were comfortably carried 
by 2,849,000 votes to 91,000.79 When Henderson addressed the Congress later in the week 
he welcomed ‘most enthusiastically’ the recommendations of the Parliamentary Committee 
and looked forward to ‘the mother of Congresses taking her proper place in the 
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international field.....’80 The stage was set for the cooperation of the NEC and the PCTUC 
over the autumn. The two bodies soon combined to form a Joint International Committee, 
the first fruits of which appeared in December with the presentation of the ‘Memorandum 
on War Aims’ to a further Special Labour conference on 29 December 1917.81 
 
No difficulties faced the acceptance of this progressively worded memorandum which, 
according to the conference chairman was adopted practically unanimously following a 
show of hands.82 This provided the platform for a comprehensive resolution on international 
policy, proposed by Henderson and seconded by MacDonald, at the Labour party annual 
conference the following month. A programme designed to culminate in a full International 
Socialist conference was set out in this resolution. A third Allied socialist conference on 20 
February 1918, for which arrangements were already in place, was approved. Participants in 
this upcoming conference were to consider and adopt a comprehensive statement of 
desired Allied war aims, and to call on the socialist parties of the Central Powers to respond. 
In the meantime, socialists on both sides of the conflict were to be enjoined to press their 
respective governments for statements of war aims matching the principles adopted by 
their parties. On the assumption that this international programme would proceed towards 
fruition, the parties would urge their ‘several Governments......to allow facilities for 
attendance at an International Congress in some neutral State......at which organised 
working class opinion of all the countries may be represented, in order that nothing may be 
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left undone to bring into harmony the desires of the working classes of all the 
belligerents.’83 
 
This was a massively ambitious undertaking. The disharmony between and within the 
world’s labour movements which had been evident in the summer was far from being 
resolved at the end of the year. Even the unity within the British movement demonstrated 
on 29 December was in reality only partial. Labour ‘pacifists’ certainly welcomed the fact 
that the party was at last prepared to state its own views on war aims, and to urge that 
governments should do the same.84 They remained uneasy however over the readiness of 
the Labour executive and the trade unionists to accommodate their conclusions to the 
aspirations of the Allied powers. As The Times observed when the approved draft had been 
published, the proposed ‘territorial readjustments......not merely accessory but essential to 
a lasting peace.....’ were a ‘proof that the heart and head of British Labour are sound.’85 This 
partiality towards the aims of the Allied governments was carried through into the 
statement adopted by the February Allied Socialist Conference, which was to be presented 
to the socialists of the Central Powers as the possible basis on which a full international 
conference could be convened. There were doubts amongst ‘pacifists’ over the statement’s 
fitness for this purpose. As MacDonald privately acknowledged, German socialists might 
simply reject the Allied statement and ‘pull it to pieces as indeed they will find it far too easy 
to do.’86 
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MacDonald was right. Although the Austro/Hungarian, Bulgarian and Turkish socialists as 
well as the German USPD offered replies that their Allied counterparts deemed satisfactory, 
the SPD failed to provide a formal response. The party’s views had to be gleaned by way of 
suggestions emanating from the Dutch socialist, Pieter Troelstra, who was known to have 
maintained good links with the German majority socialists, and from individual responses in 
the German press.  It was apparent from these sources that serious criticisms of the Allied 
socialist statement were to be expected.87 On 17 September a fourth Allied Socialist 
Conference was convened, like the previous three in London, at which the appropriate 
reaction to the SPD’s non-cooperation was heatedly debated. The British delegation 
recommended to the conference that ‘deep regret’ should be expressed in relation to the 
failure of the German majority socialists to respond adequately to the Allied initiative. The 
door to German involvement should not however, in the British view, be shut. It was urged, 
rather, that those enemy socialists whose replies had satisfied the conference should be 
encouraged to use their influence to change the minds of the German majority. 
Simultaneously, the conference should inform the SDP that their attitude created ‘an 
obstacle’ to the holding of an international conference.88 
 
Powerful voices were raised in favour of a much firmer response to the recalcitrant German 
socialists. One of these voices was that of Samuel Gompers, President of the AFL. We have 
seen that Henderson had been keen since the previous summer to bring the AFL into the 
renewed labour diplomacy, yet this conference was the first that the AFL had attended. To 
Henderson’s regret Gompers and the AFL still spoke in the strong, anti-socialist and 
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‘patriotic’ terms which had been common in the TUC three years earlier but now largely 
abandoned.89 Gompers approach to the German problem was to formally propose that the 
Allied socialists would meet in conference ‘with those only of the Central Powers who are in 
open revolt against their autocratic governors.’ Vandervelde also advocated a tougher line. 
‘So long as the German majority socialists remain the agents, the accomplices, and the 
slaves of their Government,’ he insisted, ‘the Conference must not say there is a “difficulty” 
about meeting them; it must say that it is impossible.’90 Members of the British delegation 
added their voices to the strong anti-German mood. Thorne presented a resolution 
precluding the offer of any peace terms ‘until the Central Powers had been punished for 
their brutalities’ and Sexton added a resolution ‘on the same lines.’91 
 
Unsurprisingly, British ‘patriots’ had also been creating difficulties for Henderson at home. 
The summer of 1918 was a period during which disgruntled Labour MPs and BWL stalwarts 
flexed their muscles against the party’s newly adopted ‘pacifist’ leanings. Their principal goal 
was to create an independent trade union party, which in the end proved unachievable.92 
But opposition to Henderson’s internationalist programme was also readily attacked, as a 
brief account of his frustrations attests. Huysmans, already in Britain in a supporting role 
towards Henderson, had proposed in May that the presence of Branting and Troelstra in 
London would be desirable.93 There were concerns however regarding the perceived 
sympathies of the latter towards Germany. Barnes was initially able to reassure Henderson 
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that the Foreign Office would raise no objections to the Dutchman’s admission.94 Objections 
were raised however by Labour MPs, in particular Thorne, who was convinced that Troelstra 
was ‘a rampant pro-German’ and ‘in collusion with the German Foreign Office.’95 Following 
Henderson’s refusal to accept this judgement Thorne declared that he would raise the 
question in the House of Commons.96  
 
On 19 June the matter came under consideration by the War Cabinet. Having received a 
report on the Dutch socialist’s activities from the Director of Military Intelligence, and 
learning also that the government in Paris had denied Troelstra entry into France, the 
Cabinet refused to permit him to land on British soil.97 In response, a Labour delegation 
including Henderson was commissioned to travel to Switzerland to speak with Troelstra on 
neutral territory, but they were refused passports.98 Passports were issued In October, when 
Henderson and Bowerman wished to travel to Paris to attend a meeting of the organising 
committee created by the September inter-Allied conference. Their journey however was 
halted at Folkestone by members of the National Union of Seamen who refused to carry 
them across the Channel. The reason given by the crew for their hostile attitude, Henderson 
revealed, ‘was that I and my friends were doing our work with the assistance of German 
money.’99 
 
These tribulations were soon cut short by the unexpected military collapse of the Central 
Powers, which moved Henderson’s peace programme onto new ground. The focus 
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necessarily shifted to what had become the programme’s principal goal: the convening of an 
international socialist conference ‘at the same time and in the same place as the official 
peace congress.’100 Following a confused and stressful period during the weeks following the 
armistice, at least one of these criteria was achieved. Refused permission to stage a socialist 
conference in Paris, a gathering in Berne did deliberate on peace terms simultaneously with 
the assembled statesmen now in France.  
 
By no means all labour and socialist parties were willing to attend the Berne conference. 
Belgians and Americans who had rejected meeting with Germans at the proposed 
Stockholm conference continued to take this line eighteen months later and were therefore 
amongst the absentees. French majoritaires, although they finally agreed to attend, were 
also reluctant. Thomas had written to Henderson in December stating that he was ‘entirely 
sceptical’ regarding a full international conference and that separate conferences ‘would 
have been preferable at this time.’101 When Henderson arrived in Paris en route to 
Switzerland to prepare for the speedy convention of the Berne conference there was talk 
that the majoritaires were still hoping to push ahead with alternative inter-Allied 
conferences, which would clearly imperil the hope of a united socialist world offering its 
perspectives on the settlement prior to governments agreeing terms.102 
 
Henderson continued to Berne undaunted to help form an organising committee which 
began ‘a series of informal preliminary conferences’ with ‘such delegates as had arrived’ by 
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26 January 1919. The Conference proper commenced a week later on 3 February.103 
Henderson opened proceedings with a short statement apologising for any irregularities 
there may have been in the hurried convocation of the conference, but insisting on the 
priority of ensuring that an international labour voice be brought to bear ‘on the great 
problems of the World’s peace’ by now under consideration in Paris.104 Delegates from both 
belligerent blocs (including representatives of the SPD), from neutral countries, and from 
national groups whose statehood was yet to be confirmed, contributed over the following 
days to that labour voice. The progressive and internationalist resolutions on which the 
delegates agreed were delivered in person to the French President, Georges Clemenceau, 
presiding over the preliminary peace conference in Paris.  They would fail however to exert 
anything like the influence for which Henderson and the Berne delegates hoped.105 
  
As the above summary shows, Henderson was deeply and continuously involved in the 
process which culminated in Berne. We have seen also in previous chapters that there are 
good reasons to believe that this process began not at some moment after 10 August 1917, 
but rather around the earlier date of 17 July, when Henderson initially conferred with 
Branting and Huysmans. The 10 August was of course immensely significant, in that it 
allowed him the freedom to pursue his objectives ever more openly and, no less 
importantly, cemented his leadership role in a party convinced that he had been treated 
shoddily by a widely mistrusted Prime Minister. Henderson’s goals were, as has also been 
suggested, very much in line with the 1915 Allied socialist resolution. This was not only 
evident from the fact that this resolution was placed at the fore of subsequent Allied 
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socialist statements, but was clear also from the series of articles, interviews and 
conference addresses produced by Henderson at this time. 
 
This abundance of personal statements, along with party declarations he obviously inspired, 
has contributed to a general consensus amongst historians regarding Henderson’s goals at 
the end of the war. Nobody denies that he was above all insistent that the war should be 
concluded by a ‘people’s’ or ‘democratic’ peace, to use the contemporary terminology. The 
main goal of such a peace, as declared in the Memorandum on War Aims, was that there 
should ‘be henceforth on earth no more war.’106 This would require ‘the frank abandonment 
of every form of imperialism’, ‘the suppression of secret diplomacy’, ‘concerted action....for 
the universal abolition of compulsory military service’, ‘the common limitation 
of.....armaments by which all peoples are burdened’, and ‘the entire  abolition of profit-
making armament firms.’ Additionally, the establishment of ‘a Supernational Authority, or 
League of Nations’ incorporating the sovereign states of the world should ‘be an essential 
part of the treaty of peace itself.’ Such a League should establish an ‘International High 
Court’ as well as an ‘International Legislature’ and should develop ‘appropriate machinery 
for prompt and effective mediation between states.’ In the event that these various 
mechanisms might not on every occasion work, the member states would need to make 
common cause against any individual nation which refused to accept binding agreements 
reached by the relevant bodies.107 
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Regarding the territorial and economic clauses of a future settlement the Memorandum 
rejected ‘the attempts made, now in this quarter, and now in that, to convert this war into a 
war of conquest, whether what is sought to be acquired by force is territory or wealth.’ 
Territorial readjustments would be permissible only ‘if arrived at by common agreement on 
the general principle of allowing all people to settle their own destinies’ or ‘for the purpose 
of removing any obvious cause of future international conflict.’ On the economic aspect of 
the peace settlement, the party declared ‘against all the projects now being prepared by 
Imperialists and capitalists, not in any one country only, but in most countries, for an 
economic war after peace has been secured.108 Henderson himself would insist that if a 
lasting peace were to be achieved, ‘everything must be done to prevent the division of 
Europe into two separate and hostile economic camps after the war.’109 
 
Whilst it is accepted by all labour historians that Henderson was earnest in his pursuit of a 
progressive peace, how this was balanced with other concerns he is believed to have had at 
this time is a question on which there has been room for divergent views. As we observed in 
the introduction to this thesis, Henderson pursued two important post-resignation 
objectives, one of which was the internationalist programme described above, and the 
other the constitutional reorganisation of the Labour party. Following Winter’s influential 
1972 article the latter goal has become related to the belief that Henderson’s anxiety over 
the advance of Bolshevism in Russia may have extended to concern that this perfidious 
doctrine could take hold elsewhere, including in Britain. One of the aims of Henderson’s 
constitutional changes, argues Winter, was to make of the Labour party a ‘moderate 
socialist alternative’ to extra-parliamentary action or revolution itself: ‘Just as he had 
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supported the provisional government in Petrograd as the leftist alternative to Bolshevism, 
so he advocated a few months later the reconstruction of the Labour party with an 
ideological base [the famous Clause 4 commitment to the party’s socialist objective] as the 
bulwark of the British parliamentary system.’110 
 
This argument raises some questions. Firstly, to state that Henderson wanted his 
reconstructed party to be a moderate and democratic alternative to any form of extremism 
is essentially to state the obvious. He had always wanted the Labour party to be thus, and 
presumably judged prior to 1917 that this was not seriously at issue. What needs to be 
shown is that he came to believe that the party as constituted was no longer adequately 
equipped to preserve this character and that this belief played a significant part in his 
decision to reconstruct the party. It is certainly arguable that the experience of war was 
itself a significant encouragement to radical sentiment, both on the left and right of the 
party.111 It may also be something of a truism, but for societies at war, confining violence to 
the battlefield is not always easy. Winter quotes a long passage from an article written by 
Henderson in 1917 which shows that this may have been a perception he shared. 
Henderson warns that the end of the war would see the belligerent nations ‘flooded with 
hardy veterans’ fully trained in the military arts. If insurrectionary movements were to arise 
and barricades to be ‘erected in our streets’, he continues, ‘they will be manned by men 
who have learned how to fight....’ Revolution, if it came, would be ‘veritable civil war....’112  
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The article contains however many reassuring comments to the effect that violent 
revolution was ‘alien to the British character’ and that the ‘growth of political democracy’ 
had been marked in Britain by ‘few violent crises.’ One thing Henderson certainly learned 
from his visit to Russia was how very different that country was to Britain in this respect.’113 
It is not at all obvious why he may have feared a Russian style revolution (of either the 
February or October variety) in his own nation. The reassurances regarding the nature of 
British politics appear a great deal more characteristic of Henderson’s style than his article’s 
opening apocalyptic visions ‘of barricades in the streets and blood in the gutters’.114 
 
Indeed the article soon moves on to more characteristically British forms of (largely non-
violent) militancy, specifically addressing the pre-war ‘feverish industrial unrest’ during 
which proponents of ‘direct action’ had lost faith in the political process and ‘sedulously 
fostered’ the idea that the working masses should deploy their industrial strength as a more 
effective means of achieving their objectives.115 Given its British pedigree, a recurrence of 
this sort of militancy undoubtedly seems a more realistic apprehension than a Bolshevist 
style uprising. And as the historical record shows, ‘direct action’ did indeed, to Henderson’s 
dismay, undergo a powerful resurgence in the post-war years.116 Taken in its entirety, 
Henderson’s article was, as its title might suggest, a plea for compromise rather than 
revolution when the labour movement faced, as was widely anticipated, a period of conflict 
with the forces of reaction in the aftermath of the war.117 It is indeed a warning against the 
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party turning aside ‘from the path of ordered social change by constitutional methods.’118 
What is most interesting about this article in relation to Winter’s hypothesis however, is 
that it could easily have been presented solely in terms of the warnings against a revival of 
pre-war ‘direct action’. It is difficult to avoid the impression that the uncharacteristically 
alarmist language depicting the horror of revolution was largely designed to give the central 
argument greater force. 
 
A second problem for Winter’s argument is that Henderson’s desire to reorganise the party 
can very easily be explained in other ways. As Winter himself notes, quoting from another 
late wartime article, it ‘was a fact of enormous importance that the development of 
democratic ideals and purposes synchronises with the introduction of a franchise measure 
which opens a tremendous vista of political achievement.’119 To take ‘full advantage of the 
potential re-distribution of political power,’ the Labour party’s existing form of organisation 
was ‘plainly inadequate.’120 Speaking to the editor of the Manchester Guardian in December 
1917, Henderson thought it possible that a reorganised Labour party could run as many as 
500 candidates at the next election, a number much greater than had been feasible before 
the war.121 Surely the desire to create a party carefully honed to achieve electoral success 
would under the circumstances have been incentive enough for Henderson’s reorganisation. 
We may legitimately ask whether his determination to make such changes would have been 
any the less had he never been to Russia nor seen any Bolsheviks. 
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A further difficulty with Winter’s argument, especially when it has been more succinctly or 
crudely expressed as has been the case over the years, lies in the latitude with which the 
term ‘Bolshevism’ has been used. The initial and most precise meaning of Bolshevism 
obviously refers to the political programme of the Leninist faction of the Russian socialist 
party. Perhaps the most striking characteristic of this programme during the First World War 
was its almost complete indifference to the issues for which the combatants believed or 
claimed they were fighting. The war was seen, rather, as an opportunity for the true 
socialists of all nations to exploit the resultant social and economic upheavals with the 
object of overthrowing the existing bourgeois regimes and installing in their place 
proletarian rule. 
 
 Lenin’s politics were based on a too literal reading of the observation by Marx and Engels in 
their 1849 Communist manifesto that the ‘working men have no country.’122 For the 
majority of working people in the belligerent countries who did in fact believe that the 
liberty and values of their respective nations were under attack by foreign powers, and who 
were therefore determined to play their part in ‘national defence’, Lenin had little but 
contempt. Towards the anti-war minorities who shared his view that the conflict should be 
characterised as ‘imperialist’  he was even more scathing, dismissing them as ‘bourgeois 
pacifists’ who had failed to understand that since war was an inevitable outcome of 
capitalist rivalries only the overthrow of capitalism itself could produce lasting peace. By 
deluding the masses into the belief that political pressures could force governments into 
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seeking a settlement the ‘pacifists’ were siphoning off radical elements within the labour 
movements who might otherwise support the Bolshevik view. 123  
 
Lenin’s doctrines were, in short, too extreme to make much appeal to the vast majority of 
wartime socialists, and to British socialists probably least of all.124 Matters began to change 
after the Bolsheviks succeeded in taking power in Russia. In establishing in 1919 a 
communist Third International in opposition to the pre-war Second International the new 
rulers of Russia mounted a serious doctrinal threat to the established socialist parties. 
Emerging from its internal Russian and wartime contexts, this second version of 
‘Bolshevism’ represented a new interpretation of Marx’s ideas which showed a frightening 
ability to lure more radical elements in the West away from their conservative socialist 
leaderships. Henderson himself would become involved in the complicated three way battle 
of the Internationals which followed the establishment of the Moscow based Comintern.125 
The issue on which the democratic internationals were particularly opposed to each other 
was their respective responses to the new Russian regime and to the military interventions 
against it by the capitalist powers. Clearly however these arguments, and probably also the 
existence of the Third international, were a consequence of the Bolshevik seizure and 
retention of power in Russia which few foresaw in 1917.  
 
                                                 
123
 R Craig Nation, War on War: Lenin, the Zimmerwald Left, and the Origins of Communist Internationalism 
(Durham, 1989), passim ; Richard K Debo, Revolution and Survival: the foreign policy of Soviet Russia, 1917-
1918 (Toronto, 1979), pp: 5-16. 
124
 For a discussion of the various factors which made the British working class, as compared with its main 
European counterparts, resistant to class based ideologies, see Ross McKibbin, ‘Why Was There No Marxism in 
Great Britain?’, English Historical Review, Vol.99, No.391 (1984), pp: 297-331. 
125
 The divisions which had emerged between majority and minority socialists during the war persisted into the 
peace and were manifested in the creation of two non-communist internationals, see G. D. H. Cole, A History of 
Socialist Thought, Vol. 4, Part 1: Communism and Social Democracy, 1914-1931 (London, 1958), pp: 287-342. 
261 
 
A third usage of the word ‘Bolshevism’, which developed in the latter years of the war, was 
as an all-purpose denigration of left wing perspectives of almost any variety. During the 
election campaign of December 1918, for example, Lloyd George saw fit to brand even the 
leadership of the Labour party as an ‘extreme pacifist Bolshevist group.’126 Though obviously 
open to this sort of abuse the adoption of this terminology was nevertheless a reflection of 
fears created by a widespread tendency towards popular unrest during the latter years of 
the war and into the peace. The outstanding manifestation of this sort of ‘Bolshevism’ was 
paradoxically the non-Bolshevik revolution in Russia in March 1917. And no doubt too this 
first Russian revolution greatly encouraged the radicalism which would break out elsewhere, 
leading to erosions of military discipline within the belligerents’ armed forces and to strikes 
and demonstrations on the home fronts.127 Although Britain was spared the more serious 
manifestations of this period of unrest, it was not immune. During the spring of 1917 
widespread strikes broke out in the engineering industry. Threatening as these were to the 
supply of munitions for the Western front, they caused still further consternation in that 
they were led by shop stewards in defiance of the formal trade union leaderships.128 In the 
weeks before he departed for Russia Henderson, who deplored this rank and file usurpation 
of industrial power, had been deeply involved on the part of the Cabinet in the resolution of 
this damaging disturbance.129  
 
We may reasonably assume that this flexible use of the term ‘Bolshevism’, more so than 
those indicated above, is the principal sense in which it is possible to argue, as does Winter, 
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that Henderson’s concerns over the phenomenon affected his domestic political activity in 
1917. We may also conclude then that whilst Henderson had genuine concerns over the 
militancy of sections of his party these were unlikely to have been rooted in what he had 
seen of Russian Bolshevism. He had moreover opposed domestic militant tendencies in the 
past and might reasonably have anticipated opposing them in similar ways in the future. The 
extension of the franchise in 1918 would not of itself eliminate extremism in labour circles. 
It would however undercut a powerful argument used by militants in the past: that 
parliamentary or constitutional politics under restricted franchises clearly favoured the 
ruling classes and forced workers into the adoption of other means by which to defend their 
interests. 
 
Almost thirty years after the publication of Winter’s analysis, Bridgen appears to have 
recognised some of its problems. ‘Contrary to the view of some commentators,’ he writes, 
‘fear of a Russian-style working-class revolt was not a major motivating factor in 
Henderson’s actions at this time.’130 Bridgen is nevertheless keen to uphold the idea of a 
causative relationship between Henderson’s encounter with Bolshevism in Russia and his 
subsequent political initiatives in Britain. His ability to reach this conclusion however rests 
on the unsustainable assumption that Henderson foresaw whilst in Russia the danger of an 
‘extreme left-wing government’ gaining control in Petrograd and ‘encouraging pacifistic and 
revolutionary tendencies throughout Europe.’ Conscious as he was of deepening labour 
divisions at home, Henderson doubted (so Bridgen believes) whether his party ‘would 
survive intact the divisive influence of a Russian government pledged wholeheartedly to a 
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peace by negotiation.’131 Leaving aside the lack of evidence that Henderson foresaw matters 
in this way, a further difficulty with this presumption is that in Britain the Menshevik 
dominated Provisional Government was itself widely and correctly associated with the 
desire for a negotiated settlement. Following the Bolshevik take-over divisions within labour 
movements over Russia, in Britain as elsewhere, did develop during 1918 and beyond. These 
were largely driven however by the decisions of Allied governments to intervene militarily 
against a socialist regime which had withdrawn from the war, and whose durability was 
grossly underestimated.132 
 
Bridgen differs from Winter in that he sees the threat emanating from Russia less in terms 
of the Labour party’s post war politics and more in the immediate ‘pacifist’ campaign for a 
negotiated peace. He draws attention to a question on which labour historians have never 
reached a settled answer. How far did Henderson move in the final phase of the war along 
the ‘patriot’-‘pacifist’ axis? A key determinant of any such movement would be the extent to 
which he was prepared to advocate a negotiated peace. Bridgen strongly insists that he 
remained opposed to the idea.133 Here again he differs from Winter who is somewhat more 
equivocal. It is in fact hard to detect Winter’s view on this question. He comments at the 
start of his article on Henderson’s belief during ‘the first three years of the war’ in ‘the 
necessity of total military victory over Germany....’. He implies later in the text that this 
commitment extended beyond these earlier years: Henderson ‘never wavered.....in his 
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determination to see an Allied victory over Germany.’134 He also writes however that 
Henderson’s ‘approach to peace negotiations’ completely changed ‘after his mission to 
Petrograd.....’ and  refers to Henderson’s ‘commitment to a socialist policy to help end the 
war.....’135 Many other accounts of the 1960s and 1970s share the view that Henderson was 
converted to the idea of a negotiated peace ‘as the most likely means of keeping the new 
Russian government in the war and preventing a Bolshevik take-over.’136 A more recent 
study also states that Henderson became convinced in Russia ‘of the need to find a 
negotiated peace before the Eastern front collapsed completely and the Russians were 
forced into a separate peace.’ 137 
 
Although Henderson undoubtedly remained wary of identifying too closely with the many 
‘pacifists’ who persistently advocated a negotiated peace, there are indications that he was 
not wholly averse to the idea. He publicly insisted in November 1917 that since ‘the 
consequences of the war were so appalling’ he would not hold back if he saw even the 
smallest opportunity of reaching a lasting peace, simply in order to inflict a ‘knock-out blow’ 
on the enemy.138 At the conference of 28 December at which he recommended the 
Memorandum on War Aims, he reminded the party that the war was now far into its fourth 
year and continuing to take its daily toll of ‘sacrifice, destruction and death’. He asserted 
that a ‘crushed and bleeding humanity’ now wished to know ‘if the continuance of this 
tragedy is essential to a just and lasting peace.’ Speaking specifically for Britain, he went on 
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to ask whether the Government was ‘using all the means at its disposal calculated to assist 
in shortening the period of hostilities?’ The behaviour of ministers, he suggested, did not 
‘afford much encouragement on this point.’ He raised as an example the recent capture by 
British forces of Jerusalem. Before this event, he noted, Carson, still a member of the War 
Cabinet, had indicated that both Austria and Turkey had no wish to continue the war. If this 
was so, why were the Allies not treating with them, especially Turkey? ‘Did we prefer to 
take Jerusalem by force? Was it not surprising, he pointedly asked, that ‘in neutral 
countries, in Russia, and even in America, Britain should be suspected of Imperialistic and 
annexationist designs?’ 
 
The Labour party too would demand clarification. The longstanding support of the 
movement for the war effort could be jeopardised if it became clear that this effort was 
being continued for reprehensible ends: ‘If the workers are to be called upon to make 
further sacrifices,’ Henderson declared, ‘they must secure a definite assurance that such 
sacrifices are essential to the winning of an honourable and righteous peace.’ Although he 
reaffirmed in his address the often repeated call that ‘Germany’s policy of aggressive 
militarism and world domination must be destroyed’, this was followed by the recognition 
that militarism was also to be found elsewhere and that it must be ‘universally.....for ever 
destroyed.’ The agency most likely to achieve this – the proposed League of Nations – had, 
he also noted, been treated ‘with scorn and contempt’ both by sections of the press and 
(again) by Carson.139 
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Although there was some ‘patriotic’ reaction to Henderson’s sentiments, conference 
speakers for the most part assumed similar positions. Even J. H. Thomas, who criticised 
Henderson for having contemplated a separate peace with the lesser enemy powers, took 
the view that it was reasonable at least to test out the Germans by engaging with them in 
discussions over war aims. ‘Was there not general agreement that every means ought to be 
used to bring peace at the earliest possible moment,’ he asked the conference, ‘and were 
not their main complaints that, so far as the Governments of all the countries were 
concerned, they were indulging in too many ambiguous phrases instead of coming down to 
real concrete terms?’140 At the party’s annual conference the following month Henderson 
informed delegates that he remained strongly of the opinion that the war ‘had been 
unnecessarily prolonged on account of the refusal during the past six or eight months to 
state the War Aims of the Allied countries.....’141  
 
The implications of Henderson’s above quoted statements during the winter of 1917-1918 
are clear. They may not have represented a denial of the need for victory over Prussian 
militarism, but they certainly defined this victory in a new way. For most people, Henderson 
wrote, ‘the meaning of victory is limited to.....military success.’ In his view however, any 
victory ‘which falls short of the realisation of the ideals with which we entered the war, will 
not be a victory but a defeat.’ The reluctance of Allied governments to fully and convincingly 
demonstrate that their war aims were consistent with their own earlier proclaimed ideals 
suggested that the military victory on which they remained bent was not a victory that 
Henderson (along with many in his party) would recognise as such.142 To say that Henderson 
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never wavered in his pursuit of victory is only arguable if victory is defined as he came to 
define it. Similarly, to argue that he remained firmly opposed to a negotiated settlement, 
one must take into account the lack of clarity in Britain as to what would represent a 
satisfactory basis on which to agree terms.  
 
Henderson’s leanings towards the possibility of a negotiated settlement were however short 
lived. This was a consequence of military developments. Following the stunningly successful 
breaching of Allied defences by German armies on 21 March 1918, the prolonged stalemate 
on the Western front was suddenly displaced by a ‘war of movement’ last seen in 1914. And 
as seen in that year, initial enemy advances and the prospect of an Allied defeat rendered 
talk of peace obviously inappropriate. ‘Pacifist’ campaigns were generally silenced as a 
result.143 Henderson conceded on 8 April that Labour’s ‘moral, political and diplomatic 
effort’ would have to be placed ‘under temporary suspension.’144 Even when the tide turned 
in mid-summer, it remained difficult to push for peace now that the Allies appeared at last 
to be winning.145 The long and dispiriting stalemate of trench warfare, with the continuing 
uncertainty as to when it would ever be broken, had undoubtedly encouraged a willingness 
on all sides to talk of peace.  When this stalemate ended peace terms became highly 
dependent on the movement of armies, and it became the nature of these terms, rather 
than the process of discussing them, which returned to centre stage. The fear that the soon 
to be victorious Allies might seek to impose a punitive peace became a major concern for 
Labour and other progressives.146 
                                                 
143
 Brock Millman, Managing Domestic Dissent in First World War Britain (London, 2000), p.257. 
144
 Wrigley, Henderson, p.125. 
145
 Keith Robbins, The Abolition of War: The ‘Peace Movement’ in Britain, 1914-1919 (Cardiff, 1976), p.161. 
146





Notwithstanding their several differences both Winter and Bridgen subscribe to what we 
may call the fear of Bolshevism (or left-wing extremism as Bridgen more usually and wisely 
describes it) hypothesis. This conception has arguably assumed an unwarranted 
prominence. Although references to it have generally been attributed to Winter, Bridgen 
provides its fullest and most coherent expression. At the core of this hypothesis are two 
central beliefs: firstly, that Henderson saw the threat to his party as coming primarily from 
the left; and secondly, that he believed the best way to deal with this challenge was to take 
over the left’s own programme and place it firmly under his own control. 
 
In Bridgen’s version of this hypothesis, Henderson is seen to have two major concerns. The 
first of these emerged in early 1917, as the ILP responded to changes in the procedures for 
electing the Labour executive which would work to the advantage of the trade union wing of 
the party.147 With relations between socialists and unionists at a particularly low ebb, there 
was talk in ILP circles of leaving the party. How seriously Henderson may have taken 
mutterings to this effect is questionable. Bridgen himself acknowledges that for the ILP the 
prospects for any new party ‘appeared bleak.’ An attempt to create one would have been ‘a 
gamble unworthy of the risk.’148 By the spring and early summer, suggests Bridgen, the 
matter had, anyway been overtaken by the different responses of ‘patriots’ and ‘pacifists’ 
towards the revolution in Russia, culminating in the USC sponsored Leeds convention in 
June. (Henderson was in Russia at the time of this controversial event, but was quick to 
condemn it on his return, declining ‘to have anything to do with any organisation 
established in this country which sought to set up in Great Britain bodies analogous to the 
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Russian Workmen’s and Soldiers’ Councils.’149) When news of the Leeds convention reached 
Russia this would, in Bridgen’s view, have strengthened Henderson’s perception ‘that the 
threat to Labour’s unity was becoming acute.’ This perception, combined with ‘his 
experiences in Russia....convinced Henderson to change his mind and support the 
Stockholm conference.’150 
 
Henderson’s experiences in Russia, in particular his supposed awareness that ‘a more 
extreme left-wing government’ there could encourage ‘pacifistic and revolutionary 
tendencies throughout Europe’ is the second of those major concerns which would push 
him not only to support Stockholm, but also the post-Stockholm internationalist 
campaign.151 Bridgen makes clear that in pursuing these ‘pacifist’ objectives Henderson was 
in reality trying to maintain his ‘patriotic’ position. By offering ‘pacifists’ within the party a 
programme with which they could readily identify, he helped ensure that there would be no 
significant radical defection. By setting limits as to how far the party would go in its new 
direction, he also ensured that the party remained fundamentally committed to the 
principal national war aim of defeating Prussian militarism.152 Henderson is seen then as 
pursuing the same ends as other ‘patriots’ (excluding the more chauvinistic supporters of 
the BWL). It was the means by which he believed these ends could best be achieved in 
which he differed from his fellow moderate ‘patriots’. Rather than confront and oppose the 
party minority, as had so often been the case in previous years, he would seek to appease 
them by offering them the least harmful of their goals as an all party project. 
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This is an argument which can obviously be used to diminish the significance of Henderson’s 
forays into the dangerous territory of a negotiated peace. More generally, it can diminish 
the wider internationalist campaign, making this appear less important to Henderson’s 
objectives than the need to confront the threat from the ‘pacifist’ left. But at least one 
aspect of Henderson’s activity in the latter months of the war would appear to go rather 
further than could be seen as necessary to curb the ILP and its supporters. Within moments 
of leaving the Cabinet room on 10 August 1917 following his final angry confrontation with 
Lloyd George, Henderson ran into Thomas Jones, an individual described by one historian as 
‘the solitary progressive member of the War Cabinet Secretariat.’153 Jones recalls him talking 
freely about the future of his party. As well as planning to develop a more critical stance 
towards the government, he hoped to ‘recast Labour representation in such a way as to 
bring in a larger infusion of the non-trade-unionists. He mentioned no names, but was 
clearly referring to the younger intellectuals who are keenly sympathetic with Labour.’154 
Speaking later in the year to Scott, Henderson confirmed his desire to ‘enlarge the bounds’ 
of his party and to bring in ‘intellectuals as candidates.’155 
 
These comments point to one significant aspect of Henderson’s party reorganisation: the 
creation of Advisory Committees, often staffed by new party members with appropriate 
expertise. Particular attention has been given by historians to the Advisory Committee on 
International Questions, which incorporated many disaffected Liberal recruits to the party, a 
significant number of which were members of, or sympathetic to, the UDC.156 One result of 
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this radical influx, it has been suggested, was that Labour party policy at the end of the war 
differed little from that of the UDC itself.157 Bridgen rejects this conclusion, drawing 
attention to some important differences of opinion between Labour politicians and liberal 
intellectuals on international affairs.158 But this was surely to be expected. In no 
organisation involved in discussion of foreign affairs, especially at the conclusion of a major 
war, were individuals agreed on every issue. Bridgen arguably makes a more telling point in 
stressing that an advisory committee can advise but not determine a party’s policy.159 Yet 
his view remains extremely revisionist and difficult to sustain. The influence of UDC 
individuals, and still more their ideas, does seem to have had taken Labour foreign policy 
into new ‘pacifist’ territory by the end of the war. 
 
As noted above, the peace by negotiations campaign lost much of its force during the final 
months of the war, becoming largely displaced by growing concerns over the peace terms 
the Allies might be tempted to impose when the war was brought to its conclusion. 
Henderson and his party were of course well prepared, having addressed this issue 
continuously since the previous summer. Central to this sustained endeavour had been the 
demand that Allied governments should open their war aims for public discussion. Largely 
perhaps as a result of this labour pressure, this demand was met at least in Britain when on 
5 January 1918 Lloyd George delivered (significantly to a trade union audience) a reasonably 
full statement of British war aims.160  
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Henderson commended the Prime Minister’s initiative at the Labour conference later that 
month.161 However, as a comprehensive set of peace proposals in conformity with labour 
views Lloyd George’s statement suffered in comparison with Woodrow Wilson’s ‘Fourteen 
Points’, which happened to be released a mere three days later.162 Wilson had been 
demonstrating his desire for a progressive peace over a long period of time, and the United 
States had been no party to the ‘secret treaties’ by this time released to the West by the 
Bolsheviks. Close comparison of the two leaders’ texts could moreover reveal omissions and 
equivocations in Lloyd George’s statement, which encouraged ‘pacifists’ to ask whether the 
British government would also endorse the American statement.163 This was a step the 
government, like those in Paris and Rome, was unwilling to take. Repeated efforts, 
culminating in a call from the Allied socialist conference in September for their governments 
to make ‘a public and collective declaration’ that they would subscribe to Wilson’s fourteen 
points were in vain.164 It was the German government the following month, having 
recognised that it was now defeated, which accepted the Fourteen Points, obviously in the 
hope of being granted a less punitive settlement than they could expect from the European 
Allies. 
 
If the German government hoped that Wilson’s terms would be less onerous than those 
desired by the European Allies, so too did the progressive community in Britain. For 
Henderson and his international colleagues this possibility inspired the strategy they 
adopted in 1918: the convening of an International Socialist conference to coincide with the 
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official peace congress. Henderson acknowledged that not all the Allied Governments could 
be ‘trusted, without reserve or qualification, to apply the principles of democracy in the 
peace settlement’, and clearly hoped that by holding the simultaneous Labour conference 
Wilson could be encouraged in his coming battle for a good peace.165 
 
Henderson also devoted much effort to winning domestic support for his programme. We 
can see this clearly in his much repeated advocacy of a ‘democratic’ or ‘peoples’ peace’. This 
meant in part a commitment to a new style of diplomacy. As he told the TUC in 1917, ‘we 
shall not allow [the peace settlement] to rest in the hands of diplomatists, secret 
plenipotentiaries, or politicians of the official stamp, unless they are prepared to have some 
regard for the opinion of the common people.’166 It also involved a concept of ‘democracy’ 
which went further than the much deployed propaganda argument which depicted the war 
as a conflict been inherently peace loving parliamentary democracies and autocracies 
constitutionally prone to militarist aggression.’167 This was for Henderson a concept which 
fused domestic and international concerns, drawing clear connections between a 
progressive peace and the political and economic advancement of working people in all 
nations. On detailed territorial questions regarding the peace Henderson was apparently 
prepared to be flexible, as the changing suggestions in successive war aims statements in 
relation to Alsace-Lorraine, to African colonies, and to the future of Austria-Hungary make 
clear.168 On economic arrangements for the post war period, and on the necessity for a 
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‘Supernational Authority’ to create a new basis for international relations, he was by 
contrast very consistent. 
 
Democracy was awake he declared, and aware of its power both at home and abroad.169 
The linking of progressive advance in the domestic and international spheres was to be a 
manifestation of that power. The League of Nations, to which he attached great importance, 
was not to be seen solely as ‘a barrier against aggressive militarism.’ He stressed also the 
‘constructive functions’ it could adopt in the social and economic spheres of member 
nations, notably on the question of ‘international labour legislation.’ Whilst there was an 
ongoing domestic debate over ‘reconstruction’ in Britain in which the Labour party was 
deeply involved, he also believed that equality of industrial conditions across countries 
would be an important factor in ‘promoting and maintaining friendly international 
relations’, not least by removing one of the more potent arguments in support of tariffs.170   
 
 Henderson envisaged a new world order which would see states cooperating both 
diplomatically and economically through the League of Nations to the benefit of all, and 
democratic governments removing the inequalities which had blighted their societies for 
centuries past. But all this depended in the first instance on the democratic peace 
settlement for which labour was calling, which would be responsible on the one hand for 
creating the League itself, but no less for creating the conditions under which all states 
would be willing to participate. Old international grievances would need to be removed and 
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the imposition of new injustices prevented.171 Freed from the age old resentments between 
nations and the insecurities that had perpetuated militarism and autocracy, harmony 
between peoples would encourage harmony between classes within individual states.172 
 
 The creation of a properly constituted League of Nations as part of a just and ameliorative 
peace was for Henderson a matter of world historical importance. But this was not merely 
for him a secular issue of peace and progress, but one that touched profoundly on his 
religious idealism, as the language in Aims of Labour often shows. In a pamphlet he wrote 
for the Brotherhood Movement on the eve of the peace conference he repeated his view of 
that humanity now faced a critical choice.173 But in addressing his fellow evangelicals he also 
laid emphasis on the role that they could and should play in reaffirming the certitudes of 
Christian faith, presenting to the people a new vision of life, and providing the moral 
leadership necessary to confront the problems of the day.174 He himself was in earnest in 
performing these tasks.175 
 
It was of course obvious that the crucial decisions he highlighted would be taken by 
governments, many of which were inclined to think in traditional ways - hence the 
importance to him of an international socialist campaign to supplement domestic activity, 
and in particular the convening of an international labour conference ‘to sit concurrently 
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with the official Conference.’176 There can be very little doubt as to the priority Henderson 
gave to this conference and its timing. Having been informed by 19 December that the 
official conference might open on either the 6th or 13th January, Henderson wrote lengthy 
letters the same day to the Secretary of the French Socialist Party, to Branting, to 
Vandervelde and to Gompers, as well as a telegram to Huysmans, whom he urged to 
proceed straight to Lausanne (where the socialist conference was at this time expected to 
be staged).177 Two things stand out in these letters: firstly, the sheer scale of the procedural, 
practical and political obstacles that needed to be overcome before the conference could be 
convened; and secondly, Henderson’s anxiety that his colleagues were as yet not applying 
themselves sufficiently to the overcoming of these obstacles to ensure that the labour 
conference could also open by early or mid-January. 
 
In the event, and largely as a consequence of Henderson’s sense of urgency, the Berne 
Conference opened on 3 February, only sixteen days after the formal commencement of the 
Paris peace conference. It was clear from the start what was envisaged as its main purpose. 
Branting, in his opening address, lavished praise on President Wilson, declaring him ‘a 
pioneer of the International policy of the working class’ and offering him the support of the 
representatives of that class there assembled. With this vital backing those in Paris bent on 
‘muddling’ the President’s programme could more easily be thwarted.178 As the conference 
proceeded however this central goal became overshadowed by other concerns, on which 
delegates were in strong disagreement. This was a matter of disappointment to Henderson, 
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who had long stressed the importance to democratic forces of concentrating their power 
through ‘unity of purpose and action.’ There would inevitably be disagreements ‘regarding 
the methods by which our aims and ideals may be achieved,’ he had conceded, but ‘a 
greater disposition on all sides to seek accommodation’ could keep these differences in 
check.179 Unity and purpose at Berne however were not wholly achieved, as two major 
internecine conflicts were to impose themselves on the conference. 
 
The first of these was over the unwillingness of many of the Allied ‘patriots’ to forgive or 
forget the ‘crimes.....towards Socialism’ of the enemy majorities in supporting the 
aggression of their governments.180 In a memorandum prior to the conference Henderson 
and Huysmans had stressed that the purpose of this gathering was not to settle 
longstanding differences between majority and minority socialists or to engage in divisive 
debate on the origins of the war.’181 Albert Thomas and his supporters clearly felt otherwise 
and two days of bitter debate predictably followed.182 Largely due to the efforts of 
Henderson and the British delegation the issue of war responsibility was eventually 
deflected to some future date, permitting the conference to move on to areas on which 
some consensus could be reached.183 Henderson was duly praised in the German press.184 
At the time however he was clearly frustrated. Speaking after the squabble surrounding the 
German socialists he expressed his concern to delegates, stating that he was ‘not sure that 
we are doing all we can to speak effectively to the Paris Conference or that we are bringing 
to bear the fullest measure of our influence for practical purposes.’ The remainder of his 
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address focused on several of the topics over which the Paris conference was then 
deliberating, which were of vital concern to ‘the peoples whom we represent.’185 The object 
of Berne was, in short, precisely as had been stated in the earlier Henderson/Huysmans 
memorandum, ‘to give the advice of Labour on the solution of the questions submitted to 
the examination of the Diplomatic Conference.’186 Or, as many might have put it, to 
discourage the peacemakers from reverting to the ills of Old Diplomacy!  
 
A second divisive issue was brought forth towards the end on the conference: that of 
Bolshevism. It appears that the organising committee of the conference (which included 
Henderson) had initially hoped to avoid this discussion. When faced with demands from 
both left and right to permit the debate, the topic was placed at the bottom of agenda, 
perhaps in the hope that time would run out for it. In the event the closing of the 
conference was delayed, so that the protagonists could have their say. 187 In the predictable 
absence of any agreement, two opposed resolutions were presented under the heading of 
‘Democracy versus Dictatorship’. The majority of delegates supported a resolution 
presented by Branting critical of the political methods employed by the Bolsheviks. A 
minority backed the joint resolution of Longuet and the Austrian, Friedrich Adler, which 
objected to the stigmatisation and the passing of premature judgement on the Russian 
government, which could only support ‘the manoeuvres and interested calumnies of 
bourgeois governments.’188  
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Henderson initially opted not to speak in this debate, leaving MacDonald to address the 
conference on behalf of the British. Only when he felt himself traduced by some remarks of 
Adler’s did he intervene and declare his sympathy with Branting’s view.189 Henderson did in 
the end make his position on Bolshevism ‘abundantly clear’.190 But his initial unwillingness 
to take part in this debate shows no less clearly where his priorities lay at this time. What 
we have shown above regarding his determination to bring about the Berne conference, 
and the strong sense of what he conceived as its main objective, powerfully support the 
central proposition of this thesis: that his actions in the international socialist arena 
following his visit to Russia were principally oriented to fulfilling the stipulations for a 
socialist peace articulated in February 1915. 
 
His powerful reaction to the peace terms which soon emerged further demonstrates the 
validity of this proposition. In a sixteen page pamphlet of 1 June he utterly condemned the 
terms being presented to the Germans by the victorious Allies. The details of these terms 
were shown in many cases to be inconsistent with ‘Labour’s conception of a Peace of justice 
and right’, as well as at odds with Wilson’s Fourteen Points. But the treaty was defective not 
just in so many of its individual provisions, but more fundamentally in the fact that it was 
based on 
 
......the very political principles or premises which were the ultimate cause of this war, 
and which must, if adhered to, produce not only other wars, but a perpetuation in peace 
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 LHA, Report of the Berne conference, LSI 6/658. 
190
 Wrigley, Henderson, p.129. 
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Characteristically Henderson refused to despair. Over the following years he continued to 
work to undo the damage he believed had been created by the Versailles settlement, in the 
first place by calling for treaty revision, but increasingly later, especially in his final years, to 
promote the role of the League of Nations in the conduct of international affairs and to 
preside over the hoped for comprehensive process of universal disarmament. This chapter 
has attempted to show that a single broad purpose, commencing on or around 17 July 1917 
and terminating with the Presidency of the Disarmament Conference and the award of the 
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This thesis naturally divides into two parts: the first of these parts constitutes a 
historiographical critique of the Russo-centric standard account of Henderson’s actions in 
the summer of 1917. This critique can be delivered with a good deal of confidence. As has 
been demonstrated in Chapters Two and Three above, the narratives we have been 
provided over the past hundred years clearly fail to withstand close scrutiny. The second 
part of the thesis incorporates what may best be described as preliminary ideas regarding 
the shape of a more convincing narrative which could take the place of these older 
accounts. This is by necessity a more speculative endeavour. But is speculation not 
inevitable when dealing with a character as unrevealing of his ‘thinking processes’ as Arthur 
Henderson? It could certainly be argued that all the historians who have between them 
developed the standard account share one rather significant speculative assumption: that 
Henderson’s statements during the course of the Stockholm campaign accurately and fully 
reflected his underlying ideas and motives. The principal assumption guiding this thesis is 
different. In applying a ‘high politics’ analysis to Henderson actions and statements we have 
seen that his words were carefully designed to achieve outcomes about which he was less 
than transparent. The course adopted in this study has been therefore one of informed 
conjecture, from which any hard and fast certainties cannot be expected. We are left then in 
the realms of plausibility and coherence. What sort of narrative can be constructed which 
most plausibly fits with the available evidence and also enables the episode as a whole to 
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appear coherent? The central proposition of this thesis is that the narrative offered here 
comes closer to meeting these criteria than hitherto established accounts. 
 
The Stockholm episode has always posed a number of key questions. Where, firstly, lay 
Henderson’s driving concern: Russia or Britain? To choose Russia as the answer to this 
question can be justified by Henderson’s own statements. But we should be able to answer 
an important further question. If Henderson believed that British attendance at Stockholm 
would assist the revolutionary regime in Petrograd how exactly did he imagine this would be 
achieved. On this his own words are unconvincing. The only specific way in which he 
suggests British labour at Stockholm would influence events in Russia is through 
‘educational propaganda work’, by which misrepresentations of Allied war aims could be 
challenged.1 On the face of it this seems more of a benefit to Britain than to Russia. 
Historians have been understandably keen to find a fuller answer and have been massively 
helped in this quest by the subsequent Bolshevik revolution.    
 
We have seen that Henderson would later accept retrospective credit for having tried to 
avert this unhappy event. Evidence that Henderson anticipated the Bolshevik takeover, 
whether during his stay in Russia or during the course of his domestic campaign, is however 
conspicuously lacking. It seems likely that the political and ideological battle between 
Mensheviks and Bolsheviks assumed its significance for Henderson’s Stockholm decision 
only later when that battle had reached its decisive dénouement. But this battle was fought 
and eventually won on Russian soil and it is highly questionable whether the Stockholm 
conference could have had much influence on its outcome. It was certainly the case that 
                                                 
1
 Hansard, H C Debs, Vol.96, cc: 2195-2196, 1 August 1917; Peter Stansky, ed., The Left and War: the British 
Labour Party and World War1 (New York, 1969), pp: 222-229. 
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Mensheviks and Bolsheviks had opposing views on the conference, but it hardly follows 
from this that its convention could of itself have significantly weakened the Bolsheviks. 
What might have mattered, on the other hand, was what the conference could have 
achieved. 
 
We know what the Mensheviks hoped it would achieve. By forging a united socialist 
response to the war, pressures could be generated on the belligerent states to secure an 
early peace. Any such peace would represent a massive boost to Russia’s moderate 
socialists. Amongst the several factors that allowed the Bolsheviks to gather popular 
support, the continuation of the war was among the most potent. For the Mensheviks then, 
an international conference which really could harness the massed ranks of world labour in 
favour of peace would have been an immense blessing. Henderson, we know, was aware of 
this, but aware also that the sort of peace the Russians might well settle for would amount 
for the Allies to a ‘general surrender’.2 We have also seen how strongly he objected to the 
Russian determination to create a mandatory conference. Henderson was not going to lead 
his party to Stockholm in order to have it told that it must henceforth actively oppose the 
British government. But had he succeeded in securing the consultative conference he 
apparently desired, the outcome would surely have given fuel to Bolshevik propaganda. It 
was after all a significant part of that propaganda that the majority socialists of the 
belligerent nations had sold out to their imperialist masters. In publicly affirming their 
support for their own governments’ continuation of the war Allied socialists would, in the 
view of Bolsheviks and others on the far Russian left, be condemning themselves out of their 
own mouths. 
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We cannot assume that Henderson would have had any confidence that British attendance 
at Stockholm, on terms he would accept, could have benefitted in any significant way those 
in Russia he wished to support. The view that he did believe this was most fully articulated 
not by Henderson himself but by Hamilton in her 1938 biography. Hamilton’s opinion on 
this, though never directly refuted by subsequent historians, has long given way to the 
emphasis on the wider international threat posed by Bolshevism, not least to the British 
Labour party, presented by Winter in 1972. Winter’s article then allows us to conclude that 
the political situation in Britain was probably of more concern to Henderson than that of 
Russia. This is certainly realistic. The evidence suggests that Henderson was fully aware that 
there was little he could do to influence events in Russia. In Britain however, as a member 
of the War Cabinet and leader of a political party, he was more significantly empowered. 
 
This brings us to a second key question: what issue in domestic British politics was he 
determined to address?  Winter’s apparent view, now a longstanding orthodoxy, is that the 
danger of Bolshevism or Bolshevik inspired radicalism taking a grip on the Labour party 
became a major concern for Henderson to which his volte face on Stockholm provided a 
potential solution. This hypothesis however suffers from precisely the same defects as the 
earlier position favoured by Hamilton. In the first place it rests on an extraordinarily flimsy 
evidential base. Henderson’s untypical hyperbole in the opening sentences of his article 
‘Revolution or Compromise’ largely provides the foundation for Winter’s argument that 
refashioning the Labour party as a ‘moderate socialist alternative to extra-parliamentary 
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action or even revolution itself....’ was an important ‘legacy of  his experience in Russia.’3 
But a full reading of Henderson’s late 1917 articles as gathered together in The Aims of 
Labour reveals a much greater concern for the forthcoming peace settlement than it does 
for any Bolshevist threat to the Labour party. And as argued above, the widening of the 
franchise provides a more obvious and compelling explanation for party reform at this time.  
 
 And again, it is not at all obvious how Stockholm plays into this possible concern. Winter 
suggests that ‘Revolution or Compromise’ was written ‘shortly after’ the Bolshevik 
revolution.4 Henderson’s decision to support British attendance at Stockholm took place 
several months earlier when he appears to have been discounting such a revolution. 
Moreover, it is again the case that no credible way has been suggested in which Henderson 
may have perceived that the presence of a British delegation at Stockholm could have had 
the effect of reducing militant tendencies in his party. The most obvious effect of such a 
presence would surely have been to encourage the ‘pacifists’ in labour ranks. How this could 
have spawned a more moderate demeanour in the party post-war is decidedly unclear. 
 
The alternative view offered here – that Henderson became convinced whilst in Russia that 
the British Labour party should not continue to stand aside from the revival of socialist 
internationalism both inspired by and conspicuous within the Russian revolution – certainly 
appears to be a more straightforward explanation than those considered above of his 
decision to back the proposed Stockholm conference. Exactly how he perceived this change 
of direction becoming established when he returned to Britain must remain unknown, and 
                                                 
3
 J. M. Winter, ‘Arthur Henderson, the Russian Revolution, and the Reconstruction of the Labour Party’, 





could hardly have been fully clear to him at the time.  We can however see, and have 
endeavoured to trace in this thesis, the path that he eventually persuaded his party to 
follow over the remaining period of the war and indeed beyond.  
 
The view of Henderson’s Stockholm campaign elaborated here clearly places his actions in a 
very different context from that provided in traditional Russo-centric accounts. This is the 
context referred to in Chapter One above in which the government of which Henderson was 
a part sought to challenge the rising domestic concerns over the cost and longevity of the 
war, and the canvassing, mostly from abroad, of suggestions by which the war might be 
terminated short of a decisive Allied victory. The first eight months of 1917 brought forth 
the interventions of Woodrow Wilson, the calls of the Provisional Government in Russia for 
a conference on Allied war aims, the Reichstag resolution in Berlin, as well as peace 
proposals emerging from the Vatican. Seeing these interventions as a threat to the patriotic 
consensus in Britain the Coalition government sought ways to reinvigorate this consensus. It 
is a significant coincidence, not generally noted in earlier accounts of Henderson’s departure 
from the government, that an important part of the War Cabinet’s response to these 
developments – the creation of the National War Aims Committee - emerged at precisely 
the moment that Henderson was demonstrating his own readiness to engage in war aims 
discussions with foreign socialists. The NWAC was of course designed to discourage 
discussion about specific war aims or speculation on peace, reasserting instead the original 
spirit of the patriotic consensus and the need to remain steadfast and united in the 
continuing and necessary struggle.5 
 
                                                 
5
 See the report of the NWAC launch, including Lloyd George’s address, in The Times, 6 August, 1917, p.4. 
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Henderson and Lloyd George were quite plainly at cross purposes. Henderson, we must 
assume, knew this all along, but succeeded in keeping this reality from his Prime Minister 
until after he had achieved his initial goal at the Labour conference of 10 August. His 
removal from office was thereafter inevitable. Whilst this thesis has been principally 
concerned with providing a better understanding of Henderson’s actions in this period, the 
highlighting of this particular context, rather than that of Russia or Bolshevism, offers a new 
dimension to the discussion of these events. Henderson may be seen in these terms as 
facing the same dilemma as many of the nation’s progressives who had committed to the 
war in 1914 but now felt some unease over the chronic uncertainty of the war’s duration 
and the nature of the eventual settlement which would follow.6 Henderson however 
differed significantly from the rest in that he found a politically effective way of marshalling 
these concerns. 
 
His achievement in leading the bulk of the Labour party towards an independent and 
challenging position on war aims during the final period of the war has long been recognised 
as considerable. It has however in all probability been understated. Traditional accounts, 
although they treat his failed campaign for Stockholm with sympathy, can really only begin 
evaluating his subsequent achievement from the point at which he was removed from the 
Cabinet, an outcome that he has been believed never to have sought. The preceding month 
has tended to appear as something of a muddle. Initially persuaded that a reversal of his 
party’s stance on the Stockholm conference could in some way shore up the Kerensky 
                                                 
6
 The editor of the progressive Westminster Gazette recalled in his memoirs the many letters he had received 
at this time from people who had ‘tired of mere denunciation of the enemy and would not be starved of 
argument and reason.’ The struggle to retain faith in his earlier views of the fictional Mr Britling, in a book that 
attained a vast readership in 1917, also points to this unease amongst progressive opinion, see H. G. Wells, Mr. 
Britling Sees It Through (London, 1916). 
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government and its ‘moderate’ socialist supporters against the threat of Bolshevism (always 
an unlikely proposition), he pursued this objective following his return to Britain for long 
past the point that its failure was inevitable. Whether driven by some self-defeating 
stubborn assurance in the correctness of his judgement on Russia, or anger at his 
humiliation on the ‘doormat’, he succeeded only in bringing about his supposed unwanted 
dismissal from the War Cabinet. Only as a result of these somewhat curious proceedings, so 
we have been led to believe, did he finally find himself in a position to lead his party in a 
direction its majority had hitherto strongly opposed. 
 
The conclusion reached by this thesis is that the above is essentially untenable and that the 
best available alternative explanation for the period concerned rests instead on the 
proposition that when Henderson did decide to reverse his position on Stockholm this 
decision was merely the initial element in a much wider determination regarding his party’s 
existing political stance. The fuller details of his political planning during the summer of 
1917 will always remain obscure, but we have presented at least some plausible 
speculations based on the assumption that his ultimate objective seems to have been the 
securing of a progressive peace, by this stage of the war a real possibility given the positions 
shared by the two new Allied governments of Washington and Petrograd. In taking such a 
far reaching decision whilst so far from British shores Henderson was surely impelled by a 
deep sense of personal conviction, sufficient to overcome the expectation he must have had 
of future political difficulties. This being so, we must surely conclude that the campaign for 
Stockholm, the departure from the War Cabinet, and the subsequent internationalist 
programme, can best be seen as a single unfolding political process. And in viewing this long 
and difficult process, we may also bear witness to an extraordinary combination of stamina, 
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